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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I examine the ambivalent engagement of psychoanalysis 
with questions of ‘race’ and racial difference and I argue that there are yet 
unacknowledged colonial legacies entrenched in psychoanalytic theories of 
subjectivity. Against post-colonial critiques dismissing psychoanalysis altogether 
becaused of its racial assumptions, this project adopts a psychosocial position 
and raises an epistemological question about the nature and forms of knowledge 
produced once we acknowledge the intricate, historical relationship between 
psychoanalysis and coloniality. In particular, I propose that a constructive way 
into the question of ‘race’ and psychoanalysis is to systematically trace and 
contextualise the anachronistic references to internalisation as ‘cannibalistic.’ 
As theorised in this work, the cannibal trope belongs to a long historical 
genealogy tied to the European medieval persecutions against witches eating 
their new-borns, to anti-Semitic stereotypes against Jews feasting on Christian 
boys before Easter (‘blood libel’), in order to become amalgamated in the 
European discourse of ‘race’ and racial difference during the colonisation of the 
Americas—the word cannibal etymologically derives from the word ‘Carib’, the 
native of the Caribbean islands. As a distinct representation of Europe’s others, 
the cannibal trope made its way into literature, anthropology and psychoanalysis 
and constitutes a symbolic reminder of colonial afterlife. 
To formulate psychological development as a process based on ‘taking in’ social 
norms, structures and objects, pioneer psychoanalytic figures like Sigmund Freud 
and Melanie Klein relied on the colonial aesthetics of devourment, unwittingly 
ascribing racial and gendered assumptions to the psychoanalytic subject. Using 
their works as case studies the thesis then moves on to explore psychoanalysis 
in British and French colonies. Looking at the case of Géza Róheim, the first 
anthropologically trained psychoanalyst, as well as the psychiatrist and pioneer 
post-colonial thinker Frantz Fanon, I show that although the question of 
cultural difference has been examined by psychoanalysts, without reflecting 
on the political dynamics of racialised violence and colonial domination, 
psychoanalysis until the early 1960s, leaves the question of ‘race’ unresolved. 
5As repressed components of European culture, colonial tropes are encountered 
in the margins of major psychoanalytic texts (many of which still used in 
psychoanalytic and psychodynamic training curriculums). As such they can 
be methodologically accessed only by paying attention to affects, footnotes, 
references, metaphors and tropes that drag psychoanalysis out of its apparent 
timelessness. By focusing on the forms of knowledge contained in the margins, 
this project uncovers unspoken colonial affects and shows that whilst ‘race’ has 
been forced into silence, the references to the cannibal trope help us rewrite 
psychoanalytic theory by working through the traces of its colonial reminiscences. 
Keywords: Psychoanalysis, coloniality, race, cannibalism, psychosocial, 
subjectivity
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1.1 ‘Well, how would you know?’ A psychosocial hors d’oeuvre
My relationship with psychoanalysis begins with my experience of being a 
patient. What brought me to analysis, in the first place, was a general feeling 
of discomfort and unhappiness emerging from my homosexuality and my 
difficulties in accepting it. During my earliest sessions, psychoanalysis made me 
feel angry and confused. The absence of concrete guidelines and norms made 
me unsettled; what kind of structure was this? Why do I have to be a ‘patient,’ 
to literally wait in order to experience change? What kind of change comes 
from waiting? During one of these emotionally challenging and turbulent first 
sessions, I said to my therapist that I felt she could never understand me because 
she was not gay. I still remember her answer, which seems as entertaining as it 
seemed seven years ago: ‘well, if I were gay, how would you know?’ 
My first thought was that her bravery and willingness to identify with the gay 
community seemed so profound, that she must definitely have wanted to help 
me. As years went by, I gradually began to realise that it was not so much an 
identification—a statement ‘she could be one of us—’ but a statement that 
asked me to consider an element of doubt when judging the other’s sexuality; an 
invitation to consider the possibility that one cannot know the other entirely. 
The major breakthrough that psychoanalysis had brought to my life was to open 
up a space of curiosity and uncertainty, to help me survive through feelings of 
anxiety that emerge from not-knowing and not being able to acquire answers 
with certainty. Moreover, I realised what was at stake when taking refuge in 
preformulated assumptions about female homosexuality, or other issues and I 
started exploring my own fantasies about what a gay woman looks like, how her 
femininity is or should be performed. 
A different encounter with psychoanalysis was at the very beginning of this 
project, in 2014, when I watched a documentary called Black Psychoanalysts 
Speak, which was produced and released by the biggest online psychoanalytic 
library, Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing (pep-web) and featured American 
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psychoanalysts speaking about challenges of cultural, ethnic and racial difference 
in analytic training and practice.1 The film was produced as a continuation 
of a dialogue between black psychoanalysts in a 2012 conference on black 
psychoanalysts, organised by the Institute of Psychoanalytic Training and 
Research (IPTAR) in New York. In the film, analysts of colour raised important 
questions about how racial and ethnic differences can be held accountable within 
psychoanalytic practice, what kind of challenges they present and whether 
and how racism is embedded among practitioners and training curriculums. 
Diversity inside the psychoanalytic institutions and consulting rooms, an analyst 
named Anton Hart claims in the documentary, is not a matter of ‘competency’—
namely, the analyst’s capacity to be able to listen and tolerate otherness without 
becoming judgmental.2 Dealing with diversity is not a skill to be taught, it is the 
central question of psychoanalysis: how to be ‘radically undefended’ (his words), 
genuinely open and curious about the experiences and backgrounds the patients 
bring in the consulting room. As I understood the difference between the two 
terms, it is a question of whether diversity, in the domain of the psychoanalytic, 
is preserved as such—a form of natural pluralism, a polyphony in the way bodies 
can exist, perform and connect—or whether diversity must necessarily come 
under the sway of political asymmetry: some bodies are victimised, separated, 
identified, marked and carved through sexism, racism, homophobia, anti-
Semitism and other forms of social violence. 
This project was born from my personal, burning question of how psychoanalysis 
deals with diversity, difference and differentiation. It is a question of how 
psychoanalysis thinks of otherness, if it does not speak from a position of 
sameness, but of unknowability. Like my therapist said: how does one know about 
the other? And what does the erasure of the possibility to not-know the other 
entirely do? At that time, whilst being preoccupied with questions of diversity, 
it seemed reasonable to begin by exploring those instances where diversity and 
differentiation fail: where boundaries collapse, difference dissolves into union 
and individuality is deprived. I became attracted to concepts of consumption and 
their theoretical currency, but a major breakthrough came when I watched the 
1991 Jonathan Demme film The Silence of the Lambs, an extraordinary thriller 
about monstrosity and transgression. 
1 Basia Winograd, Black Psychoanalysts Speak (PEP Video Grants 1(1):1, 2014).
2 Winograd.
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The film is about a female FBI agent (Clarice Starling) consulting an imprisoned 
psychiatrist for having eaten one of his patients (Hannibal Lecter) to help her 
arrest one of his former patients, a serial-killer (Buffalo Bill). In the film, the 
characters emerge out of messy power and gender relations. The serial-killer, 
Buffalo Bull murders women to tailor a skin-costume that would suit the female 
body he wishes to have. As we learn from Hannibal Lecter, his psychiatrist, 
Buffalo Bill ‘is a man at odds with gender identity or sexual identity and his 
self-presentation is a confused mosaic of signifiers.’3 Buffalo Bill is a monster not 
only because he murders, neither only because he denounces his masculinity as 
Judith Halberstam argued, but because his confusion cannot be contained and 
worked through. His fragmented and undone identity, his unmanaged envy for 
the female body is projected externally with murderous rage against women and 
with castrating hatred against his own body. Against this quasi trans-man there 
is an omnipotent, manipulating monster representing another form of castration 
threat: the psychiatrist Hannibal Lecter who literally and metaphorically invades 
his victims’ minds. While in prison, he manipulates the FBI agent Clarice Starling 
interviewing him, he asks about her dreams, her fears and fantasies. Lecter forces 
her into an analytic relationship and ironically, despite their close relationship 
she does not get eaten throughout the trilogy—their sexual difference helps her 
survive. Lecter is ‘an unusual threat to society not simply because he murders 
people and consumes them, but because as a psychiatrist he has access to minds.’4 
For Halberstam, Lecter is a monster that creates monsters out of his patients 
‘as an inverted model of his own pathology.’5 If Lecter’s wish is to consume his 
patients, Buffalo Bill’s is to ‘dress in’ his victims.6 One is incorporating, the other 
is projecting, and both vacillate between their pathologies and the borders of 
their masculinities. 
I found the film—and Judith Halberstam’s analysis of the plot—not flattering for 
the psychoanalytic relationship. Halberstam’s analysis seems to miss a crucial 
aspect about the film. She writes: ‘The Silence of the Lambs is a horror film that, 
for once, is not designed to scare women, it scares men instead with the image 
of a fragmented and fragile masculinity, a male body disowning the penis.’7 It 
3 Judith Halberstam, “Skinflick: Posthuman Gender in Jonathan Demme’s The Silence of the 
Lambs,” Camera Obscura 9, no. 3 (1991): 41.
4 Halberstam, 39.
5 Halberstam, 42.
6 Halberstam, 42.
7 Halberstam, 41.
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seems unlikely that the film does not scare women; the female characters are 
manipulated, tricked, seduced, kidnapped, perpetrated, murdered, skinned, 
dissected. Clarise Starling is the only female character who mediates between 
the two violent masculinities, Lecter’s and Bill’s, subjecting to the manipulation 
of the one monster and pursuing the other. Halberstam concludes that in the 
film the horror is psychology: 
‘[A] bad therapeutic relationship, a fine romance between the one 
who knows and the one who eats, the one who eats and the one who 
grows skins; the one who castrates and the one who enacts a parody 
of circumcision. Psychology is no longer an explanation for horror, it 
generates horror, it founds its most basic fantasies and demands their 
enactment in the name of transference and truth.’8 
But I would like to add that the horror is also a heteronormative patriarchal 
psychology and the anxieties of masculinity in the absence of or liminal presence 
of sexual difference. While Hannibal devours the brains of his (male) patients 
‘with fava beans and a nice chianti’ as he narcissistically declares, he refrains 
from eating Starling.9 Halberstam’s point ‘Hannibal analyses people to death,’ 
seems to be missing something important about the role of sexual difference in 
the play—and I would argue in psychoanalysis too.10
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that something about this horrific 
portrayal of psychoanalysis in Hollywood triggered me to begin exploring the 
relationship between those popular fears of being devoured by the analytic 
relationship and the account of devourment found within psychoanalytic 
discourse. Exploring the relationship between consumption, transgression 
and differentiation, the cannibal trope allowed me to open up  a space from 
where to investigate anxieties about otherness, sameness, and bodily boundaries 
from a psychoanalytic perspective. The cannibal trope soon became an 
opaque shibboleth that I could not decode, but had nonetheless put words, not 
meaning, to my frustration. Cannibalism remained for me an empty signifier, 
which was invested with too much meaning at the same time. On the one 
hand, the cannibal trope stood as a grotesque imagery of undifferentiation, 
of a threatening, pervasive, homosexual masculinity, of the proximity of the
8 Halberstam, 47.
9 Jonathan Demme, The Silence of the Lambs, Horror (Orion Pictures, 1991).
10 Halberstam, “Skinflick: Posthuman Gender in Jonathan Demme’s The Silence of the Lambs,” 
44.
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analytic relationship and so on. On the other, it felt like a concept without an 
opposite and hence, impossible to be defined—let alone resisted. In Western 
epistemology concepts are traditionally defined in relation to something else. 
If cannibalism symbolises an act of a human eating another human, then 
is withdrawal from the act the only possibility of negating cannibalism? The 
film implied that sexual difference could be a place from where to think of the 
cannibal trope and difference; like the vital distance between Hannibal Lecter 
and Clarise Starling—a relationship, otherwise immersed into psychological 
violence and coercion. 
Through my personal clinical experience as a psychoanalytic patient, 
psychoanalysis seemed to manage the unique tension of allowing difference 
without consuming it; containing and undoing the subject, dissolving and re-
stitching identity together, like Buffalo Bill’s skin-suit, but without the murderous 
impulse. Psychoanalysis for me was, if you like, a different form of cannibalism; 
a new form of eating that is not done to kill and annihilate, but to nurture, to 
develop and to enjoy. It was finding the possibility of this new form of subjectivity 
that motivated me personally throughout this project and led me, eventually, to 
question the content of psychoanalytic theory, its history and the discipline’s 
own fantasies about consuming others. The cannibal trope unexpectedly had 
cropped into as a theme that would offer a useful angle into these questions. In 
the documentary Black Psychoanalysts Speak, I was more than delighted to hear 
an American psychoanalyst, Dorothy Holmes, juxtaposing to the imaginary of 
cannibalism a less gruesome, more enjoyable culinary imaginary of the process 
of psychoanalysis:   
‘The implications […] of psychoanalysis, and another reason why as a black 
person—and just as a person—I find it so meaningful, is because it is essentially 
radical. The whole purpose of psychoanalysis is to stir the pot, not by actually 
turning up the heat so high. It’s more like slowly. It’s more like when you prepare 
a stew. Heat is being applied, but rather gently, to loosen up the tough fibres and 
to make the person more pliable, more supple, more flexible, more agile, and more 
delicious.’11
11 Winograd, Black Psychoanalysts Speak.
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1.2 Introduction: Critiquing Psychoanalysis  
In psychoanalysis, there is a sense that sexuality is the only marker of difference 
inscribed on the body. On the one hand, sexuality seems indeed to be the 
primary driving force of individuals; it is a source of creativity, pleasure, 
confusion, experimentation, connection and communication. On the other 
hand, the diffusion of psychoanalysis outside Europe, with the simultaneous 
explosive growth of the need for psychoanalytic or psychoanalytically informed 
treatments amongst marginalised ethnic communities seems to suggest that 
it is more appropriate than ever to raise questions about the role of race and 
racial difference in psychoanalysis. Are unconscious structures universally 
shared or do they differ among ethnic groups? How does cultural difference 
inform masculinity and femininity and their unconscious fantasies? Is race and 
experiences of racialisation important in psychoanalytic practice? Are we raced 
subjects and how can we account for this, psychoanalytically? When posing 
these questions in contemporary psychoanalytic practice and psychodynamic 
training, one can be overwhelmed by a series of resistances, and interpretations. 
In a discipline where everything can be an utterance, critique needs to come 
well-thought through and substantiated.
While the need for a radical reformulation of the psychoanalytic orthodoxies 
might seem a relevant and exigent claim, one would be forgiven for arguing that 
the main radicalism of psychoanalysis is precisely its refusal to uncontestedly 
change. A great breakthrough of psychoanalysis relies on its stability and integrity, 
on the perseverance of a cure through speech, which welcomes repetitive returns 
to worn-out narratives of one’s self, and maintains an unrushed, time-consuming 
rhythm. It is the consulting room where pauses, silences and inertia are allowed 
to occur. And while during the past century the Western world has frantically 
changed and transitioned through different political regimes—from the collapse 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the emergence of nation-states, to the 
murderous power of totalitarianism, the Cold War, the fall of communism and 
the contemporary neoliberal enterprise—there is a sense that the practice of 
psychoanalysis has stubbornly, and rightly so, not followed. 
This is not to say, however, that there have not been significant debates within 
the institutes of psychoanalysis advocating for the reconsideration of, and shift 
in, traditional views on for instance, female sexuality and homosexuality, like the 
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‘great debate’ of the 1920s and 1930s, and the proliferation of feminist critiques 
towards psychoanalysis in the 1970s. Most recently, criticisms sprang from the 
space of post-colonial studies which during the 1990s engaged in meticulous 
and powerful reviews of the ways the psychoanalytic subject entertains, as one 
critic put it, ‘equation of an unmarked whiteness with its norm of subjectivity,’12 
which is afforded at the cost of silencing the racial, female other. What is at 
stake in these arguments is the question of whether and how race, as a socially 
constructed category, is involved in the theorisation of psychic life, and how the 
representations of the psychoanalytic subject reiterate, challenge or bypass these 
ethnic and racial social distinctions. In other words, how does psychoanalysis 
approach the question of race, not as a biological difference, but as Stuart Hall 
put it as a ‘discursive regime’ whose ‘elements function discursively which enables 
it to have “real effects”?’13 If race and racism come to life through discourses, 
through systems of symbolic representation, did psychoanalysis partake in these 
discourses as a discipline; i.e. was it formed and shaped through hegemonic ideas 
about race, and does it have to offer a different viewpoint, a new perspective on 
these discursively constructed prejudices? These are the sets of questions that 
come to life in the interdisciplinary dialogue between post-colonial theory and 
psychoanalysis. 
Nevertheless, to argue, as many critics have done, that the ‘conceit of whiteness,’14 
or the ‘unacknowledged whiteness’15 of the imagined psychoanalytic subject 
must be examined through the same epistemological tools that have explored 
and deconstructed Western literature and film, psychology, anthropology and 
so on, is an argument that does no favours to post-colonial theory. We must 
avoid the error of lumping together European epistemes, with different histories 
and genealogies, in the search for diversity and pluralism, or we merely—and 
paradoxically—reiterate the logistics and effects of the same power relations we 
are trying to critique. As Jacqueline Rose argued, in her response to feminist 
criticisms about psychoanalysis as apolitical, it is important to avoid the fallacy 
of a pure, unproblematic and ‘wholly satisfactory’ theory for the subject and 
maintain a relation of pragmatism as to what psychoanalysis can and cannot 
14 Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, “The Primitive as Analyst: Postcolonial Feminism’s Access to 
Psychoanalysis,” Cultural Critique, University of Minnesota Press, 28 (1994): 178.
15 Jean Walton, “Re-Placing Race in (White) Psychoanalytic Discourse: Founding Narratives of 
Feminism,” Critical Inquiry 21, no. 4 (1995): 775–804.
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offer, while simultaneously maintaining its status as a therapeutic practice.16 
Paradoxically, the critical statements about how the psychoanalytic subject 
is implicitly white and male, whose agency is built upon the silencing of the 
black woman, only reaffirm the racial asymmetries that they seek to undo. The 
work of Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks is a good example of this. In her critique of 
psychoanalysis, Crooks neglects to account for its foundational premise: the 
unconscious as the agency which aborts any attempts at foreclosing identity. 
Crooks believes that it is impossible to use ‘psychoanalysis (or ethnopsychology) 
to describe the subproletariat woman as an already constituted, thus wholly 
accessible subject.’17 In this claim lies the paradox which undermines Crooks’ 
argument: namely that from a psychoanalytic point of view such an account 
of an ‘already constituted, thus wholly accessible subject’ is an impossibility 
and a fantasy. I will be arguing that we need to maintain the radical openness 
of psychoanalysis, alongside the fact that it cannot provide a reading of racial 
difference that will ultimately override and shut down racism. This does not 
mean that I endorse the perspective that racism and racial discriminations are 
aspects of everyday reality that one should ensconce themselves with or give 
up fighting against. But rather, what I am suggesting is to attune to the fact that 
diversity is uncomfortable, and racism—as a set of certainties and prejudices—
shuts down this discomfort by claiming to know the other. What we need to do 
is to hold on to the traces of racist imageries—those moments that foreclose 
or deny unknowingness - within psychoanalysis and listen to what kind of 
discomfort they are trying to disclose.
1.3 The Cannibal Trope as a Psychosocial Critique of Psychoanalysis 
This project seeks to explore these questions around otherness and race by 
historicising, exploring and theorising the imagery of cannibalism within 
16 Jacqueline Rose, “Femininity and Its Discontents,” Feminist Review, Palgrave Macmillan 
Journals, 80, no. Reflections on 25 Years (2005): 24–43.
17 Seshadri-Crooks, “The Primitive as Analyst: Postcolonial Feminism’s Access to 
Psychoanalysis,” 176.
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psychoanalysis; namely whether and how fantasies about threatening 
and devouring others fostered through colonial representation, shaped 
psychoanalytic theory, from its emergence as a form of therapy and theory 
about the subject, until the decolonisation of the non-European world. It is 
premised on the assumption that human-flesh consumption is an unexplored 
racialised and sexualised trope that dominates the European imagery since the 
Ancient Greco-Roman traditions. However, cannibalism as a concept, I argue is 
a predominantly modern term; it becomes a major trope for othering during the 
historical processes of European colonialism. Hence, cannibalism became a tool 
for European domination through racial and sexual objectification. The project 
examines how this imagery gets played out in psychoanalysis, as a discourse 
premised on the study of taboos, personal, social and sexual boundaries. More 
precisely, I look at the theories of four psychoanalysts and psychoanalytically-
informed theorists—Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, Géza Róheim and Frantz 
Fanon—to investigate the place of the imagery of cannibalism in their works. 
These four cases are used to examine why and how the cannibal trope as a 
‘watchword’–I am borrowing this term from Celia Brickman18—for racial 
and sexual othering enters their works, and what are the effects from this 
uncomfortable displacement. The idea of tracing how a stereotype about the 
non-European is dislocated in a predominantly European discourse of psychic 
life offers a way into the theoretical disjunctions previously outlined: namely the 
uncomfortable or unsettling place in which psychoanalysis and the social meet. 
Therefore, this project asks: what kind of knowledge does the cannibal trope 
acquire, produce and expose within the domain of the psychoanalytic? What 
does it do to psychoanalytic theory and what does psychoanalytic theory do to 
the imagery of the non-European as a cannibal? 
Broadly speaking my aim is to investigate the various modalities through which 
psychoanalysis participated in the knowledge of the other as a cannibal, and 
through this process to examine the place of diversity and difference within 
psychoanalysis. This project could be read as an intellectual exercise on the 
tension between psychoanalysis and colonialism: how psychoanalysis was 
formed by colonialism through the imagery of the cannibal trope and how 
it contributed to the decolonisation of Western thinking. It resists, therefore, 
considering psychoanalysis merely as an object of study—a discourse that can 
be dissected, deconstructed and criticised—but looks at it as a discipline with 
18 Brickman, Aboriginal Populations in the Mind.
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an inner, unconscious life and fantasies; one which has participated in the 
deconstruction and decolonisation of the European subject, re-articulating and 
re-signifying not only the concept of ‘subject’ but of the very notion of doing 
decolonisation and performing anti-colonial resistance, as well.
In this regard, at first sight it seems paradoxical or unconventional to develop this 
line of questioning through what I call the ‘cannibal trope.’ Psychoanalysis and 
cannibalism have very little—if anything—in common: psychoanalysis is one of 
the most prominent analytical tools and forms of knowledge about the subject, 
whilst cannibalism is an outdated, old-fashioned and repugnant idea. After all, is 
it really legitimate, politically correct or even plausible to draw on the gruesome 
myth of cannibalism, when the very effects of the colonial infrastructure were 
literally the ‘cannibalisation’ and elimination of most Aboriginal cultures around 
the globe? In a rather provocative way one could also ask: what is actually wrong 
with cannibalism? Or in a psychoanalytically-motivated fashion one would 
rephrase the question in the following way: what is at stake in either the fantasy 
of or the abhorrence and distaste surrounding cannibalism? I argue that it is 
precisely in these tensions that cannibalism meets psychoanalysis: in-between the 
colonised and the coloniser, in the space between fantasy and fear, cannibalism 
can lead us, in a rather unique way, to a critique of psychoanalysis’ own fantasies 
about otherness.
Furthermore, the pairing of psychoanalysis and cannibalism to open up a 
space to critique psychoanalysis and use psychoanalysis as the tool of the 
critique is not unique. Among recent literature, the work of Celia Brickman, 
an American psychotherapist, sits well with this project. Brickman traces the 
racial configurations embedded in the discourse of ‘primitivity’ as they enter 
Freudian psychoanalysis. Primitivity, as Brickman shows, is associated with 
the ‘earliest often repressed stages of psychic development,’19 marking an 
essentially racialised stage of psychosexual development. As a racial metaphor 
it performs as a nodal point within the psychoanalytic text which exposes how 
psychoanalysis has been actively implicated in fantasies about otherness. As 
previously mentioned, Brickman thinks of primitivity as a ‘watchword,’ which 
once followed, contextualised and historicised in the form of a genealogy of 
knowledge exposes how race as an ideology haunts Freudian psychoanalysis.20 
19 Brickman, Aboriginal Populations in the Mind, 4.
20 Brickman, 5.
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The purpose of bringing together cannibalism and psychoanalysis then, is not 
made to advance any claims to provocative radicalism or to forced originality, 
but because there seems to be a substantial need for further psychoanalytic and 
psychosocial research on marginalised, racial and gendered imageries, which 
are sources of embarrassment and discomfort for the modern reader. These 
displacements or cacophonies, these incongruous tropes, like cannibalism 
or primitivity, which seem ‘out of place,’ are also what mark this project as 
fundamentally a psychosocial one.21  
The purpose of this project, therefore, is to use this marginal space to explore an 
epistemological and theoretical issue, namely the relation between psychoanalysis 
and colonialism, which can be addressed in a unique way through the study of 
the cannibal trope. This does not mean however, that I am using the case studies 
to make a political claim about psychoanalysis and its anti-colonial resistance. 
I do not turn to these four case studies, three psychoanalysts (Freud, Klein, 
Róheim) and one psychoanalytically-informed psychiatrist (Fanon), to consider 
and explore whether and how the form of subjectivity that psychoanalysis had 
to offer is useful for anti-colonial or post-colonial politics—there is a plethora 
of scholarship that acknowledges this.22 Rather, my aim is by exploring the 
interplay between psychoanalysis and the cannibal trope to consider whether 
and how colonial fantasies have shaped and informed the theorisation of the 
psychoanalytic subject. 
1.4 Inside, Outside, Beyond and in-Between: on Psychosocial Method 
This thesis is a psychosocial critique of psychoanalysis, in the sense that it 
advocates a non-disciplinary or a ‘transdisciplinary space,’ a rather ambiguous 
arena which requires some unpacking. To begin with, there is a debate about 
21 Lisa Baraitser, Enduring Time (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 23–28.
22 Homi K. Bhabha, “The Other Question: Homi K. Bhabha Reconsiders the Stereotype and 
Colonial Discourse,” Screen 24, no. 6 (1983): 18–36; Ranjana Khanna, Dark Continents: 
Psychoanalysis and Colonialism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003); Judith 
Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York and London: Routledge, 
1993); Derek Hook, A Critical Psychology of the Postcolonial: The Mind of Apartheid (London and 
New York: Psychology Press, 2012).
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whether the psychosocial is a disciplinary space at all. Psychosocial studies are 
not formulated like other traditional disciplines which delineate their boundaries 
either through exclusion or opposition, creating therefore essential divisions 
between inside and outside of the discipline. The psychosocial negates this 
logic. Moreover, and yet more confusingly, it is not formulated by a sociological 
approach to psychology, nor from a psychological view towards the social. 
Rather, the psychosocial emerges from the claim that any distinction between 
the two is impossible. Frosh and Baraitser have stressed the interconnectedness 
between the inside and the outside, the psychic and the social, through the 
visualisation of the Moebius strip—where the question of perspective becomes 
one of tactics: one can choose which aspect of this unbreakable continuity to 
examine, but one can never entirely study it in isolation.23 Thought this way, the 
psychosocial space has no logical beginning or point of departure. This does 
not mean, further, that the psychosocial makes absolutist claims and statements 
for the transparency of phenomena, structures and objects, hallucinating that 
they can be studied in their entirety. The psychosocial is not about illusions of 
wholeness and the avoidance of acknowledging a fundamental incompleteness. 
Rather, it must be remembered that the psychosocial is a space, which comes to 
life once the cracks, ruptures, limitations and margins of master discourses are 
acknowledged; that opens us ‘to experiences and realities that usually escape 
established disciplines and discourses through which we usually seek to know 
the world.’24 
Broadly speaking, questions of a psychosocial perspective emerge counter-
intuitively. This means that the psychosocial deals with concepts which seem 
fundamentally ‘anachronistic,’ outdated, out of place and ‘embarrassing.’25 
Baraitser theorised the psychosocial as a ‘temporal drag,’ in the sense that it 
emerges out of concepts that carry a particular affect and radiate embarrassment 
that begs us to leave them behind, when actually they signify moments of 
disjuncture; namely, points where the past uneasingly survives in the present. 
Among these embarrassing concepts the cannibal trope rightly claims a position. 
The cannibal trope in this project marks a return, as Baraitser puts it, that ‘drags 
23 Stephen Frosh and Lisa Baraitser, “Psychoanalysis and Psychosocial Studies,” Psychoanalysis, 
Culture and Society 13 (2008): 349.
24 Magda Schmukalla, “Artistic Ruptures and Their ‘communist’ Ghosts: On the Post-Communist 
Condition as Threshold Experience in Art from and in Eastern Europe” (University of London, 
2017), 19.
25 Lisa Baraitser, “Temporal Drag: Transdisciplinarity and the ‘Case’ of Psychosocial Studies,” 
Theory, Culture and Society 32, no. 5–6 (2015): 210.
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a discipline back to out of date.’26 For the purposes of this project, the traces of 
cannibalistic imagery as a colonial logic mar the psychoanalytic discourse, since 
they represent reminiscences not only of the exploitation of the non-Western 
world by a constellation of political, financial and psychological oppression, but 
also of the organic connection between psychoanalysis and colonialism. The 
cannibal trope embedded in psychoanalysis, thus, creates a sense of discomfort 
in the contemporary reader of psychoanalysis, who either resorts to an elective 
reading of psychoanalysis (the cannibal trope is left behind, forgotten, ignored), 
or inspires a political, anti-colonial critique of the discipline as a whole (as 
the post-colonial approach would imply). Drawing on the cannibal trope as a 
psychosocial case, I am suggesting a third option: staying with the discomfort 
and the embarrassment and exploring the kind of contents and intersections the 
cannibal trope seems to conceal. 
What is more, the psychosocial critique of psychoanalysis requests that it 
is a particular form of psychoanalysis—historically situated in the period 
of colonialism—that comes under scrutiny. As a psychosocial case, this 
project looks at how ‘colonial psychoanalysis’ can become reprinted precisely 
through what makes it fall out of place now. In other words, an unorthodox 
temporality is formulated; one which is situated in the present, and looks at the 
psychoanalytic disciplinary past, through the discomfort that certain traces of 
that psychoanalytic past create in the present. What I am hinting at, is Freud’s 
concept of Nachträglichkeit, according to which the psychosocial case claims to 
access the discomfort of the cannibal trope as an effect that is deferred; that 
acquires meaning at a different temporality than the one in which it originally 
emerged. It is perhaps the same point André Green was making, when in a 
1972 issue of the French Psychoanalytic Association journal, dedicated to the 
fate of cannibalism (Destins du Cannibalism), he referred to the ‘paradox of 
cannibalism,’ that ‘while anthropophagy was disappearing amongst the cultures 
which practised it, our culture’s interest in the phenomenon continued to 
grow.’27 What is it that made French psychoanalysts eager to explore the fate of 
cannibalism—of a phenomenon whose talk and fantasy had already disappeared 
26 Baraitser, 209.
27 André Green, “Cannibalisme: Réalité Ou Fantasme Agi?,” Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse 6 
(1972): 27–52. My translation
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by 1972 (as I show in Chapter Two)—if not the psychoanalytic fascination 
with whatever is endangered by the passage of time? This fascination is not a 
form of fetish with the past and the outdated, but perhaps it springs from the 
acknowledgment that when cannibals are not put to rest, they return to haunt.   
Having said this, there is one more point that needs to be raised in this brief 
exercise on the ontology of the psychosocial—if these two terms can hold 
together. And this is the question of what kind of work the psychosocial 
method, which is being at used in this project, entails. Retrospectively reflecting 
on the process, tracing the cannibal trope within each of the four case studies 
explored, technically means navigating endlessly in psychoanalytic texts 
seeking for marginal, liminal and repressed images. Being cautious about not 
imposing assumptions about colonialism on the psychoanalytic texts, I have 
strictly followed explicit references to the cannibal trope tracing their role 
and impact within the text. My main aim has been to understand what is it 
that these references do to the theory and to the text itself. Additionally, in the 
four case studies I have provided extensive historical backgrounds to explain 
how the imagery of the cannibal trope has reached each one of the theorists. 
Moreover, where appropriate I have situated the texts historically, among social 
phenomena and movements that might link back to the concept of cannibalism. 
Contextualisation allowed me to see that some authors used the cannibal trope 
as a response to a particular reality and to show that the cannibal trope has not 
been part of one coherent discourse on cannibalism, but rather it emerges in 
the form of devouring mothers, greedy children, Aboriginal tribes setting up a 
human feast. 
Apart from Chapter One which offers a systematic historical exploration of the 
cannibal trope and its role within colonial representation, the chapters share 
a similar structure and flow. They can be read as episodes, separate cases that 
highlight the ways the cannibal trope is embedded within psychoanalysis as a 
reminder of the historical context within which it emerged, and tensions this 
brings into the psychoanalytic thinking of racial difference. They can also be 
read as cases that together build up an argument about how psychoanalysis was 
informed by colonialism and how as a discourse about the subject it created 
post-colonial possibilities.
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1.5 Chapter Outline 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters, all of which deal with parts of the 
argument I adumbrated above. The next chapter is a genealogy of the cannibal 
trope in Western, modern thought. To navigate around such an immense task, 
the chapter places some iconic works of literature alongside post-colonial 
anthropological sources to unmask how a dominant and persistent form of 
representation among the European Empires was the black indigenous as 
a cannibal. More precisely, the chapter departs from the distinction between 
anthropophagy, meaning the practice of eating human flesh as a practice of 
cultural rituals (e.g. mortuary), and cannibalism, as a European fantasy about 
a devouring other. It follows this fantasy from the Ancient Greek tradition, to 
the persecutions of witches and Jews in the Middle Ages to the first colonial 
encounters of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in the Caribbean and the 
role of cannibalism in the construction of concepts of savagery that radically 
differentiated Europeans from the indigenous and was used to justify massacres. 
However, what this exteriorisation of cannibalism demonstrated was that 
oppression, erasure, annihilation of cultural difference were primary motives of 
colonialism, alongside financial and political exploitation. This would then lead 
to the question of whether cannibals would only lie outside the boundaries of 
Europe and to the establishing of links with anti-Semitic myths and prejudices, 
like those of blood libel and ritual murder. The chapter also looks at the 
imagery of the cannibal trope as it re-emerged in the late 18th century and early 
19th century in the context of European racism and the scientific discipline of 
Victorian anthropology. 
This post-colonial critique of colonial representations is used to construct a 
framework for the place of cannibalism—which in the European imagery was 
detected always on the margins—and which becomes the point from which this 
thesis departs. What is more, the connection between racism and anti-Semitism 
is important, because it introduces race and racial difference as not necessarily 
a marker of blackness (a distinction that becomes challenged by Fanon, as we 
will see in chapter six). What this genealogy exposes, thus, is that the fear of 
difference and diversity is not a recent phenomenon. Instead, it is rooted in the 
structure of whiteness and has allowed racial inequalities to be perpetuated.
The third chapter looks at the work of Sigmund Freud, not just because he was the 
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founder of psychoanalysis, but also because he bolstered psychoanalytic insights 
by drawing on disciplines like anthropology and biology, opening a constructive 
dialogue about the relation of the subject and the social. However, the disciplines 
Freud drew on concealed a racist ideology constructed upon an evolutionary 
doctrine that assumed the superiority of the white, European subject against 
the inferiority of the non-white other. Departing from these discourses, Freud 
visualises the origins of the social as emerging through the taboo on cannibalism; 
namely once the (paternal) law is psychically assimilated, the need for the re-
enactment of cannibalistic rituals ceases to exist. This meant that Freud saw the 
social as premised upon the repression of cannibalistic desires, which, however, 
do not disappear but become part of the subject’s unconscious life. In this sense, 
Freud not only marked the psychoanalytic subject as one which emerges out of 
the withdrawal of the wish to cannibalise, but also, he founds the discipline of 
psychoanalysis upon an ideology that, until then, was among the main processes 
of racialisation of the colonised peoples. I then move on to explore how this 
tension informs mechanisms and defences of the self, like identification and 
melancholia. Last but not least, I suggest that it is impossible to trace the subtle 
racial context embedded in psychoanalysis through Freud’s use of the cannibal 
trope, without reading this choice historically, and psychosocially—namely, 
by asking the question of what Freud was trying to do. Therefore, in the final 
part of the chapter, I explore the link Freud made between cannibalism and the 
Christian ritual of the Eucharist as a refusal to forgo the loss of God, and instead 
ritualistically eating him. Reading this critique of Christianity against the anti-
Semitism of his time, and in particular, in his relation to Carl Jung, I argue that 
the use of the cannibal trope conceals a powerful critique of the ideology of racial 
differences between Jews and Christians, from a psychoanalytic perspective. In 
other words, while Freud uses the imagery of cannibalism firstly in a theorisation 
of the unconscious that is racialised, he also uses the cannibal trope as a critique 
against the Christian, colonial subject.  
Freud shows that there can be no individual that escapes being shaped by a 
racialised past, in terms of the nature and force of their drives. However, Freud 
also implied that not only external norms, but objects too can be incorporated 
within the human mind—in a direct parallel with cannibalism. Therefore, the 
following chapter looks at Melanie Klein’s object-relations developmental theory, 
as well as her emphasis on orality as the site of various forms of internalisation. 
Klein’s formulation of two psychic positions, the paranoid-schizoid and the 
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depressive, also follows on an evolutionary schema which is exposed once we 
follow the traces of a cannibal imagery and its racial assumptions. Klein, in 
talking about the infant’s fantasy of devouring the mother, provides an obvious 
but nonetheless, unexplored relationship to racial othering. The Kleinian 
idea of an ordinary depression, based on reparation, is effectively a process of 
transitioning to a psychic state that has left cannibalism behind. Once historically 
contextualised in the early and late 1940s, the Kleinian idea of managing one’s 
own cannibalistic desires, and the racial assumptions associated with it, can be 
read as a prevalence of a more democratic way of life. It is proposed, however, 
that Klein is enforced by social and institutional circumstances, as well as the 
logistics of her account of the death drive, to rely on some form of essential and 
idealised whiteness as a way out of destruction. 
As well as developing the unconscious structures of subjectivity, psychoanalysts 
have also engaged in debates about the applicability and limitations of their 
theories. The fifth chapter takes as its point of departure the question of the 
universality of the psychoanalytic unconscious and looks at the work of the first 
anthropologically trained psychoanalyst, the Hungarian Géza Róheim, with 
Australian Aborigines. The chapter firstly looks at how ideas about Aboriginals 
were forged in colonial text and shows that claims of Aboriginal maternal 
cannibalism enriched, albeit marginally, child-abduction policies. Róheim 
considers these social discourses and incorporates them into a model of an anti-
Western form of psychosexual development. Psychoanalytic ideas that associate 
states of simplicity and savagery are regarded as ways to turn around racialised 
assumptions and construct less oppressive psychological and cultural theories. 
It is found that for Róheim culture can no longer be considered as irrelevant 
for the formation of psychic mechanisms and sexual difference. Maternal 
cannibalism for Róheim must be read alongside Aboriginal sexual freedom, 
excessive—but not sadistic—masculinity, and an overall state of happiness. 
However, it is suggested that despite unloading the racist connotations that 
weighed cannibalism as a ritual in the Western imaginary, it becomes gradually 
apparent that for Róheim there can be no Aboriginal femininity understood 
without some notion of threat or persecution. Róheim weaves racial assumptions 
onto Aboriginal sexual difference making a link between the fear of separating 
from the mother, seen as a cannibal who does not let the (male) child go, and 
masculinity. If so, the question remains open as to whether and how the cannibal 
trope can be essentially detached from the other and become incorporated in an 
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essentially racist gaze. 
The next chapter (chapter six) addresses the question of the cannibal trope as 
part of colonial racism and the objectification of the racial other, through the 
work of Frantz Fanon. Fanon’s arguments about black subjectivity, alienation 
and the epidermalization of racial difference will be deployed in the service of 
cutting a theoretical impasse that emerges through psychoanalysis’ emphasis 
on the internal world of the individual. Fanon allows us to see the limits of a 
psychoanalytic paradigm and go beyond them in exploring racial difference 
and the unconscious from a position that is both inside and outside the 
psychoanalytic discourse. I use Fanon’s concepts of desire and the body to show 
that the universal categories that psychoanalysis is based on amount to the 
erasure of racial difference. Last but not least, for the purposes of this project 
Fanon’s discussion of the fear of the black man (what he calls ‘negrophobia’) is 
very relevant, as it shows that this fear is an unarticulated latent homosexual 
desire of the white man. The white unconscious is shown to be premised upon 
the limit of racial difference, which is embroiled with latent, homosexual desire. 
Fanon situates the cannibal trope in the white man’s unconscious and sees the 
whole enterprise of colonialism, and its violent suppression of the black body as 
a form of a repressed sexual desire. 
The displacement of the cannibal trope, the tensions between post-colonial 
theory and psychoanalysis become the main theme of the last chapter. I first turn 
to the work of Herbert Marcuse, who produced a Marxist rereading of Freudian 
psychoanalysis to explore how he handles the tension between the social and 
the psychic and what happens when a capitalist analysis is not accompanied by 
a post-colonial and feminist lens. Last, I consider some implications emerging 
from the tension between post-colonial theory and psychoanalysis, because of 
the latter’s affinities with colonialism and in particular with the cannibal trope.
1.6 On Leftovers
So far, I have offered a brief outline of my project and a contemplation on 
methodology. I would now like to reflect on the process of case study selection, 
since it is not only a task that shapes the boundaries of the thesis but informs 
the thesis’ overall argument and agenda. The choice of the four case studies was 
made on some basic criteria. Firstly, the question of chronology. My aim is to 
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study psychoanalytic theories of the subject in relation to the colonial fantasy 
of the cannibal trope, as these were formulated from the 1910s until the late 
1950s. These historical limits are proposed as a suggestive framework that 
however, should not be understood as constituting a linear piece with a coherent 
narrative that is being dissected. The four case studies are not to be understood 
as following some progressive chronology or as evolving exponentially one after 
the other. There is no coherent history binding them altogether. Rather, the four 
case-studies represent variations of a particular theme that is firstly exposed in 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory and acquires a life and analysis of its own in 
literature following from Freud. In other words, my task has not been to define 
rigid historical boundaries and assume the historical timeframe between 1910 and 
1960 as a coherent site in which to look for the cannibal trope. My methodology 
is the opposite; it begins from the fragmented references to the cannibal trope in 
the psychoanalytic discourse and by historically contextualising them highlights 
the nearby intellectual and historical web within which this grim idea comes 
into play.  However, the absence of rigid historical landmarks does not mean that 
the project has no boundaries. It means that the form of its boundaries is not 
shaped according to conceptions of time as linear and progressive. 
Furthermore, my aim has been to study psychoanalytic theories from Freud 
until the Fanon’s death in 1961. This is a historical conjuncture that extends from 
a colonial moment to the emergence and fruition of several major decolonising 
movements. Decolonisation here is not used only in terms of political hegemony 
and administration (struggles between national liberation and metropolitan 
dependence continued in many of the former colonies) but in terms of a form 
of writing about the subject, in thinking about cultural and ethnic difference 
and in the deconstruction of ‘race’ as an essentialist category that marks radical 
difference through the skin. The decolonisation of India in 1947 was followed by
more than fifty nation-states established in Africa during the 1950s.28 Hard-won 
anti-colonial battles in both Africa and Asia gave rise to a conceptualisation of 
a ‘beyond the empire’ future, supported by the institutional recognition of civil 
rights movements, movements on sexual liberation, major demographic shifts 
and the establishment of national hegemony, where European colonies were once 
standing. More importantly, decolonization which was first coined as a term 
in the 1930s, achieved its powerful political status as a ‘cleansing’ change from 
28 Raymond F. Betts, Decolonisation: Making the Contemporary World, 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2004).
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colonialism in the 1960s, marks the possibility of replacing the imperial political 
hegemony and the ideological, epistemological and discursive domination of 
the ‘West’ with other forms of political power.29 However, in my understanding 
the 1960s mark the collective response of movements of human rights and 
political liberation in Europe and the United States that have challenged major 
assumptions about racial difference. Without getting into too much detail here, 
my interest has been to examine psychoanalytic fantasies within discursive 
regimes shaped by the colonial partitions of global territories, and forms of 
knowledge about the non-European other not yet challenged and dismantled.  
Secondly, another methodological question that has troubled me was the criteria 
for case-study selection. I am aware that the four case studies raise certain issues, 
not only as to why these specific theorists have been chosen—this is an issue 
I develop in each chapter—but also, why other key psychoanalytic theorists 
have not. Given his prominent role within the field of psychosocial studies, 
and his contribution to development of psychoanalysis towards a direction 
that emphasises language as the primary regime enfolding meaning, one might 
wonder why Jacques Lacan is not included in an interrogation about the cannibal 
trope and psychoanalysis. 
The overall trajectory of Lacan’s psychoanalytic subject significantly differs from 
the Freudian and Kleinian tradition. Lacan emphasised language and speech as 
the primary site of the unconscious. He considered the psychoanalytic subject 
as split, but unlike Freud, the nature of this split is not upon repressed material 
but is created by the mediation of language. By allowing symbolism and thought 
language creates the unconscious—it does not expose the hidden meaning of the 
unconscious as a container. In other words, in Lacan the psychoanalytic subject 
emerges out of excessive meaning that symbolisation can never wholly manage.30 
Lacan named this irreducible surplus of meaning the “Real” and argued that it 
is not real in the sense of an actual, material existence, it does not correspond 
to particular social structures, quite the opposite, it cannot be captured by 
signification and can only be understood through its effects. My point here 
is that Lacan disrupts a fundamental binary between external reality and the 
internal unconscious world that predominates in Freudian, post-Freudian and 
Kleinian psychoanalysis. Lacan’s emphasis on an abstract, structural system that 
29 Betts, 2.
30 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (New York: W.W.Norton, 
1981).
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creates the subject means that his theory has not been as concerned with the 
social, the group or the prehistoric pasts as Freud’s, neither as preoccupied with 
a psychosexual, developmental narrative as Klein’s.31 While it is true  that in his 
early works Lacan acknowledges the cannibal trope in the context of his theory 
of identification—in his 1938 paper on the Family Complexes in the Formation 
of the Individual—the overall trajectory of his work transgresses this kind of 
terminology and moves away  from binary thinking symptomatic of the colonial 
discourse.32 This would beg the question of why not invoke Lacan as a counterforce 
to the colonial imaginings of the psychoanalysts examined here. The answer is to 
be found on the ways these psychoanalysts vacillate between the social and the 
psychic, the colonial imaginary and the designation of psychoanalytic otherness. 
During the time-frame under scrutiny here, Lacan’s work moves away from the 
Freudian influence into a structural theory that does not sit uncomfortably next 
to post-colonial theory—which is the necessary tension that this project seeks 
to explore. 
Overall, through the aforementioned theoretical limits it becomes clear that 
this thesis does not claim the possession of an absolute truth and insight about 
the nature of psychoanalytic discourse and its relations to colonialism. On the 
contrary, the four cases under scrutiny here only claim to embody moments 
where the friction between psychoanalytic and colonial thinking can be 
examined most clearly. In other words, they are typical and indicative cases 
that concern certain moments in the polymorphous and discontinuous history 
of psychoanalysis. What is more, the pairing between psychoanalysis and 
colonialism eventually aims at illuminating how colonialism is not a particular 
historical period that we can be easily done with. Colonial assumptions are heavily 
entangled in psychoanalytic concepts and forms of psychoanalytic theorisation. 
This means that the case-studies selection was not made to isolate the traces of 
a colonialist trope in order to accuse certain theorists of being complicit in the 
colonial project. The purpose of the case selection here is to highlight through 
31 Frosh and Baraitser, “Psychoanalysis and Psychosocial Studies.”
32 For example, critics like Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen have argued that Lacan resolves 
the ‘normative and neurotic’ aspects of Freudian theory by dissolving the illusion 
of knowing one’s identity fully and suggesting that the Oedipus complex is not an 
achievement but a failure and that the subject itself emerges through ‘a failure.’ This 
shift of perspective, for Borch-Jacobsen bypassed the problems of ‘good normalizing 
identification from the bad, rivalrous identification.’Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan: The 
Absolute Master, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991), 41. 
Emphasis in the original. 
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the contextual reading of psychoanalytic concepts and theories how difficult it is 
to bring the colonial past and its hauntings to rest. These four case studies help 
us identify, understand and evaluate the role of this colonial grammar, but, there 
is a lot of work to be done yet in this direction. These four case studies are only 
a beginning.
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CHAPTER TWO
A Brief History of Cannibalistic Fantasies 
2.1 The Question ‘Cannibal’ and a non-Cannibalistic Genealogy
The cannibal trope is one of the most popular categories associated with 
colonialism in the Western discourse. An etymological inquiry reveals that 
the word cannibal has its origins in the Spanish word Canibales, a variant of 
Caribes, first mentioned by Christopher Columbus after his conquest of the 
Caribbean islands in 1492. ‘Through Spanish mispronunciation, Caribs became 
Canibs and eventually cannibals.’1 Oddly enough, the word for the consumption 
of human flesh etymologically derives from one tribe living in the Caribbean 
islands, and the tautology between the Carib and the cannibal has survived 
in the European imagination, turning them into synonyms: the indigenous of 
another community is a man-eater.2 The French historian Frank Lestrignant 
has offered two etymological alternatives—though not equally plausible. He 
attributes it to the Latin word for dog ‘canis,’ which in turn is associated with 
the ancient representation of monsters as Cyclops, Cynocephalus (dog-headed) 
and Monoculi (one-eyed), or, the land of the Great Khan whose nationals were 
dog-headed men, and thus Cannibals could also be another term for the men 
of the Great Khan. This is because Columbus believed that by sailing into the 
West he could devise another sea route towards Asia. The last two explanations 
remain unproved, and in fact, they have faint possibilities of ever being verified.3 
Nevertheless what all three of them share in common is that the cannibal is 
a monstrous non-human figure who belongs in community other than the 
European (Carib). 
The category of the cannibal is one amongst other interlocking terms that have 
shaped the racial dualisms assumed to be immutable within the discourse of 
colonialism such as the primitive and the barbarian. While all these concepts are 
used interchangeably, they have different historical genealogies and highlight 
different dimensions of colonial opposition. Coming from the Latin word silva 
1 Walter Arens, The Man-Eating Myth, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 44.
2 For more details on the inconsistencies of the colonial discourse on the naming of cannibalism, 
see Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London: 
Methuen, 1986), 45-87.
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meaning forest, the concept of savagery was used to demarcate life as animality 
outside cultural organisation. Savagery meant the incapacity to belong to 
communities and thus implied a form of life as isolation. In the writings of 
French Enlightenment figures such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the figure of the 
Noble Savage represents a romantic nostalgia for nature as an alternative to the 
discontents, alienation, and inequalities of the French society.4 On a partially 
similar note, the term primitive was used to describe fantasies surrounding 
origins as well as to designate temporal difference and its vicissitudes. The 
primitives lived in eras long gone alongside forms of life that were as brutal as they 
were naïve, innocent, and simplistic.5 Finally, barbarism derives its origins in the 
Greco-Persian antagonism and initially it captured the linguistic difference—
‘bar bar’ was the phonetic description of how the Persian language sounded 
to sophisticated Greek ears. But eventually, barbarism became associated with 
ethno-political conflicts and adumbrated otherness as irreducibly inferior in 
terms of economic, political, and moral organisation.6 Overall, all of these terms 
are caught up in assumptions that structure the Western identity on the basis 
of opposition. As Slabodsky puts it: ‘[T]he barbarians are a reified collective 
exhibiting characteristics that incarnate the antithesis of civilization’s desired 
self-image.’7 
One of the central characteristics that separates cannibalism from the other three 
categories is that cannibalism is not a natural state, but a desire or a practice. 
While the primitives, the savages, and the barbarians are supposed to have 
cannibalistic desires, it is not necessary that they practice cannibalism altogether. 
Historically speaking, allegations of cannibalism have been addressed to one 
group of Aboriginals against another. For example to discern the Caribs from
 their friendly and peaceable neighbours, the Arawaks.8 In this case, cannibalism 
would be a practice assigned to tribes to segregate between those who would 
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality,” in The Essential Rousseau: The Social 
Contract, Discourse on the Origin of Inqeuality, Discourse on the Sciences, The Creed of a Savoyard 
Priest, ed. Lowell Bair (New York: New American Library, 1974).(New York: New American 
Library, 1974)
5 Celia Brickman, Aboriginal Populations in the Mind (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2003), 24.
6 Santiago Slabodsky, Decolonial Judaism: Triumphal Failures of Barbaric Thinking (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 40.
7 Slabodsky, 40.
8 Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London: 
Methuen, 1986).
35
collaborate with the Europeans, and others who would be more rebellious. 
Peter Hulme highlights that although the historical evidence for this distinction 
is circumstantial, the sharpness of the distinction is telling: those who would 
collaborate enjoyed inclusion whereas those resisting would be perceived as 
fierce, threatening, and in stark opposition to civilisation.9 
However, the imagery of eating or being eaten as an allegory of domination 
entertains a variety of uses outside the colonial framework. For example, it can 
be found in linguistic metaphors expressing forms of perverse love as Alexei 
Ivanovich confesses to Polina Alexandrovna Praskovja in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s 
novel The Gambler: ‘Do you know that I shall kill you one day? I shall kill you 
not because I shall cease to love you or be jealous, I shall simply kill you because 
I have an impulse to devour you.’10 Or, it has been used as an allegory employed 
to flesh out the intricacies of intimate desires in a slightly less murderous but 
still violent way, as in French feminist thought. In an essay titled ‘Love of the 
Wolf,’ Hélène Cixous employs the cannibal trope as a theoretical vehicle to 
talk about love as a form of physical transgression. For her, love appears as a 
surrender of one’s physical integrity and individuality in the mouth of the other 
(similar to Alexei Ivanovich’s passion)—love emerges only on the potential of 
the dissolution of boundaries: 
Grown-ups pretend, but children get a thrill. The wolf says to the child: 
I’m going to eat you up. Nothing tickles the child more. That’s the 
mystery: why does the idea that you’re going to eat me up fill me with 
such pleasure and such terror? It’s to get this pleasure that you need the 
wolf. The wolf is the truth of love, its cruelty, its fangs, its claws, our 
aptitude for ferocity. Love is when you suddenly wake up as a cannibal, 
and not just any old cannibal or else wake up destined for devourement. 
[…] For us, eating and being eaten belong to the terrible secret of love. 
We love only the person we can eat. The person we hate we ‘can’t swallow.’ 
That one makes us vomit.11
For Cixous love does not lead into an equal merging (who devours the wolf?), 
but in a union through the engulfment of the other. Cannibalistic love is founded 
upon domination based on an order different from humanity: it needs ‘wolves.’ 
On a partially similar note, the French philosopher Jacques Derrida has argued 
9 Hulme.
10 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Gambler and Other Stories, trans. Constance Garnett (London, 
Melbourne, Toronto: William Heinemann Ltd, 1957), 28.
11 Hélène Cixous, Stigmata, 2nd ed. (New York and London: Routledge Classics, 2005), 78.
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that while bestiality is a common denominator for the pariah and the outsider, 
in Western philosophical thought it is linked with sovereignty, too. For Derrida, 
the desire to devour is not an indication of love but of domination: it is the desire 
par excellence of the ‘sovereign’ subject—might ‘its greatest force, its absolute 
potency be, in essence and always in its last instance, a power of devourement 
(mouth, teeth, tongue, violent rush to bite, engulf, swallow the other, to take the 
other into oneself too, to kill it or mourn it?”12
Nevertheless, the idea of cannibalism as gesture of inclusion whereas hate is a 
form of vomiting had previously been taken up by Claude Lévi-Strauss in relation 
to strategies of dealing with difference at the level of society. In his 1961 Tristes 
Tropiques, Lévi-Strauss argues that there are anthropophagic societies where the 
foreigner is forced to assimilate to become absorbed in the ‘body public.’ Also, 
there are anthropoemic (from the Greek work emein, meaning to vomit) societies 
where the foreigner is segregated and isolated. While the former involves a 
violent inclusion, the latter is based on a forced exclusion. However, it is worth 
pointing out that Lévi-Strauss has stressed that the anthropophagic societies seen 
as ‘primitive’ and inspiring ‘the profoundest horror’ are no less barbaric than the 
Western ones where ‘vomiting’ hatred onto the other prevails. ‘Societies which 
seem to us ferocious may turn out, when examined from another point of view, 
to have their humane and benevolent sides.’13 While Cixous regards cannibalism 
as a unilateral phenomenon, Lévi-Strauss acknowledges how cannibalism as an 
assumed practice is strongly dependent on the eye of the observer. 
There is no wonder why such a rich allegory has had an intellectual resonance 
with the psychoanalytic project as we will see in the chapters that follow. The 
cannibal trope takes up an important question of ethics, starting from the point 
of ambivalence: how does one manage otherness? What are the boundaries and 
the limits of interpersonal relations of love, aggression, sadism, and hatred? 
And, how are these boundaries reconfigured at the level of the social? My aim in 
this chapter is not to ‘cannibalise’ theory by incorporating each and every debate 
that has engaged with patterns of eating. Instead, my interest is on cannibalism 
as a trope with a racial ramification central to coloniality. As Peter Hulme puts 
it: ‘The racial dimension of the discourse of cannibalism was never far from the 
12 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and The Sovereign, vol. I (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), 23.
13 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John Russell (New York: Criterion Books, 1961), 
386.
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surface during the colonial period: the tendency was to associate cannibalistic 
practice with darkness of skin.’14
However, had this genealogy commenced the moment of the iconic colonial 
conquest of Christopher Columbus in the Caribbean, then the question of the 
cannibal would be based upon an important methodological mistake. Columbus 
did not ‘discover’ cannibals in America—but rather there was a pre-existing 
European framework about otherness as threatening and consuming that 
became amalgamated through this encounter. Therefore, my research will take 
as its point of departure not the emergence of the modern world, but it will go 
back to Ancient Greece and trace the histories and myths about figures that have 
been portrayed as ‘cannibalistic’ since. This point of departure is chosen for two 
reasons. Firstly, Ancient Greek mythology has been one of the pillars shaping 
Western thought and alongside it, the psychoanalytic canon (although as we will 
see Freud drops the Ancient Greek signification of cannibalism and adopts the 
colonial one).15 Secondly, and more importantly, one of the claims this chapter is 
making is that cannibalism has been a predominantly Western trope of thinking 
about domination and otherness. Unsurprisingly, accusations of perverse 
eating can be found in crucial moments in Western history—from the Greco-
Roman era to the first persecutions of Christians alongside witch-hunting and 
the anti-Semitic tale of the ritual murder. Nevertheless, as Santiago Slabodsky 
has stressed, genealogical readings can dangerously lapse into anachronism as 
they tend to reconstruct their narratives as a linear and ‘naturalized’ Western 
history.16 
Anachronistic readings tend to assume a logical sequence of events that 
evolves as a form of scaffolding. Slabodsky cautions that these imposed forms 
of linearity conceal the fundamental disjunctures between Ancient Greece, 
Rome, and the contemporary West. As a result, one of the major victories of the 
colonial discourse, I argue echoing Slabodsky, has been not only that it justified 
domination on the grounds of the Aboriginal’s cannibalism but also it concealed 
how this category was born from the very core of European thought in the first 
14 Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen, Cannibalism and the Colonial World (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30.
15 Garfield Tourney, “Freud and the Greeks: A Study of the Influence of Classical Greek 
Mythology and Philosophy Upon the Development of Freudian Thought,” Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences 1, no. 1 (1965): 67–85, https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-
6696(196501)1:1<67::AID-JHBS2300010109>3.0.CO;2-N.
16 Slabodsky, Decolonial Judaism: Triumphal Failures of Barbaric Thinking, 41.
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place. Cannibalism has been the trope of this concealment. 
2.2 The Cannibals that Never Were—a Second Take on the Genealogy of a 
Fantasy
So far, I have discussed cannibalism as an ‘alleged’ practice, one that emanates 
from European thought and imagination, implying that it is more a matter of 
perspective than an observable, concrete reality. Even more so, in this section, I 
want to suggest that cannibalism has been a paramount European fantasy about 
otherness. By anthropologists, cannibalism has been regarded a practice that 
can be observed, documented and described, and for this reason it has become 
a topic of passionate debates about its existence and meaning. After the 1970s, 
critical anthropologists highlighted how anthropology has been complicit 
with the colonial project.17 In this sense, a ground for a critique was opened, 
and it allowed the revision of evidence that rendered non-European cultures 
cannibalistic. The most important work of this kind is that of William Arens. 
Arens was an American anthropologist who in 1979 published a book arguing 
that the anthropological evidence for cannibalistic practices of Aboriginal 
tribes from the 15th century onwards had not been sufficiently supported, and 
as a result, cannibalism should be regarded as a profound component of the 
colonial mythology that ideologically justified conquest.18 Arens’ compelling 
and provocative work examined anthropological accounts of man-eating to show 
that they are devoid of first-hand documentation and sustainable anthropological 
evidence. Within a few decades, critical anthropologists discussed cannibalism 
as a ‘talk,’19 a ‘meta-myth,’20 an ‘ideology,’21 a colonial obsession;22 as a signifier 
covering up something that is not really there. In short, the history of cannibalism 
17 Talal Asad, ed., Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (London: Ithaca Press, 1973); 
George W. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (New York& London: The Free Press, A Division of 
Macmillan, Inc, 1987).
18 Walter Arens, The Man-Eating Myth, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
19 Gananath Obeyesekere, Cannibal Talk: The Man-Eating Myth and Human Sacrifice in the South 
Seas (U.S.A: University of California Press, 2005); Gananath Obeyesekere, “Cannibal Feasts in 
Nineteenth-Century Fiji: Seamen’s Yarns and the Ethnographic Imagination,” in Cannibalism 
and the Colonial World, ed. Francis Barker and Margaret Iversen (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 63–86.
20 Tracey Banivanua-Mar, “Cannibalism and Colonialism: Charting Colonies and Frontiers in 
Nineteenth-Century Fiji,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no. 2 (2010): 255–81.
21 Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London: 
Methuen, 1986).
22 Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen, Cannibalism and the Colonial World (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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has been a history of an absence or a fake presence. 
The implication is not that human flesh consumption has never taken place as a 
practice—it is not a question of denial.23 There are several accounts of cannibalism 
in the context of shipwrecks, on-board famine, dire food scarcity24 and as part of 
complex mourning rituals.25 These instances, however, are conceptually different 
from cannibalism which indicates a fantasy about another who wants to, or, is 
going to eat me.26 In this chapter, I am dealing with the latter: the fantasy of 
what a otherness is going to do to the self and reversely. For reasons of clarity, I 
am going to maintain the distinction originally coined by Peter Hulme between 
anthropophagy (a Greek term literally meaning man-eating) which describes the 
act of consuming human flesh, and cannibalism as a fear and desire to annihilate 
through merging, as inherent in European culture.27 
To think cannibalism as a fantasy means to think about the colonial structures 
as supported by psychological resonances that problematise the immutability 
of normative dichotomies between the civilised self and the cannibal other. It is 
to argue that the cannibal has been a construction of imagination that has had 
psychological as much as a political utility. It has been a handy accusation and 
representation persistent for different reasons in different historical times, deployed 
for different political purposes and with different social outcomes. Therefore, my 
23 The anthropologist Marshal Sahlins was one of the few opposing the arguments about 
cannibalism as a tool of colonialism by grouping together the denial of cannibalism with Holocaust 
denial. He argued that challenging cannibalism is part of an ‘anti-intellectual conspiracy’ to cast 
doubt against clearly strong historical facts. Peter Hulme’s critique of Sahlins is fascinating. 
Hulme argued that while the available evidence for the Holocaust is in stark contrast with the 
thin evidence for cannibalistic practices, there is a distinction between cannibal scepticism on 
the grounds of colonial ideology and fantasy, and denying historical accounts motivated by anti-
Semitism to perpetuate fascism. However, what is intriguing in this association is the connection 
between cannibalism, genocide and mass murder justified on the grounds of protecting humanity 
from sub-humans; a core distinction for modernity’s domination. Peter Hulme, “Introduction: 
The Cannibal Scene,” in Cannibalism and the Colonial World, ed. Francis Barker and Margaret 
Iversen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 13–15.
24 In the 18th century there were several cases of shipwreck cannibalism reported in Europe, the 
most famous among them being the Duddley and Stevens case (1884). The case was eventually 
incorporated in Customs of the Sea, and the act was not considered as legally murder. See: 
A.W.B. Simpson, “Cannibals at Common Law,” The Law School Record 27 (1981): 3–10.
25 For example, the anthropologist Beth A. Conklin discusses the mourning rituals of an Indian 
tribe in Western Amazonian, the Wari’ Indians whose mourning rituals involved the consumption 
of the dead’s flesh from their kins. However, Conklin explains that during her fieldwork she had 
no chance to witness the ritual.Beth A. Conklin, Consuming Grief: Compassionate Cannibalism 
in an Amazonian Society (University of Texas Press, 2001).
26 Obeyesekere, Cannibal Talk: The Man-Eating Myth and Human Sacrifice in the South Seas.
27 Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797, 86.
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historically-situated readings of the genealogical episodes of the cannibal trope 
enable me to make a case about cannibalism, and on how during colonialism 
it became naturalised—it structured the distinction of racial difference. The 
cannibal signifies the racial other. My argument is that the construction of the 
new vocabulary of the cannibal trope (as its etymology exposes) carried forward 
assumptions about otherness dating back to Ancient times while it concealed pre-
colonial histories of domination and presented cannibals as natural enemies of 
Western culture who were ‘eventually’ discovered through the colonial conquest. 
2.3 Anthropophagy in Ancient Greece
Despite being a predominantly modern term, binaries of the eater and the 
eaten historically appear much earlier than the commencement of the period 
of colonisation. In the Classical Greek tradition, anthropophagic monsters were 
constructed as examples of social isolation. Homer’s epic poem Odyssey is one 
key text where anthropophagy is discussed as an example of transgression of 
social norms, especially hospitality. Odysseus and his comrades shipwreck in 
the land of the Cyclops and find shelter in one of the Cyclops’ caves when one of 
them, Polyphemus, discovers the hapless travellers and devours a few of them. 
Polyphemus’ act is an insult to Greek ideals of hospitality—the foreigner must 
be protected from harm.28 He soon finds punishment by Odysseus who tricks 
the foolish ogre. The motifs of incorporation as a collapse of boundaries and 
identification are rife in the text. Polyphemus’ anthropophagy renders the land 
of the Cyclops, as a place outside the polis, a dangerous and uncontrollable one. 
The Cyclops are excessive in terms of demeanour and appearance. They are 
gigantic one-eyed semi-human creatures that inhabit a far-away island and live 
in caves isolated from each other while they have uncontrollable physical power 
and do not obey Greek ideals. In Euripides’ retelling of the story, the emphasis 
on rules governing social life becomes even clearer because he has the Cyclops 
explicitly sketched as nomads. When Odysseus reaches their island he asks: 
‘Who is their leader? Do they have a democratic state?’ only to receive the reply 
that ‘they are nomads; nobody listens to or [obeys] anybody about anything.’29 
28 François Hartog, Memories of Odysseus: Frontier Tales from Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001). For more about the idea of hospitality 
in relation to hubris, see: Julian Pitt-Rivers, “The Law of Hospitality,” in The Fate of Schechem 
or the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean, vol. 2 (Cambridge UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 94–112. 
29 François Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of 
History (Berkley: University of California Press, 1988), 205.
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Anthropophagy then becomes a rhetorical trope to articulate the dangers of 
anomie. Echoing Aristotle, Jacques Derrida has argued that it is only gods, kings, 
or beasts that live outside the invisible boundaries of society whilst at the same 
time marking them as such.30 
Images of anthropophagy in relation to anomie and divinity are encountered in 
the genealogy of Greek gods which consists of a succession of fathers devouring 
their sons, with the latter taking revenge by castrating them—a heirloom that 
ends with the genesis of the Greek Pantheon. Through the Father of Greek 
mythology, Hesiod, we learn that the story of the genesis is a story about a jealous 
and anxious father, Kronos, the ‘cannibal patriarch of Olympians’31 who ate all 
his children to avoid being supplanted. According to Hesiod’s Theogony, the plan 
was cancelled by the youngest one of them, Zeus, whom Kronos did not devour 
because his mother had hidden him away as a baby. Zeus tricked his father, 
and with the help of a purgative, freed his siblings who were released from the 
paternal body as if from a surrogate pregnancy.32 In this instance, the motif of 
anthropophagy is related to questions of origins and the limits of kinship as it 
attests to the paternal desire for affirmation of ownership over the child, which 
is why Rhea allows Kronos to devour his children. Being eaten is portrayed as 
a form of incorporation, not followed by digestion—and hence, destruction—
which in turn allows the return to the paternal body and the experience of a 
male surrogate pregnancy.33 These questions of origins and belonging, paternal 
engulfment, and identification are persevered in Christian theology—also 
imbued with a quasi-anthropophagic act. In fact, the early persecutions of 
the small, scattered nomadic Christian sects under the Roman Empire were 
reinforced by accusations of incestuous orgies and anthropophagic feasts.34 
2.4 Christianity, Witchcraft, anti-Semitism 
If there is a particularly popular cultural practice that approximates cannibalism 
30 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and The Sovereign, vol. I (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2009).
31 Marina Warner, No Go the Bogeyman: Scaring, Lulling, and Making Mock (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1998), 9.
32 Marina Warner, “Fee Fie Fo Fum: The Child in the Jaws of the Story,” in Cannibalism and the 
Colonial World, ed. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
33 Warner, 169.
34 Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons: The Demonization of Christians in Medieval 
Christendom, 2nd ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1993), 8.
42
in the European tradition, it would certainly be the Christian communion. Τhe 
Christian ritual of the Eucharist, first proposed by Saint Paul in the 2nd century 
A.D., ties together incorporation, community, and Christianity demonstrating 
how the ecclesiastical body of the Church is equated with that of Jesus, encouraging 
an enforced identification and unity within the Christian community—one 
could argue, it is similar to what Levi-Strauss categorised as an ‘anthropophagic’ 
organisation.35 Christianity was based on the idea that slaves, peasants, and 
masters; Roman, Greeks, and, barbarians could all become members of the 
same ecclesiastical body by participating in the communion. As such, Slabodsky 
observes that the Christian Church ‘severed traditional boundaries delimiting 
and circumscribing human action according to polis, nation, class, or tribe.’36 
Through the act of communion, the worshippers would repeat Jesus’ offering of 
his flesh and blood in the Last Supper, and would remind themselves that the 
equal partaking establishes an egalitarian relationship against God that erased 
their ethno-political diversities. 
However, an important theological issue about the communion was the nature 
of its content—as it associated the Christian ritual with anthropophagy. Prior 
to the 13th century, the claims of Jesus’ presence in the bread and wine posed a 
series of problems associated with the lack of clarity surrounding the nature of 
the consumption. Two popular positions sustained that either the Eucharist is an 
entirely symbolic act, proposing a more spiritual relation with God’s incorporated 
body, or it is an act where Jesus’ actual flesh is consumed, which meant that 
the Christian ritual could be easily translated as an anthropophagic act.37 The 
‘spiritual’ position did not satisfactorily clarify how God’s flesh and blood are 
communicated to the worshippers whereas the materialist position would often 
excite worshippers into a frenzy of miraculous visions about the Eucharist’s bread 
being replaced by the ‘smiling infant Jesus’ or ‘bleeding meat.’38 Both contested 
and asserted, Jesus’ presence in the sacrament was institutionally settled in 
the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. In order to compromise between the two 
positions and affirm a unified and coherent ecclesiastical body, excluding heresies, 
the Council legislated that in the Eucharist the miracle of transubstantiation 
takes place, namely, the bread and wine acquired the substance of Jesus Christ, 
35 Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques.
36 Slabodsky, Decolonial Judaism: Triumphal Failures of Barbaric Thinking.
37 Kilgour, 81.
38 Merrall L. Price, Consuming Passions: The Uses of Cannibalism in Late Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe (New York& London: Routledge, 2003), 28–31.
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without changing in form—a solution which turned out far from satisfactory.39 
Despite the theological settlement of the nature of the communion, Christianity 
did not seem to put fantasies of human flesh consumption to rest. During the 
Middle Ages, accusations of anthropophagy informed religious persecutions 
against Jews and witches. Norman Cohn describes witchcraft as a persistent 
medieval stereotype mostly aiming at women through conspiracies, paranoid 
fears and irrational accusations. Witches, shows Cohn, were seen as forming 
mystical societies that practice ‘maleficium’ and conspired against Christian 
faith.40 They symbolised apostasy and devil-worshipping, and they posed a threat 
to families, to husbands, to children, to neighbours and to society in general. But 
above all, I argue, witchcraft symbolised the evil, dark side of motherhood and 
was used to demarcate the duties, obligations and the dangers of mothering a 
child. 
Witches were believed to specialize in the killing of babies and small 
children. More than mere malice was at work here—witches needed the 
corpses for very young flesh; according to some writers of the time, to 
kill, cook and eat a baby which had not yet been baptised was a witch’s 
greatest pleasure. But the flesh of infants was also full of supernatural 
power. As an element in magical concoctions it could be used to kill other 
human beings, or else a captured witch to keep silent under torture. It 
could also be blended in a salve which, applied to a witch’s body, enabled 
her to fly.41
As it becomes clear in the passage, the witch and the baby were seen as a 
powerful and threatening pairing, having magical, super-human properties. 
This phobic stance towards the mother/witch that draws power from her baby 
and, on the contrary, poses a deadly danger to it, is a theme that emerges in 
the psychoanalytic view on motherhood, as part of her desire—as we will later 
see. Moreover, in feminist literature witchcraft constitutes an iconic example 
of the institutionalisation of patriarchal control since the allegations of eating 
babies has been regarded as a form of power constitution over the female body, 
sexuality, and reproductive powers. As Silvia Federici has argued the aim of 
the persecutions was not the punishment of certain acts of witchcraft but the 
eradication of certain forms of femininity which ‘had to be made abominable 
39 Kilgour, From Communion to Cannibalism: An Anatomy of Metaphors of Incorporation, 83.
40 Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons: The Demonization of Christians in Medieval Christendom, 147.
41 Cohn, 145.
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in the eyes of the population.’42 The witch-hunting in Europe fed into the 
ethnographic lens through which the simultaneously ‘discovered’ monstrously 
feminised Aboriginal cultures were interpreted.43 Another characteristic of the 
European witch-hunting was the portrayal of the witches’ practices so that they 
symbolised the ‘quintessence of anti-Christianity.’44 Cohn explains that witches 
were believed to meet in synagogues, and later to organise ‘orgiastic gatherings’ 
known as ‘sabbats.’ 45 The reference to Judaism was made to illustrate that the 
institutionalisation of the persecution of witchcraft would not be possible 
without a pre-existing form of discrimination and othering that sprang from a 
much older figure; that of the Jew. While Jews were also accused of ‘maleficium’ 
Cohn explains that the distinction between the Jew and the witch was instituted 
on the latter’s apostasy from the Christian faith.46 
From the 1870s onwards, the medieval myth of ‘ritual murder,’ or ‘blood libel’ 
revived in the Eastern Europe. Social and political changes had marked the rise of 
an intensely anti-Semitic activity in Central and Eastern Europe with pogroms, 
riots, street harassment, and anti-Jewish petitions alongside spontaneous forms 
of racial abuse and stereotyping. The emerging public anti-Semitic discourse 
breathed new life into the old medieval superstition that was seemingly 
incompatible with the modernisation of life in the Central European capitals, 
and at odds with the budding spirit of rationality and scientific prominence.47
According to the myth—which has admitted several variations since the Middle 
Ages—before the Passover Jews kidnapped, fattened, and murdered a Christian 
boy (girls were occasionally used, too), drained his blood, and used it for the 
making of the matzah (unleavened bread). In some cases, the intestines and the 
heart were devoured separately as well.48 During the middle Ages, ritual murder 
accusations sparked pogroms and mass executions of Jewish communities but 
the revival of the myth in the nineteenth century communities in Eastern Europe 
42 Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch (New York: Autonomedia, 2004), 170.
43 Federici, 221.
44 Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons: The Demonization of Christians in Medieval Christendom, 145.
45 Cohn, 145.
46 Cohn, 147.
47 Hillel J. Kieval, “The Rules of the Game: Forensic Medicine and the Language of Science in the 
Structuring of Modern Ritual Murder Trials,” Jewish History 26, no. 3/4 (2012): 287–307; Robert 
Weinberg, “The Blood Libel in Eastern Europe,” Jewish History 26, no. 3/4 (2012): 275–85.
48 Alan Dundes, “The Ritual Murder or Blood Libel Legend: A Study of Anti-Semitic Victimization 
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required a different form of power structure for the circulation and sustenance of 
these allegations. It was because on the one hand, in the Habsburg and the Russian 
Empires more members of the public were literate, and hence were granted access 
to information about the trials’ details through mass-circulated press,49 and on 
the other hand, witness testimonies were not sufficient in establishing criminal 
investigations and persecutions, and instead, a more sophisticated system of 
forensic examination and presentation of judicial evidence was in place.50 The 
clash between modern, rational, scientific, cultural worldviews and superstitious, 
prejudiced, irrational, magic ones reflected a polarisation in the public life of 
central European communities, in which ‘ritual murder’ was a sensationalist and 
extravagant paradox. In the words of an anti-Semitic editorial for a 1913 ritual 
murder trial: ‘[A]ttorneys did not permit themselves to accept that there “could 
be ritual murders in the century of airplanes and electric trams”.’51 Between 1879 
and 1913, Jewish defendants stood trial for ‘ritual murders’ in Russia, Austria-
Hungarian, and German Empires while the allegations peaked in the decade 
before the turn of the century between 1891 and 1900 when 120 such accusations 
were made public in the Eastern Europe and the German Empire.52 By the end 
of the nineteenth century, the anti-Semitic construction of the figure of the Jew 
had come to symbolise, among others, an adherence to a retrograde, medieval 
mysticism, and savagery through the sacrificial consumption of Christian blood 
and intestines: a gothic imagery not exhausted in the folklore.
In his 1867 publication of The Capital, Karl Marx draws on the same blood-
thirsty trope to critique capitalism as a system structured on self-draining 
and self-consumption. Marx conceives the function of capital through the 
imagery of sucking something valuable and vital (labour) from the working 
classes (the living) only to produce more dead capital: ‘Capital is dead labour, 
which vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour and lives the more, 
49 Weinberg, “The Blood Libel in Eastern Europe,” 279.
50 Kieval, “The Rules of the Game: Forensic Medicine and the Language of Science in the 
Structuring of Modern Ritual Murder Trials.”
51 Weinberg, “The Blood Libel in Eastern Europe,” 279.
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the more labour it sucks,’53 and again: ‘[T]he means of production [are the] 
devourers of living labour.’54 Whether Marx was intending, or not, to fashion 
his critique upon anti-Semitic vocabulary is beyond the scope of this chapter.55 
However, it suffices to emphasise that the widespread fantasy of an all-powerful 
agency (inveterate moneylenders, blood-thirsty, cannibalistic ruling classes) 
threatening to drain and suck the life out of communities was either tolerated or 
passionately supported by the late 19th century anti-capitalist struggles. In fact, 
one wonders whether the timelessly topical anti-capitalist slogan ‘eat the rich’ 
popularises a reversely aggressive anti-capitalist sentiment, originating from 
Marx’s theorisation of capitalist exploitation. Nevertheless, the point is that in 
this world-view it is the greediness and the voracious hunger of the Jew that 
drives his hunting for Christian blood, the plotting of financial exploitation, and 
the uncontrollable absorption of something precious, vital, and desirable that the 
non-Jewish communities possessed. In short, the cannibal fantasies projected on 
Jewish communities exposed financial, cultural, social, and religious anxieties56 
and informed the anti-Semitic imagery of a people which live among us, eat our 
flesh, and suck our (Christian) blood. 
2.5 Cannibals at the Margins of European Empire
In February 1493, whilst returning from the first accidental contact with the 
Amerindians, the Genovese sailor Christopher Columbus wrote a statement to 
the Spanish Crown and public about the process and findings of the voyage. The 
letter was published and disseminated in Barcelona in April 1493 and within a 
53 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, 3rd ed., vol. I (Penguin 
Books, 1982), 342.
54 Marx, I:983.
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few years it was translated into several languages across Europe (Latin, French, 
German, Italian, and Catalan).57 Addressed to various administrators, officials, 
and royals, the letter functioned as an informative and detailed description of 
the islands alongside the climate and the environmental conditions thereof, and 
a lively—yet idealised—portrait of the indigenous cultures. The overarching 
purpose of the report was to celebrate Columbus’ achievement of finding ‘many 
islands inhabited by men without number, of all which I took possession for 
our most fortunate king […]’58 and to attract financial aid and investments, 
prolonging the Spanish presence in the Caribbean islands by making claims for 
merchantable goods.59 Above all, the letter provided an extensive and popularised 
early account of the proto-colonial contact with indigenous cultures that whets 
the imperial appetite and confirms the exigency of Spanish intervention. 
The feminist historian Anne McClintock has argued that the colonial space 
becomes the space where race is invented and exhibited, and in this process 
of construction, gender and sexuality were the founding stones. From her 
analysis of images and journals from the proto-colonial period, McClintock 
argues that in the imperial imagination the ‘terra incognita,’ or the unknown 
lands, were feminised. In his letter, Columbus portrayed the lands as abundant 
in natural wealth: The lands were ‘fertile’ with ‘salubrious rivers,’ ‘beautiful,’ and 
‘full of a variety of trees stretching up to the stars,’60 and their inhabitants are 
naked, peaceful, and well-formed, ‘timid and full of fear;’61 they are ready and 
‘favourably inclined’ to convert to ‘the holy religion of Christ.’62 More amusingly 
so, while sailing toward the Caribbean islands, Columbus fantasised the earth 
as ‘a woman’s breast, with a protuberance upon its summit in the unmistakable 
shape of a nipple—toward which he was slowly sailing.’63 As we will see in 
Chapter Four, Melanie Klein uses a similar image of conquest to describe the 
boy’s response to the unknown and terrifying maternal breast. Furthermore, 
McClintock identifies a paradox running through the travel journals from 
57 Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797, 42.
58 Christopher Columbus, The Letter of Columbus on the Discovery of America, Digital, The 
Library of Congress (New York: Lenox Library, 1892), 2.
59 ‘I promise this, that if I am supported by our most invincible sovereigns with a little of their 
help, as much gold can be supplied as they will need […].’ Columbus, 11.
60 Columbus, The Letter of Columbus on the Discovery of America, 3.
61 Columbus, 5.
62 Columbus, 8.
63 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New 
York and London: Routledge, 1995), 21.
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Columbus to Amerigo Vespucci which she called the ‘long tradition of male 
travel as an erotics of ravishment.’64 McClintock argues that the feminisation 
of the unknown newly encountered lands demarcated the limits of European 
masculinity and framed the conquest in relation to male fears and lust. In the 
European imagination the colonial spaces were invested with libidinal desires 
and fears about the infinite possibilities of gendered and sexualised bodies: ‘[M]
en sported gigantic penises and women consorted with apes, feminized men’s 
breasts flowed with milk and militarized women lopped theirs off.’65 
In the proto-colonial narrative, the cannibal trope became the image of 
a threatening unknown. As previously shown in medieval atrocities and 
persecutions, accusations of human flesh eating were made in order to 
dehumanise, exclude, and separate the prudent Christians from the demonic 
and monstrous witches and Jews. In the colonial context, the cannibal trope 
becomes an assumed ‘essence’ of the figures of the margins. In his letter to 
the Spanish crown, Columbus also reported a certain island of the Caribbean, 
with competent and well-equipped warriors who ‘eat human flesh’ and ‘are 
considered warlike wherefore the other Indians are afflicted with continual 
fear.’66 Compared with the idyllic image of the rich and nurturing, breast-like 
lands, and the yielding nature of some of the inhabitants that lured the European 
male hero, the anthropophagic neighbours made the colonial invasion necessary 
so as to protect the good and naïve Caribbeans from the bad and cannibalistic 
ones. The cannibals were to be found in a yet unconquered and unknown 
‘certain island of the Caribbean.’ They were figures living at the threshold of the 
European empires. Columbus not only carried to the New World assumptions of 
masculinity and femininity and used what Federici calls an ethnographical ‘lens’ 
to interpret the Amerindians.67 But, as psychoanalytically-informed readings 
such as McClintock’s expose, he also carried forward imperial fantasies about 
the margins that were used to demarcate and libidinally energise the colonial 
exploration in terms of gendered violence. Indeed, the tradition of associating the 
unknown with the possibility of cannibalism, as something that lures, swallows, 
engulfs, and terrifies can be found in cartographic practices where the areas 
on maps not explored yet were marked with the word ‘cannibals.’ McClintock 
comments: ‘With the word cannibal, cartographers attempted to ward off the 
64 McClintock, 22.
65 McClintock, 22.
66 Columbus, 10.
67 Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 221.
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threat of the unknown by naming it, while at the same time confessing a dread 
that the unknown might literally rise up and devour the whole.’68 Therefore, the 
word ‘cannibal’ literally became the name that marked the outer borders of the 
European empires, that is, a figure of the margins.
Colonial iconography exposes most vividly the intricacies of the cannibal trope 
in relation to imperial subjectivity, masculine megalomania, and the feminised 
other. A famous 1587 engraving of a Flemish artist, Jan van der Straet, working 
in Florence captures another Italian navigator, that is, Amerigo Vespucci at the 
moment he set foot on Brazil. The scene is presented as a scene of seduction: 
it presents on the one side, the conquistador, in full armour, holding the 
symbols of war (sword), science (astrolabe), and civilisation (flag); and on the 
other, a half-naked long-haired woman in a hammock ‘erotically inviting’ the 
conquistador to lie with her.69 In the middle, there is an indiscernible scene for 
Vespucci consisting of several women engaging in a cannibalistic feast, roasting 
a human leg, and a remarkable absence of indigenous men. The colonial contact 
is translated into an experience of a threshold and in-between binaries: the sea 
and land, the naked and clothed, male and female, raw and cooked, rational and 
eroticised, conquest and sex.70 As such, in hosting cannibals, the threshold is a 
place of risk for imperial masculinity. 
What these accounts from the early colonial contact expose is the fantasy of 
Europe’s margins as a fearful and anxiety-invoking place. Vespucci’s problematic 
account of indigenous femininity may be regarded as producing the indigenous 
as others in a way that constantly affirms the imperial subject’s sense of supremacy 
and consolidates the Christian duty to respond to such a savage threat (they 
eat their enemies). Resembling an all-powerful gigantic breast or populated 
by sexually inviting yet devouring women, these unchartered lands and waters 
expose an ‘acute paranoia’ for physical vulnerability.71 For McClintock, the 
feminisation of the threat functions as a ‘compensatory gesture’ in the sense 
that it substantiates the reason for such a powerful masculine anxiety into a 
more familiarly threatening trope,72 the female body’s (sexual) containment 
as incorporation. The imagery of an all-powerful female breast and body both 
68 McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest, 27.
69 McClintock, 26.
70 McClintock, 26.
71 McClintock, 24.
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promises to nurture those ragged men travelling towards it but also threatens to 
swallow them. In other words, the anxiety of boundary loss gets projected on the 
island of the Caribs, and therefore, male fragility and anxiety are disavowed and 
displaced by the inhabitants who in turn become cannibals. It is they who pose 
a physical threat to the body of the conquistadors, and by extension, to the body 
of the Christian commonwealth. 
The rhetoric of cannibalism signifies that the fear of being lost in the unknown 
lands and annihilated by their inhabitants is a fear dominant in these spaces 
of proto-colonial liminality. Accordingly, the fantasy of being engulfed in the 
unchartered oceanic waters and lands turned the male conquistadors also into 
figures of ‘liminality’ and ‘threshold,’ which in turn necessitated and justified 
excessive masculine violence, equally sweeping and devouring.73 In the land 
of the outlaws, aggression and excessive anti-social behaviour is allowed and 
encouraged since it accomplishes the psychical disownment of the anxiety of 
being annihilated in the body of the other. Eventually, the Central American 
cannibalism became the ‘mark of greatest imaginable cultural difference,’74 
by being inscribed upon and enriching another framework marking radical 
difference, that is, sexuality. As a result, the figure of the cannibal becomes 
the epitome of male anxieties around the vulnerability of the body, emerging 
through the contact with cultural difference and otherness. The fantasy of the 
man-eating other becomes a very personally felt threat. 
While protocolonial iconography exposes the fantasies associated with the 
imperial unknown, it is important to look at how European law and institutions 
were equally dependent on fantasies of engulfment, and regulated them. The 
colonial law of 1503 vividly exposes how the cannibal trope became the excuse 
that justified the European atrocities of murder, rape, and colonial enslavement. 
The 1503 decree is also known as the ‘Cannibal Law’ and was issued by Queen 
Isabella to settle the alleged indigenous threats in the New World by means of 
conversion to Christianity:75 
Every person under my command who should go to the islands and Terra 
73 McClintock, 24.
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Firma of the said Ocean Sea… that if the said cannibals should resist and 
not wish to receive and welcome in their lands the captains and peoples 
who by my command go and make the said voyages, and if [the cannibals] 
do not wish to listen to them in order to be indoctrinated in the things 
of our Holy Catholic Faith and enter my service and become subject to 
me, may and can capture in order to take them to whichever lands and 
islands… in order that they might be sold and a profit be made.76
The decree effectively legalised and encouraged enslavement after the initial 
quest for gold and spices had come to nothing.77 Michael Palencia Roth argues 
that for the Spanish settlements in the Caribbean islands, the instructions of the 
decree were ‘clear and unambiguous’ and resulted in a frenzy of accusations of 
tribes, groups and whole islands as cannibalistic.78 The allegations were legalised 
only once ‘witnessed by a Spanish bureaucrat and duly notarized.’79 To support 
his argument about the arbitrary nature of the allegations, Roth refers to an 
anecdotal story from the 1530s, when King Ferdinand of Castille, issued a royal 
provision that prohibited the enslavement of those allegedly documented as 
cannibals, and as a result ‘the number of official reports, petitions and complaints 
concerning cannibals, which had radically diminished since the 1520s increased 
again.’80 That was because the exploitation of those dehumanised as cannibals 
was a profitable enterprise which transformed the New World into a battlefield 
and a slave market.’81 While Roth does not focus on the gendered dynamics 
of the colonial settlements, he claims that accusations of cannibalism also 
legitimised sexual harassments and abuses of the indigenous women since they 
were supported by claims that ‘the victim was a woman of the cannibals.’82 
The example of the decree of 1503 shows that the cannibal trope was not 
only part of the imperial, masculine fantasies but it had a significant political 
implication as well: it enabled colonial expansion, exploitation, and enslavement. 
Colonialism was founded upon an arbitrary, systematic bureaucratisation which 
is presented as legal, through which the other is categorised as foreigner and 
non-human. This is a foundational feature of modernity and as I have shown 
is rooted in the imaginary naming of the other as cannibal. The colonisation of 
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the New World gave an opportunity to the European empires to consolidate the 
identities of their subjects. The fantasies of cannibalism gave shape to the male 
imperial Christian subject who, as he is surrounded by threatening cannibalistic 
figures, was self-proclaimed as non-cannibalistic. While the cannibal trope was 
a predominant form of othering in European discourse, this is not to say that 
dissident voices were absent. In literature, we encounter a shift in the colonial 
history of cannibalism in which the cannibal trope becomes associated with the 
darker side of imperial masculinity. 
2.6 Interlude: Things of Darkness 
In his 1580 essay ‘Of Cannibals,’ the French philosopher Michel de Montaigne, 
as inspired by the interrogation of three Brazilian Tupinamba members by the 
king of France in Rouen in 1562, draws a link between the discourse of the 
monopoly of ferocity on behalf of these cannibals and French ethnocentrism 
alongside religious fanaticism. Montaigne juxtaposes the tortures occurring 
during the French Religious wars of his time—which involved dismemberment 
and feeding of limbs to dogs and pigs—and challenges the grounds on which 
barbaric and savage demeanour is hypocritically decided as dissociated from 
colonial violence. This is Montaigne: ‘We are justified therefore in calling these 
people barbarians by reference to the laws of reason, but not in comparison with 
ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarity.’83 The implication of his 
argument is that knowledge about the other is indiscernible from knowledge about 
one’s self and as such Montaigne’s understanding of cannibalism is weaved upon a 
space separate from prejudiced Brazilian ethnographies, which instead, functions 
as a ‘black mirror’ for the vices, excesses, and violence inherent in modern society.84 
A similar juxtaposition is played out by William Shakespeare in his final play The 
Tempest (1611). Shakespeare integrates the theme of cannibalism in one of the 
play’s main characters, Caliban (upon whom the most prevalent interpretation 
was that of an anagram of cannibal)85 who represents an exemplar of the 
non-European subject. The reference to cannibalism becomes the signifier 
of difference, not only because it is paired with Caliban’s semi-human nature 
83 Michel de Montaigne, The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, Vol. 1, trans. Jacob Zeitlin (New 
York: Knopf, 1934), 114.
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and savagery but also because Caliban is a transgressive figure who cannot 
be contained within specific boundaries, and hence, becomes the emblem of 
‘morphological ambivalence.’86 Prospero finds shelter in Caliban’s island and 
takes control of him. Their relationship exposes the mutuality of dependency 
between a European master and the other as monster. The status of sovereignty 
of the former requires the presence of another as ‘the usurper depends upon the 
usurped.’87 As such, the inherent instability of this power relationship comes to 
the fore, and towards the end of the play, Prospero acknowledges the fragility 
of his mastery, claiming Caliban as the only true servant of himself, a property 
of himself and as such, Caliban’s monstrosity becomes his property:88 ‘[T]his 
thing of darkness I acknowledge mine.’89 Shakespeare’s cannibal is sketched as an 
object for the master’s utility, and a kind of darkness, a spectral entity produced 
from the master’s discourse to affirm his superiority, as an aspect of the master 
himself. 
The subjugation of the cannibal by a European saviour has often been associated 
with the self/other binary and the anxieties of its collapse. Cannibalism defines 
the precariousness of limit. It signifies where the self ends and the other begins, 
and how easily they are transgressed: that which belongs to me that can never 
be a property of myself. This theme is ingeniously played out in Daniel Defoe’s 
famous castaway novel The Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1719),90 in which the 
Christian slave-trader Crusoe finds himself in the company of a cannibal whom 
he rescues and names Friday. The interest of this story does not lie so much in 
the couple’s affairs—which is informed with some of the motifs of the colonial 
power dynamic—91as in what preceded the encounter with the cannibals and 
Crusoe. For years, Crusoe finds himself in a solitary state wandering on an 
isolated island with no map. Having established that there is no presence of 
another on his island, the only presence is his own, the only voice he hears is 
86 Paul Brown, “‘This Thing of Darkness I Acknowledge Mine’: The Tempest and the Discourse 
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his own along with the echo of his parrot Poll. Until that day Crusoe terrifyingly 
discovers the existence of a ‘print of a Man’s naked Foot on the Shore,’92 unsure 
about whether the trace is his own or it manifests the presence of another on the 
island, Crusoe enters a whirlpool of self-doubt, horror and persecution:
I began to persuade myself it was all a Delusion; that it was nothing else 
but my own Foot, and why might not I come that way from the Boat, as 
well as I was going that way to the Boat […] and that if at last this was 
only the Print of my own Foot, I had play’d the Part of those Fools, who 
strive to make stories of Spectres, and Apparitions; and then are frighted 
at them more than anybody.93
Crusoe’s solitude produces presence as spectre, the identity of the other as a 
trace of a ghost, a delusion, and a fantasy. Ironically, throughout the novel, his 
island is only populated by himself and cannibals: men and their monsters.
2.7 The Curious Incident with the Maoris on Board 
Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, the proliferation of visual images, 
paintings, and novels played a fundamental role in the distribution of groups 
indulging in cannibalistic feasts and dismemberments, systematically entwined 
with extermination and enslavement. However, by the 18th century, European 
Enlightenment ideas about the rational human subject and the increase of 
colonial explorations meant that the stories about cannibal ogres did not hold 
the same validity. As colonial contact became more frequent, and European 
missionaries and explorers were in greater proximity with indigenous groups, 
the fantasies of devouring creatures gave their place to the emerging discourses 
about differences as established on the grounds of nature or culture,94 and 
justifications of savagery related to the emerging concept of race.95 
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In a remarkable account about the production of Polynesian cannibalism, 
Gananath Obeyesekere argues that the best-selling narratives of the British 
navigator Captain James Cook about the most famous and ferocious cannibals, 
the Maori and the Fiji, were fuelled, on the one hand, by the readiness of 
European audiences to devour cannibal stories, and on the other hand, by the 
increasing frequency of shipboard and shipwreck anthropophagy cases among 
European sailors that created the possibility that even in good conscience, fellow 
crew members might resort to eating human flesh for survival.96 During the 17th 
and 18th centuries in Europe, anthropophagy at sea became a frequent practice 
under extreme conditions of shipwrecks, or on-board famine but survivors 
were not punished with manslaughter, and instead, anthropophagy was an 
exigent part of sea customs law.97 Whilst European shipwreck anthropophagy 
could be justified as imposed by survival needs, Aboriginal cannibalism was 
invested with assumptions of ferocity and savagery. In other words, it was not 
because of the act of consuming human flesh per se that cannibalism became
a sign for something that had to be forced to cease. This is best exemplified in 
the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi according to which New Zealand was declared a 
British colony and the Maori inhabitants were subjugated to the British crown. 
The Treaty ordered the abandonment of cannibalistic practices, and as a result, 
the 1840s is considered the date marking the ‘end of Maori cannibalism,’ and 
the beginning of their submissiveness to the crown.98 This political, judicial, 
and bureaucratic control of the island was prepared by the accounts of Maoris 
as cannibals and Cook’s ethnography—despite being embedded in a series of 
cultural misunderstandings, colonial power, and fantasy—was instrumental in 
this regard.
96 Obeyesekere, Cannibal Talk: The Man-Eating Myth and Human Sacrifice in the South Seas, 40.
97 Simpson mentions extensively the following cases: In 1710, the Nottingham Galley sank near 
the Caribbean, eleven members survived, they killed and ate a 44 year-old man. In 1737, the slave-
ship Mary sank near the Canary Islands, four Englishmen, two Portuguese, and an American 
escaped via a raft, they survived after killing and eating the Portuguese man. In 1759, the Dolpin 
ran out of resources causing great shipboard famine. Lots were cast, and a Spanish man was 
killed and eaten. In 1765, famine on board led the crew to cast lots, a black man was killed and 
eaten. In 1766, another ship the Tiger sank and the surviving members killed a young black man 
and ate him. In all of these cases, no conviction for murder or anthropophagy occurred until 
the 1884 the famous case of the Mignonette in which the two survivors of the shipwreck, having 
killed and eaten a black man, were sentenced (a sentence which was reversed shortly after since 
the act was justified by the extreme conditions of hunger and the need for survival). Simpson, 
“Cannibals at Common Law.”
98 Obeyesekere, “Cannibal Feasts in Nineteenth-Century Fiji: Seamen’s Yarns and the 
Ethnographic Imagination,” 64.
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One striking example illustrating the production of Maori cannibals comes from 
1773 and the second voyage of Captain Cook in New Zealand (1772-1775). The 
incident began when some men from Cook’s ship—which was anchored for 
repairs—went ashore to trade artefacts with the natives. This was a common 
practice for the purposes of collecting trophies such as human skulls and bones as 
well as other paraphernalia from the South Seas which were either traded or sent 
to museums and anthropology departments for scientific anatomical research 
in Britain and America.99 When inland, the sailors found the head, the heart, 
and the intestines of a young boy forked on a stick, they bought the head and 
decided to invite a handful of men on-board to test the Maori’s anthropophagic 
preferences. They carved a piece of human flesh from the human head and 
cooked it, then offered it to one native who ‘devour’d it most ravenously and 
suck’d his fingers half a dozen times.’100 When Captain Cook returned to the ship, 
he heard of the incident and ordered the repeat of the experiment which was met 
with great ‘scientific success:’ since one Maori devoured ravenously the piece of 
human flesh, there was no doubt that they were cannibals.101 
Reflecting on the method of objective experimentation and observation, what 
appears to be startling is firstly the presupposition and then the generalisation of 
the accusation of cannibalism, judging from the response of one Maori native, 
and attributing it to all of them. Secondly, the problematic execution of the
experiment which does not take into consideration other possible explanations. 
For example, Cook and the crew members did not take into consideration the 
native as having an agency, and as such responding—out of fear, mockery, 
politeness, or some other unknown reason—not to a British experiment but 
to an offer of a snack.102 More importantly, I want to highlight the profound 
prominence given to the scientific validation and certainty about the practices 
of cannibalism. The experiment put an end to any possibilities of controversy 
around Maori cannibalism. This is Cook’s conclusion: ‘That the New Zealanders 
are Cannibals can now no longer be doubted, the account I gave of it in my former 
Voyage was partly founded on circumstances and was, as I afterwards found, 
99 Obeyesekere, Cannibal Talk: The Man-Eating Myth and Human Sacrifice in the South Seas, 
43–44.
100 Obeyesekere, 31.
101 Obeyesekere, 31.
102 For example, another explanation would be that ‘the Maori eating cannibal steaks with 
seeming relish and with seeming fun […] was based on the fear-knowledge that the British were 
cannibals and hence expected the Maori to eat what was offered to them.’ Obeyesekere, 36.
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discredited by many people.’103 Observation marked cannibalism as a practice 
that could not be challenged; on the contrary the affirmation of pre-contact 
Maori cannibalism became indisputable and incompatible with doubt. After 
Cook’s voyages, several cases of shipwrecks near New Zealand were accompanied 
with reports of Maori consuming the surviving Europeans, fostering the idea 
that ‘Maori would eat anyone whenever circumstances were favourable,’ even 
though ‘there was no evidence supporting such presumption.’104 The intolerance 
towards any obscurity surrounding cannibalistic practices was necessary in 
order to sustain the fantasy of the Maori as cannibal because the presence of 
a consistently threatening other informed colonial expansion and exploitation, 
and more importantly, fed into forms of racial harassment against Europe’s inner 
cannibals. 
2.8 The Cannibal Club 
It was not without controversy that sensational narratives of cannibalism were 
produced. Some early British ethnographers challenged these accounts105 
marking an intricate contradiction within the emerging anthropological 
discipline between ‘liberalism on the one hand, and imperialism and racism 
on the other.’106 The most iconic paradigm of this ideological and political 
incongruity is reflected in the last episode of this genealogy, demonstrating that 
cannibal fantasies do not only belong in the sphere of colonial otherness but 
they have also penetrated into the sphere of European science as the history of 
the foundation of the Royal Anthropological Institute (RAI) in Britain in 1871 
outlines.107
Prior to the establishment of the RAI, two scientific societies, the Ethnological 
Society of London (ESL) and the Anthropological Society of London (ASL), 
engaged in a clash over the descent and the unity of humankind and ideas around 
103 Cook quoted on: Obeyesekere, 32. My emphasis
104 Obeyesekere, 124.
105 See for example the case of Lorimer Fison. Bratlinger, Taming Cannibals: Race and the 
Victorians.
106 Bratlinger, 1.
107 Initially known as ‘the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland’ it became 
known as the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1907 Henrika Kuklick, “The British Tradition,” 
in A New History of Anthropology, ed. Henrika Kuklick (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008), 
55..
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race.108 The ESL followed a liberal anti-slavery political tradition, supporting 
humanitarianism. Most of its members were ‘committed Darwinians,’ and 
believed in the unity of humankind.109 The two groups held their meetings in 
the same building and often exchanged papers,110 but by late 1860 the ASL had 
636 members compared to the 230 of the ESL (two of them were women), and 
29 members were shared among both societies.111 While ethnologists (ESL) 
denoted emphasis on studying the nature and conditions of developmental 
stages, anthropologists (ASL) were concerned with differences in physical 
characteristics. Members of the ASL embraced the view that there was anatomical 
and physiological evidence (especially in the shape and form of the cranium) 
that indicated Blacks as a different and inferior species.112 While the members 
of the ASL passionately celebrated racist ideas (for example, that black slaves 
were constitutionally unsuitable to be free)113 this is not to argue that racism was 
unknown among the ESL, either. For example, one of the prominent ESL figures 
Thomas Huxley (famously known as ‘Darwin’s bulldog’) found the possibility of 
racial equality between blacks and whites ‘so hopelessly absurd as to be unworthy 
of serious discussion.’114 But, perhaps, the most distinct differentiation between 
the two societies was a matter of style, that is, an issue where the cannibal trope 
played a determining role. 
Part of the ASL was an inner clique called ‘The Cannibal Club’ which functioned 
as a space that eschewed the standards of scientific activity and respectability 
of the time.115 The ‘Cannibal Club’ was an elitist and reactionary sub-group of 
108 Kuklick, “The British Tradition”; George W. Stocking Jr., “What’s in a Name? The Origins of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute (1837-71),” Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain 
and Ireland, Man, 6, no. 3 (1971): 369–90.
109 This meant that all humans belong to the same species, the developmental stages are the same 
for all human groups, the direction of evolution is the same, but only the pace is different.
110 Stocking Jr., “What’s in a Name? The Origins of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1837-
71),” 378.
111 Marc Flandreau, Anthropologists in the Stock Exchange: A Financial History of Victorian 
Science (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 55.
112 Stocking Jr., “What’s in a Name? The Origins of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1837-
71),” 379. It is important to mention here that skin pigmentation was not necessary for the racial 
differentiation, as Irish were also considered racially inferior. Stocking Jr., “What’s in a Name? 
The Origins of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1837-71).”
113 Kuklick, “The British Tradition,” 54.
114 Flandreau, Anthropologists in the Stock Exchange: A Financial History of Victorian Science, 49.
115 Stocking Jr., “What’s in a Name? The Origins of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1837-
71).”
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the ASL which collected and translated pornographic literature116 and promoted 
colonial ‘land-grabbing’ through a scheme of settling debts (mostly in South 
American and African countries) through exchange for private land.117 At a 
time when gentlemen’s clubs were flooding London, the sub-group mockingly 
disregarded the canons of gentlemanship through their provocative self-styling 
as ‘cannibals’ and the display of a ‘savage’s’ skeleton in their front window.118 The 
club was fed with artefacts, photographs, and skulls from local secretaries in the 
British colonies,119 and notoriously gavelled to order by a ‘mace in the form of a 
Negro head.’120 To my knowledge, there is no bibliographical reference on why 
they self-proclaimed themselves as members of the ‘Cannibal Club’, however, I 
would argue that their overall effort to establish an intimidating quality of the 
club is indicative of the equivocal nature of the cannibal trope: attractive and 
loathsome, powerful and greedy.
The two societies merged in 1871, during Thomas Huxley’s presidency, in 
what was considered a triumph of the ESL,121 and although many of the 
racist views of the ASL were institutionally repressed after the fusion, these 
controversies shaped the history of British anthropology.122 The name of 
the ‘anthropological’ was maintained—despite the outcry of prominent ESL 
members (e.g. Lubbock)—not only as a ‘dialectical offshoot’123 and as part 
of the arrangements to guarantee the representation of both societies,124 
but also, ironically, because the ‘Cannibal Club’ had left an unpaid financial 
debt under the ASL which could not be extinguished through the merging. 
2.9 Conclusion
When the cannibal trope becomes appropriated by a group of bourgeois 
colonialists like the ‘Cannibal Club’ members, we witness who has the power 
and the right to designate and represent ‘cannibals,’ exposing the arbitrariness of 
116 Matt Cook, London and the Culture of Homosexuality, 1885-1914 (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 91–92.
117 Flandreau.
118 Stocking, 380.
119 Flandreau, Anthropologists in the Stock Exchange: A Financial History of Victorian Science, 55.
120 Stocking,  380.
121 Kuklick, “The British Tradition.”
122 Stocking.
123 Stocking, 384.
124 Kuklick, “The British Tradition,” 55.
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this representation. The ‘Cannibal Club’ highjacked the term and from a signifier 
of the non-human status of the Aboriginal it became a signifier for inhumane, 
demoralising and supercilious capitalistic greed. Therefore, paradoxically they 
exposed that this trope is a cultural construct and raised questions that have 
haunted anthropology, and European epistemologies in general namely ‘who 
authorises colonial representation.’125 The genealogy of the cannibal trope exposes 
the blindness and the denial of the inherent violence of European scientific 
discourses, institutions and epistemologies. More importantly, it brings to the 
fore how the vestiges of the cannibal trope in the history of anthropology pulse 
at the heart of the institutional history of anthropology and colonial history. 
Overall, this genealogy has shown that the cannibal trope sealed pre-modern 
formulations of anthropophagy and transformed a fear of otherness into 
the colonial configuration of race. Race was consolidated through science, 
observation and anthropology and became the signifier of a displacement: a 
category that translates an archaic fear of otherness into a natural, physical and 
material truth—the existence of cannibals. The cannibal trope has exposed that 
being racialised signifies a form of otherness that is ‘other enough’ so that its 
consumption (appropriation, annihilation) does not mean the breaking of a 
taboo. Human flesh consumption, thus, in the white imaginary, is prohibited 
precisely because the white body cannot be objectified; it is considered ‘human’, 
whereas the black one can be exploited, enslaved, raped, imprisoned, traded, 
killed without transgressing the ethics of Western civilisation. This is why when 
in his work Totem and Taboo Sigmund Freud argued that Western civilisation 
has repressed the memory of a prehistoric act of cannibalism and is founded 
upon this violence, he made an important intervention in European ethics and 
the colonial subjectivity. But this is to be explored in the chapter that follows. 
125 Homi K. Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” The MIT 
Press, October, 28, no. Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis (Spring 1984): 131.
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CHAPTER THREE
Freud and the Cannibal: 
Race, Religion, Anti-Semitism in Psychoanalysis 
3.1 Introduction
 In his 1977 work Violence and the Sacred, Rene Girard writes that ‘we are perhaps 
more distracted by incest than by cannibalism, but only because cannibalism has 
not yet found its Freud and been promoted to the status of a major contemporary 
myth.’1  Girard claims that Freud’s intervention elevated incest into the founding 
myth of the psychoanalytic subject. Yet, incest’s credence among psychoanalysts 
did not only serve its designation as a major contemporary mythology. Girard 
also implies that in finding its way into psychoanalysis, incest became a troubling 
and disturbing human desire diverting our attention away from another one; 
the question of cannibalism. The claim here can be read as an epistemological 
critique to psychoanalysis which plays into another major myth: Freudian 
psychoanalysis’ fixation with sexuality. Psychoanalysis’ lack of engagement 
with desires of annihilation and consumption has contributed to the silencing 
of cannibalism as another meaningful mythology, which according to Girard, 
symbolises the violence of integration of foreign members into a community. 
While psychoanalysis exposed incestuous desires at the heart of subjectivity, 
it unwittingly left cannibalistic ones unspoken and unaccounted for. Echoing 
the anthropological critiques on the question of cannibalism mushrooming 
in the 1970s, Girard highlighted the startling absence of human sacrifice and 
consumption amongst the taboos that shape psychoanalysis. In this chapter, I 
argue otherwise: Freud had in fact found cannibalism, but he uncovered what 
was, for his contemporaries, an uncomfortable proximity between cannibalism 
and Christian community. Hence, his argument was necessarily silenced and has 
been ever since. 
Freud’s first substantial discussion of cannibalism can be found in his 1913 text 
Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages 
and Neurotics, in the context of the father-son antagonism throughout humanity’s 
1 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), 277. 
62
prehistory.2 Freud believed that, by exploring the cultural and religious structures 
of Australian Aboriginals, one could illuminate the nature of their psychological 
mechanisms, which could thence be traced back to humanity’s prehistory. 
Freud was not seeking to produce a comparison about what is common in the 
psychology of the black Aboriginal and the European neurotic as the subtitle of 
the work indicates. However, he was looking for what is commonly repressed, 
denied or blocked out in both groups. In drawing on anthropological theses 
to consider the unconscious structures of the human psyche, Totem and Taboo 
marks one of the first psychosocial works of psychoanalysis. 
However, Totem and Taboo was not the first work where the theme of 
cannibalistic wishes was articulated. In his 1900 work The Interpretation of 
Dreams, Freud took cues from the Ancient Greek myth of Kronos to describe 
the psychology of the father-son dynamics. While Kronos the despotic patriarch 
devours his children ‘just as the wild boar devours the sow’s litter,’ to impede 
being overthrown his son Zeus punishes him by castration.3 In this context, 
paternal cannibalism is counterbalanced with filial emasculation which Freud 
mistakenly attributes to Zeus (Zeus overthrew but did not castrate his father), a 
slip which Freud later utilised to expose the truth-revealing aspect of the wrong 
recollection of the myth.4 For Freud, even if the father is a pompous cannibal, 
the castrator son will eventually oppose and defeat him, exposing, through this 
act, the inevitable genealogical succession and the inextricable vulnerability of 
the paternal position—fathers are meant to be dethroned.5 In Totem and Taboo, 
as we will see, the racial subtext in the father-son relationship is reversed, and 
it is the son who becomes the cannibal. Perhaps then, to examine the relation 
between psychoanalysis and race, the question that needs to be asked is not 
only how colonial imagery carried along racial implications that shaped the 
psychoanalytic subject, but also why it was deployed in the first place. Why did 
Freud willingly engage in the perpetuation of a colonialist smear, and why at that 
particular historical moment? 
2 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of 
Savages and Neurotics, trans. James Strachey, 6th ed., vol. XIII, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute 
of Psychoanalysis, 1953).
3 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 
2010), 274.
4 Warner, “Fee Fie Fo Fum: The Child in the Jaws of the Story,” 177.
5 Warner, 177.
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By approaching his engagement with the cannibal trope from an epistemological 
as well as a historical perspective, a crucial methodological issue emerges: 
this is a problem that plagues historical approaches outside historiography. 
It is whether in considering Totem and Taboo within a web of socio-political, 
cultural, and personal dynamics one not only explains but also explains the 
racism away. Norman O. Brown, a marginal American philosopher who 
produced a very powerful critique of Freudian theory in the 1950s, cast a useful 
distinction between psychohistory as a tool leading to a deeper understanding 
of an author’s work, or, as a ‘perverted argumentation’ concealing aspects that 
insult contemporary morals and aim at the ethical cleansing of a theorist’s 
most disagreeable aspects.6 It is by widely acknowledging the tension invoked 
by historicising psychoanalysis that the examination of the cannibal trope in 
Freud’s theory can refrain from idealisation and tarnish, and do justice to the 
tensions between colonialist and post-colonial implications of psychoanalysis. 
Keeping these questions in mind, I examine how Freud utilises cannibalism 
to designate a racialised order of savagery that both informs and threatens 
civilisation. By historically situating Totem and Taboo in the genesis of the 
psychoanalytic institution and the politics that accompanied it, I argue that 
another layer of analysis emerges: the cannibal trope becomes an anti-Semitic 
intervention motivated by Freud’s fatherly, complex, and antagonistic relationship 
with Carl Jung. This historical context is fundamental to understanding why 
Freud developed this colonial imagery and situated it at the core of European 
civilisation and the psychoanalytic subject. Subsequently, I examine how the 
trope was carried forward in psychoanalytic theory and history, and became 
attached to Freud’s theories of aggression, identification, and religion. Overall, 
the argument is that although Freud used the cannibal trope to decentre anti-
Semitic Christian subjectivity, in doing so, he also perpetuated a colonial 
dichotomy between the civilised and the cannibal that relied on the racialisation 
of a non-European other. In this sense, the cannibal trope in Freud’s work 
retained an unresolved relation to Western hegemonic subjectivity, Christianity 
and colonialism—which is why, as is noted by Girard, it is a commonly held 
view that Freud only engaged with the taboo of incest, but not with that of 
cannibalism. 
6 Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History, 2nd ed. 
(Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 181.
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3.2 Race, Racism and anti-Semitism: Psychoanalysis and the Colonial 
Imagination
When examining psychoanalysis in relation to colonial racism, we must take 
into consideration that psychoanalysis has been, from its genesis, a marginalised 
theory and practice. Originally developed by Sigmund Freud and a small circle 
of Jewish physicians, psychoanalysis emerged amidst an intensely hostile, anti-
Semitic social context and was unavoidably shaped by it. In his book Freud, Race 
and Gender, Sander Gilman contends that Vienna was ‘the most anti-Semitic city 
in Europe’ and therefore, race and racial difference were concepts with concrete 
impact and direct influence on Freud’s psychoanalytic thinking.7 ‘As an ‘Eastern’ 
Jew in ‘Western’ Vienna,’ Sander Gilman writes, Freud ‘saw himself as the Other, 
at least in his perception of the world.’8 In the anti-Semitic Christian imagery, the 
Jew’s otherness was inscribed on his body as much as in  his character: Jews were 
considered more carnal, associated with impurity, dirt, hysteria, and madness. 
Moreover, a common slur of the late 19th century was that Jews had ‘no language 
at all,’ and hence were Calibans—such as the cannibal hero from Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest—‘reduced to the level of the beast.’9 Daniel Boyarin argues that the 
alleged carnality of the Jews was manufactured to contrast Christian spirituality, 
a distinction which was also transferred against the body of the colonised, that 
is, ‘one of the prime figures that will be carried forward into the thematics of 
colonialism, with Christian remaining in place and ”the savage” being substituted 
for the Jew.’10
The widespread anti-Semitic ideology affected both the content and the 
institutional politics of psychoanalysis. Freud rejected attempts to label 
psychoanalysis in racial terms because of its Jewish origins. In a letter to his 
Hungarian colleague Sandor Ferenczi in 1911, he writes: ‘There will surely be 
different world views […] here and there. But there should be no distinct Aryan 
or Jewish science. Their results should be identical; only their presentation might 
vary.’11 Freud’s emphasis on infantile sexuality had put him at odds with his Swiss 
and Christian colleagues who considered any engagement with the body as a 
7 Sander L. Gilman, Freud, Race and Gender (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
15.
8  Gilman, Freud, Race and Gender, 215.
9  Daniel Boyarin, “Épater L’Embourgeoisement: Freud, Gender, and the (De)Colonized 
Psyche,” Diacritics, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 24, no. 1 (1994): 34.
10 Boyarin, 34.
11 Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time, Revised (New York and London: Norton, 2006), 239.
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manifestation of the Jewish obsession with carnality. As George Makari notes, 
‘whispers had it that Maeder would dignify the claim that the Jews in Vienna 
were overly concerned with sex—’12Alfonse Maeder being a psychoanalyst and 
a close collaborator of Carl Jung and Eugen Bleuler, the leading psychiatrist and 
the director of the Burghölzli psychiatric clinic in Zurich respectively. However, 
despite these subtle tensions Freud acknowledged that the only possibility to 
safeguard the future of psychoanalysis was to disassociate it from its Jewish 
origins, and for this reason, he appointed his Swiss Christian colleague and friend 
Carl Jung as the first President of the International Psychoanalytic Association 
(IPA), founded in 1910. 
It was Jung who seemed to Freud to ‘bring salvation to psychoanalysis from a 
seemingly Jewish insularity by opening doors to the Swiss and to the gentile 
world. In return, Freud was willing to bestow upon him ‘the mantle of apostolic 
succession.’13 Ignoring Jung’s grandiosity and anti-Semitism, and thereby 
“assigning him the IPA Presidency, Freud believed, was the necessary evil to 
counter the popular anti-Semitic resistance to psychoanalysis.14 At the same time, 
Freud paradoxically situated racial difference within psychoanalysis’ institutional 
history since his choice for the presidency was motivated by the marginal 
place of psychoanalysis. Jung’s gradual theoretical differentiation from Freud’s 
tenets is translated by Freud into a racial conflict and becomes amalgamated 
in the principal myth of Totem and Taboo—where the sons murder and devour 
the father to annihilate him, as a historical allegory of the birth of the social. 
Jung’s publication of Transformations and Symbols of Libido in 1911 began to 
foreshadow the imminent rupture of the two men. In this work, Jung substituted 
Freud’s focus on infantile sexuality with the invocation to expand psychoanalysis 
beyond the individual to the realm of myths.15 Jung aspired to explain how 
cultural symbolisms were responsible for the formation of a ‘collective spirit:’ a 
uniformity of the human unconscious. Myths offered access to the finite arsenal 
12 George Makari, Revolution in Mind: The Creation of Psychoanalysis (London: Duckworth, 
2008), 276.
13 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable (New York 
and London: Yale University Press, 1991), 41.
14 Stephen Frosh, Hate and the Jewish Science: Anti-Semitism, Nazism and Psychoanalysis, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 43.
15 Carl J. Jung, Symbols of Transformation: An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia, 
Vol. 5, trans. R.F.C. Hull, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 1986).
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of unconscious ‘primordial images’16 (a term which in 1919 was substituted 
by the concept of the ‘archetype’).17 Towards the end of Transformations Jung 
argues that the prototypical psychoanalytic self must be understood through 
the Christian concept of homoousios (that is, of the same substance); man is 
made in accordance to Jesus’ image: ‘[F]rom the point of view of psychology 
and comparative religion,’ Jung writes, ‘Christ […] is a typical manifestation of 
the self.’18 ‘The self is an imago Dei,’ it is made in accordance with God’s image 
and ‘cannot be distinguished from it empirically.’19 Where Freud had emphasised 
infantile sexuality and sexual libidinal energy as driving and decentring the 
subject, Jung juxtaposed a non-sexual account of psychoanalytic subjectivity; he 
regarded libido as a ‘neutral force’ resembling ‘appetite like hunger and thirst’20 
and found in the figure of Jesus a model for unconscious struggles. Having read 
the manuscript twice and in the caring tone their relationship entertained at 
that point, Freud wrote to Jung the following November 1911: ‘One of the nicest 
works I have read (again) is of a well-known author on the Transformations 
and Symbols of Libido’ and added that ‘[S]ometimes I have a feeling that his 
horizon has been too narrowed by Christianity.’21 Remarkably, the letter ended 
with a spirited condemnation of a father who becomes drawn (or even seduced) 
by the playfulness of his son: ‘Why in God’s name did I allow myself to follow 
you into this field?’22 Jung’s Transformations posed a provocation to Freud to 
follow a form of ‘wild analysis,’ but unlike Jung, he did not pursue a comparative 
psychoanalytic study in myths and religion, having turned to anthropological 
evidence about non-European cultures instead.
Freud’s turn to British anthropology should be understood primarily in relation 
to Jung’s turn to mysticism, that is, his appropriation of the Christian self and 
departure from the kind of material grounding on the body that Freud had 
painstakingly managed to establish. Until 1911, when Freud began working 
on the four essays comprising Totem and Taboo, he had been preoccupied with 
16 Sonu Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of A Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 297.
17 Shamdasani, 302.
18 Jung, 392.
19 Jung, 392.
20 Jung, Symbols of Transformation: An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia, 131.
21 Sigmund Freud, “Letter from Sigmund Freud to Carl Jung, November 12, 1911.” The Freud/
Jung Letters: The Correspondence Between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung, 1911, 457-459.
22 Freud, 459.
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the psychopathology of everyday life23 and the role of infantile sexuality in 
the development of neurosis, as outlined in The Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality, published in 1905.24 His writings on infantile sexuality demonstrated 
that although fantasy was essentially of importance in the development of 
neurosis, so were actual events in the individual’s life. As Eliza Slavet has 
noted the questions of materiality versus fantasy, history versus mysticism, 
and sexuality versus spirituality lay at the core of Freud and Jung’s divergence. 
Especially after Jung’s publication of Transformations Freud understood that 
Jung ‘was no longer mired in the reality of childhood sexuality—he had moved 
beyond the literal actuality of Freudian psychoanalysis.’25 This is why, while in 
the first three essays of Totem and Taboo Freud mostly draws on anthropology 
and discusses the parallels between cultural rituals in Aboriginal tribes of 
New Zealand, Australia, and Melanesia along with European psychoanalytic 
patients, the final essay mainly focuses on anthropology of religion, and makes 
a detour through humanity’s prehistory to ascribe a common historical origin 
of all cultures in the primal myth.26 At bottom, because Jung leaned heavily on 
mysticism and spirituality, Freud juxtaposed the figure of the Aboriginal as a 
historically-grounded model for the psychoanalytic self. Therefore, through the 
representation of racial difference in Totem and Taboo another racial tension 
is managed, as Jacqueline Rose puts it, ‘[b]ehind Freud and Jung’s engagement 
with sacrifice and ritual, in which they were equally—and equally passionately—
involved we already discover the barely concealed conflict between the Aryan 
and the Jew.’27 In this sense, it becomes impossible to examine the discourse of 
race in Totem and Taboo separately from the wider context of anti-Semitism that 
surrounded its publication. 
In Totem and Taboo’s preface Freud clearly outlines the two strands of knowledge 
23 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 
2010 [1900]); Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII (1905): Jokes and their 
Relation to the Unconcious, 1-247. 
24 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, ed. Anna Freud and James Strachey, 
vol. 7, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: 
Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1974).
25 Eliza Slavet, Racial Fever: Freud and the Jewish Question (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2009), 56.
26 Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and 
Neurotics.
27 Jacqueline Rose, “Freud in the ‘Tropics,’” History Workshop Journal, Oxford University Press, 
47 (1999): 52.
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to which the work responds: Wilhelm Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie and the Zurich 
School’s work on social psychology (Carl Jung is mentioned in a parenthesis), and 
their emphasis on myths and language for the crafting of a theory of individual 
psychology.28 With these in mind, the following section traces discourses of 
human sacrifice and consumption in European anthropological texts, exploring 
how they  informed Freud’s arguments in Totem and Taboo. 
3.2.1 Austrian and German Anthropology
In Vienna, the chair of anthropology was not established until 1913—the 
year in which the final essay of Totem and Taboo was published. Prior to that 
date, anthropological research was conducted in the context of the Austrian 
Anthropological Society, which was founded in 1870 (one year before the British 
Royal Anthropological Institution), and had strong ties with the German one.
Particularly after 1889 the two societies held joint meetings in Vienna.29 The most 
influential Viennese anthropologist—to whom the first chair of anthropology 
was given—was Rudolf Pöch, a Berlin-trained anthropologist who in the 1900s 
undertook two extended fieldwork projects in New Guinea and South Africa, and 
aimed to produce a form of racial anthropology, consisting of an array of collected 
evidence: photographs, films and recordings.30 This emerging racial science, 
emphasising the physical, facial, and morphological characteristics of humans to 
associate racial variety with racial inequality, sat well with contemporary social 
debates about the concept of national character and groupings, having supplied 
the grounds for a scientifically approved racist and anti-Semitic ideology which 
developed mainly after 1913.31 During the First World War, Pöch led a project of 
Viennese and German anthropologists engaging in a tedious and bureaucratic 
collection of data and all other necessary information suitable for statistical 
evaluation and categorisation from detainees in camps and prisons.32 Pöch 
28 Freud, XIII:xiii.
29 Margit Berner, “From ‘“Prisoner of War Studies”’ to Proof of Paternity: Racial Anthropologists 
and the Measuring of ‘“Others”’ in Austria,” in “‘Blood and Homeland’”: Eugenics and Racial 
Nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe, 1900-1940, ed. Marius Turda and Paul J. Weindling 
(Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007), 41–42.
30 Maria Teschler-Nicola, “Volksdeutsche and Racial Anthropology in Interwar Vienna: The 
‘Marienfeld Project,’” in “‘Blood and Homeland’”: Eugenics and Racial Nationalism in Central and 
Southeast Europe, 1900-1940, ed. Marius Turda and Paul J. Weindling (Budapest and New York: 
Central European University Press, 2007), 57.
31 Berner, “From ‘“Prisoner of War Studies”’ to Proof of Paternity: Racial Anthropologists and 
the Measuring of ‘“Others”’ in Austria.” 46.
32 Berner, 46.
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died in 1921 and was succeeded by Father Schmidt, an anti-Semitic pastor who 
overshadowed Viennese anthropology for the years to come.33 In short, both 
German and Viennese anthropologists were preoccupied with ‘racial science’ and 
‘racial biology,’ namely the documentation and cataloguing of physical differences 
to confirm racial hierarchy. The implication is that the Viennese anthropological 
society was far from an objective scientific circle disinterested in politics. On 
the contrary, the anthropological discipline was sustained by a racist ideology: 
it both informed and was informed by discourses around the nation-state, and 
as to the methods whereby the national ‘biological capital’ could be preserved.34
Opposed to the category of race was that of the Volk (people). In Germany, 
since the mid-19th century, a field of psychological studies had gained significant 
ground and entertained a great theoretical dissemination among both German 
and French sociologists (Max Weber, Werner Sombart, Emile Durkheim, 
to name a few).35 Völkerpsychologie stood as an alternative to the racialized 
anthropological studies and aimed at the investigation of national character by 
unpacking the laws of human development from a psychological point of view, 
thus moving away from the inscription of difference on the body and physical 
characteristics. Through the study of myths, customs, and languages, the aim 
of Völkerpsychologie was to trace the nature of the ‘cultural spirit’—the way in 
which cultural advances were shaped upon the sum of past talented individuals. 
Völkerpsychologie was a liberal scientific approach aiming at disengaging the 
concept of race from the study of culture, and as such, it regarded humans as 
complex entities that could not be compartmentalised and studied in isolation. 
They rather had to be studied within the conditions of a national and cultural 
group.36 The term Völkerpsychologie was coined by Moritz Lazarus in 1851, an 
emancipated, liberal Jew who along with his friend and brother-in-law Heymann 
Steinthal set the foundations for cultural and community studies in Germany, 
and the association of an academic project with a political program to publicly 
combat anti-Semitism and debate the national assimilation of Jewish Germans 
(against conversion to Christianity).37 Both Lazarus and Steinthal aimed to bridge 
33 In a letter to Arnold Zweig on the 30th of September 1934, Freud wrote that Father Schmidt 
was responsible for the ban of the Italian version of the Review of Psychoanalysis. Sigmund Freud, 
“Letter from Sigmund Freud to Arnold Zweig, September 30, 1934,” 1934. Letters of Sigmund 
Freud 1873-1939, 421-423.
34 Berner, 7.
35 Klautke, The Mind of the Nation: Völkerpsychologie in Germany, 1851–1955, 75–77.
36 Klautke, 66.
37 Klautke, 22–27.
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the gap between philosophical idealism on the one hand, and the depersonalising 
characters of anthropology and ethnology on the other, by means of their idea 
of individual psychology studied through the collective. However, none of them 
escaped the idealisation of the Jewish spirit, and as such, they remained gripped 
by the anti-Semitic politics of their time—none of them managed to break the 
‘glass ceiling’ and become full members of German academia.38 
Wilhelm Wundt, a professor at the University of Leipzig since 1875, inherited 
their project, and expanded the concept of folk psychology by including the study 
of language, the analysis of myths, forms of religious thought, customs, morals 
and politics. In his 1912 work Elemente der Völkerpsychologie39 (a work Freud 
drew upon in Totem and Taboo), Wundt proposed that cultural diversity was 
not an issue of racial difference, but of collective creation of the community, that 
is, the folk. The ‘folk soul’ was a form of a collective spirit that was responsible 
for the formation of the people’s character while informing art, religion, and 
language.40 Wundt valued the role of the collective more than the individual, and 
as a result, he regarded products of the community such as morals, myths, and 
language as the keys to understand individual psychology. Wundt’s work was 
based on a liberal epistemological framework that relied on the idea of progress 
and evolution, and regarded mankind as not split in different races, unlike many 
Austrian and German anthropologists tried to do. While this view challenged 
racial hierarchies, by allowing the comparative study of cultures, it created yet 
a different version of asymmetry. However, the most important implication of 
Völkerpsychologie perhaps was that, although it produced an alternative to the 
racist anthropological theories, it failed to take the body into account. Culture 
and cultural difference were in many ways products of the mind that is, of 
language, mythology, and morals. Wundt’s emphasis on the symbolic structures 
was very influential for Carl Jung, since Völkerpsychologie informed Jung’s idea 
of the ‘primordial images’ and enabled him to consider myths as exemplars of an 
archaic and inherited collective memory, which through cross-cultural parallels—
how the same symbols appear in different cultures—confirmed the hypothesis 
38 Klautke, 15.
39 In this work, Wundt refers to Fraser, Morgan, Spencer, and Gillen, all British anthropologists 
thanks to their work on comparative methodology in the study of marriage and in particular 
the Australian phenomenon of group marriage as a transitional stage between promiscuity and 
monogamy. Wilhelm Wundt, Elements of Folk Psychology (London: George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd., 1916), 38.
40 Klautke, The Mind of the Nation: Völkerpsychologie in Germany, 1851–1955, 68.
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of a finite unconscious container, as removed from physical materiality.41 For 
example, both Jung and Wundt believed that the feelings of aversion to incest were 
enforced by the existence of a cultural prohibition disregarding any psychological 
or biological explanation: humans were culturally trained to feel disgusted 
by incestuous wishes.42 In a letter from August 2, 1912, shortly before their 
separation, Jung wrote to Freud that it is ‘highly unlikely that primitive man ever 
passed through an era of incest. Rather it would appear that the first manifestation 
of incestuous desire was the prohibition itself.’43 Freud had a different view.
3.2.2 British Anthropology
While German anthropology was primarily preoccupied with the mind and the 
cultural connections of the folk, British anthropology was widely dependent on 
biological and evolutionary narratives that explained cultural difference in racial 
and temporal terms. As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, liberal British 
anthropologists took their cue from Charles Darwin and argued that human race 
was one, unified, and equipped with the same mental capacities. As the historian 
of Victorian anthropology George Stocking has shown, amongst the most liberal 
strands of British anthropology cultural difference was not biologically given but 
was the result of temporal transformations: the human races could be found in 
distinct measurable evolutionary scales that range from savagery to civilisation.44 
Sir Edward Tylor’s 1871 work Primitive Culture is one of the best-known in this 
tradition.45 Reviewing material collected from administrators and missionaries 
who lived with indigenous people under colonial settlements, Tylor produced 
a comparative account of the evolutionary development of humankind. He 
believed that the European intelligentsia was the most culturally advanced 
group of people and were the historical product of transformations from so-
called primitive cultures. Hence European and American intellectuals settled 
‘a standard by simply placing its own nation at one end of the social scale and 
41 Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of A Science.
42 Wilhelm Wundt, Elements of Folk Psychology (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1916), 
151–52.
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the savage tribes on the other, arranging the rest of mankind within these 
limits according as they correspond to savage or to cultured life.’46 European 
civilisation manifested the overall direction of humanity’s progress, and, 
what Tylor took as his task was to classify cultural artefacts such as linguistic 
phenomena, myths, physiological features (type of brains, bone structures 
and so on) in order to manufacture the stages in this evolutionary scale. Tylor 
developed the idea that previous cultural systems can be accessed by examining 
relics in contemporary cultures of so-called savages. He therefore utilised the 
‘doctrine of survivals’ to show that the past makes itself known through cultural 
relics: ‘processes, customs, opinions, and so forth, which have been carried on by 
force of habit into a new state of society.’47 The doctrine of survivals challenged 
notions of progress and linearity as well as the distinct and solid classification 
of evolutionary stages. Similar to Freud’s understanding of the symptom, Tylor’s 
idea of ‘survivals’ offered a threshold to the past that explained cultural change 
as transformation. For Tylor, the purpose of evolutionary anthropology was to 
decipher these signs,48 just as the purpose of psychoanalysis was to unpack the 
meaning of the symptom.
Furthermore, in Tylor’s thought, human flesh eating was associated with 
the acquisition of someone’s qualities, and it was a practice of both so-called 
primitive cultures as well as of the lower classes which were also situated in 
his evolutionary scale. Tylor believed that the European equivalent of the 
savages, in which ‘exceptionally low civilization’ was encountered, were the 
proletarians, beggars, and thieves.49 He therefore provided a vivid description 
of how improper consumptions indicated the unsophistication and naivety 
proper to less evolved groups. In an anecdotal story about an English merchant 
in Shanghai, Tylor writes that ‘at the time of the Taeping attack, [the merchant] 
met his Chinese servant carrying home a heart and asked him what he had got 
there. He said it was the heart of a rebel, and that he was going to take it home 
and eat it to make him brave.’50 Similarly, in his 1865 work Prehistoric Times, Sir 
John Lubbock gives the following account of what the ‘true savage’ looked like: 
‘The true savage is neither free nor noble; he is a slave to his own wants, his own 
passions, imperfectly protected from the weather, he suffers from the cold by 
46 Tylor, 1:26.
47 Tylor, 1:16.
48 Tylor, 1:21.
49 Tylor, 1:43.
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night and the heat of the sun by the day […] hunger always stares him in the 
face, and often drives him to the dreadful alternative of cannibalism or death.’51 
Like Tylor, Lubbock linked cannibalism with destitution and poor reasoning—
Tylor’s servant believed that eating a rebel’s heart would equip him with bravery 
while Lubbock’s ‘true savage’ is plagued by his ignobility and improper passions. 
As Stocking pointed out, although utterly different from the Papuans of the New 
Caledonia, for Victorian anthropologists, the European peasantry still served, 
‘as a crucial link between modern civilised and primitive savage man,’52 as an 
instance of ‘broken-down civilization.’53 
Amongst British anthropologists, Sir James Frazer was a controversial figure. 
Influenced by Tylor, Frazer produced a comparative work on religions in which 
he questioned the validity of Biblical views, inviting his audience not to take 
them at face value.54 His 1890 iconic twelve volume work The Golden Bough is 
a thorough study of classical mythology and colonial anthropology, where he 
traces cultural evolution in different forms of thinking ranging from magical to 
religious to scientific.55 Frazer made use of the comparative method not to affirm 
the progressive character of the European cultural achievements, as Tylor and 
Lubbock did, but in a more insightfully radical way. Frazer juxtaposed different 
religious worldviews to decenter the hegemonic affirmations of Christianity. 
Religious belief was not necessarily progressing towards a more advanced 
structure, since in believing in Jesus as of half human, half divine nature, 
worshippers, claims Frazer, lost their belief in their own sanctity and virtue: 
The notion of a man-god or of a human being endowed with divine 
or supernatural powers, belongs essentially to that earlier period of 
religious history in which gods and men are still viewed as beings of 
much the same order, and before they are divided by the impassable gulf 
which, to later thought, opens out between them. Strange, therefore, as 
may seem to us the idea of a god incarnate in human form, it has nothing 
very startling for early man, who sees in a man-god or a god-man only 
a higher degree of the same supernatural powers which he arrogates in 
51 Lord Avebury, Prehistoric Times as Illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and 
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perfect good faith to himself.56 
In Frazer’s view, Christian religion was a historical transformation from other 
forms of religious organisation and magical belief. This is why in the third edition 
of the Golden Bough his critique of Christianity was forced into the appendix 
(the version Freud used for Totem and Taboo).  Furthermore, in his four-
volume work Totemism and Exogamy, Frazer developed his theory of religion, 
by assembling what Wundt called as ‘the richest collection of facts concerning 
totemic culture.’57 Frazer believed that totemism was both a religion and a form of 
social organisation that regulated the relations among the individual themselves 
and the group: the totem was a sacred object that defined ‘the relations of mutual 
respect and protection between a man and his totem.’58 Moreover, ‘in its social 
aspect it consists of the relations of the clansmen to each other and to men of 
other clans.’59 Belonging in the same totem meant that individuals who shared 
‘one blood’ were ‘descendants of a common ancestor,’ and were also ‘bound 
by a common faith in the totem.’60 By grouping individuals and linking them 
in the same ancestral lineage, the role of totemism among so-called primitive 
cultures was, according to Frazer, to fundamentally prevent incest. Unlike Jung, 
Frazer maintained the view—which Freud enthusiastically adopted—that the 
‘innovation’ of totemism was not introduced ‘from any such moral antipathy 
to incest.’61 On the contrary, ‘that antipathy is rather the fruit than the seed of 
the prohibition.’62 As the allegedly less evolved cultures exemplified, totemism 
provided the concrete evidence for the social exigency to regulate the individual’s 
incestuous desires. 
The Scottish anthropologist and Biblical scholar Robertson Smith provided 
the most crucial account for Freud’s narrative of the origins of society in the 
primal crime. Smith’s 1889 study Lectures on the Religion of the Semites uses the 
concepts of the totemic meal and totemic sacrifice to examine the evolution of 
56 Frazer, I:32.
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religions.63 Smith studied the Bible and the religions of Eastern Mediterranean 
and Mesopotamia seeking for an evolutionary account of totemism. He 
believed that it was not individual faith that bounded religious groups, but a 
communal participation to the ritual of totemic sacrifice. Providing evidence 
from the Hebrews, the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Romans, 
Smith showed that ancient cultures practiced human sacrifice, which, however, 
gradually eclipsed and was substituted with animal flesh, and in Christianity 
with a symbolic flesh—which was a concrete proof of cultural advancement.64 
According to Smith, the sacrificial meal was a social act of eating and drinking 
during which the prohibited totemic animal was collectively consumed by a 
particular group and established a sense of duty among them: ‘[T]hose who 
eat and drink together are by this very act tied to one another by a bond of 
friendship and mutual obligation.’65 While with the domestication of animals, 
totemic sacrifices gradually ceased, Smith argues that ‘where the sacrificial meal 
was retained, the tendency was to drop such features in the ritual as suggested 
the disgusting idea of cannibalism.’66 
Furthermore, in choosing to study the Semitic cultures, namely the civilisations 
of Eastern Mediterranean and Mesopotamia, Smith accepted the popular 
racial distinction of the 19th century between the Aryan and the Semite.67 
Smith constructed a historical and evolutionary scale of religions, which was 
overlapped by a racial subtext, imputing that evolution meant a gradual progress 
to Christianity, so-called Aryanism and whiteness. As a historically younger 
religion, and allegedly more evolved one, the ritual of the Christian communion 
could only be explained in the light of the older Semitic traditions. So, Smith 
offered historical and anthropological depth to the meaning of the Christian 
totemic meal, and in this sense, as did Frazer, he challenged the hegemony of 
Christianity as the source and origin of Western culture. In a way, Smith implied 
that the communion is an allegedly more evolved transformation of a much 
older ritual shared by Semitic peoples.
Overall, in Totem and Taboo Freud drew widely from the comparative 
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method, the anthropological accounts, and the evolutionary narratives of 
Aboriginal structures as traced in the works of then eminent and liberal British 
anthropologists such as Tylor and Lubbock. As Celia Brickman has insightfully 
argued, the theoretical pillar of Totem and Taboo is the British evolutionary 
theory, and it was used by Freud to correlate ‘civilization, the culmination of the 
cultural evolutionary scale of the anthropologists with psychosexual maturity,’ 
while the figure of the savage served as the exemplar of a less-evolved social 
and psychological moment.68 Moreover, while the cannibal trope was featured 
as a marginal element in savage practices, in British  anthropologists’ accounts it 
served as a designation of uncivility and destitution, and therefore it becomes an 
indicator of a social practice that helped forge the idea of European civility. On 
the contrary, it is in Smith’s discussion of the sacrificial meal that the cannibal 
trope becomes incorporated in the evolutionary history of religions, as the 
predecessor of the Christian Eucharist. Freud’s turn to Frazer and Smith was not 
just because these sources were available to him, as Edwin Wallace has claimed 
in his study of Freud’s deployment of anthropology.69 But rather, Freud’s use of 
literature was both strategic and political. Prior to the publication of the final 
essay ‘The Return of Totemism in Childhood,’ he wrote to Abraham that his 
work would ‘serve to neatly eliminate anything Aryan-religious. Because that will 
be the consequence.’70 Freud took his cues from two Christian British scholars 
who had both decentered Christianity by taking it as a cultural text and studied 
it comparatively. Accepting the evolutionary framework that culminated in a 
white Christian subjectivity, Freud incorporated a lineage among cannibalism, 
totemism, and the Christian communion. This way, he could argue that the 
minds of European Christians and Australian Aboriginal so-called savages were 
from a psychological point of view formed by the same unconscious wishes; 
and, cannibalism was one of them. However, in arguing so Freud brought 
within psychoanalysis a discourse of race and racial difference which defined 
unconscious processes. 
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3.3 Totem and Taboo
Freud’s Totem and Taboo was developed in the shadows of his conflict with 
Jung as an anti-Semitic intervention to psychoanalytic history. It was the racial 
antagonism and its implications for psychoanalytic theorisation that Freud came 
to reject, but in doing so, he absorbed the racial imagery of the cannibal trope 
embedded in Victorian anthropology. In The Return of Totemism in Childhood 
Freud applied this imagery in the manufactured narrative of the primal crime. 
Modern society and individuals, Freud believed, came to being from a ‘primal 
horde’ that was ruled by an authoritarian and powerful father who possessed all 
the women:71 
‘One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed 
and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde. 
[…]  Cannibal savages as they were, it goes without saying that they 
devoured their victim as well as killing him. The violent primal father had 
doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the company 
of the brothers: and in the act of devouring him they accomplished their 
identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion of his 
strength. […]72
While the sons committed the murder to defeat the father, their love for him was 
expressed through the act of eating his dead body. The cannibal meal signified 
the brothers’ union through partaking in the father’s flesh and their individual 
acquisition of the paternal power through the possession of the women. 
However, the displacement and identification with the father invoked great 
feelings of guilt because in destroying him they had also destroyed a loved and 
admired figure. ‘The dead father became stronger than the living one had been,’73 
and remorse led the sons to perpetuate his regime by renouncing the women he 
possessed and refraining from substituting him. The primal crime, therefore, 
led to the establishment of the two prohibitions of totemism which represent 
‘the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex’74: the taboo on incest and on 
cannibalism. 
For Freud, then, religion was just a transformation of totemism that helped 
manage the psychological conflict caused by ambivalence towards the father: 
71 Freud, XIII:142.
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‘[A]t bottom God is nothing other than an exalted father.’75 Freud then proceeds 
to examine the development of the Christian religion, as a unique social 
phenomenon that presents a shift from the father religion to ‘the son-deity who 
was destined to lasting success.’76 First of all, the primal crime was developed
into totemic religion where the god-father was symbolised by absence: the 
withdrawal from sexual impulses, the observance of prohibitions, and the 
carrying of guilt. This had established an ‘original democratic equality that had 
prevailed among all the individual clansmen.’77 However, as the initial bitterness 
towards the dead father ceased, the fraternal clan sought the recovery of an ideal 
figure that embodied the ‘unlimited power of the primal father.’78 Following 
Frazer and Smith, Freud argued that the histories of annual sacrifices among 
the Latin and Semitic tribes prove the indestructibility of the guilt from the 
primal crime. Moreover, the ritual sacrifices did not express sympathy for the 
sacrificed god’s passions but served the absolution of responsibility for the god’s 
death. Therefore, in the anthropology of religion Freud had found evidence for 
the sons’ rebelliousness against the father and the simultaneous feelings of guilt 
accompanying these impulses, which confirmed his psychological hypothesis 
about the fundamental ambivalence of the human subject. 
In Freud’s historical, evolutionary account from the primal crime, to totemism, 
and to organised religion, the genesis of Christianity stands as a moment of 
rupture. The ground-breaking novelty of the Christian sacrifice was that it 
offered an ‘alternative method of allaying […] guilt.’79 Instead of the sacrifice 
being committed by the clan as a whole, Christ ‘sacrificed his own life and so 
redeemed the company of brothers from original sin.’80 Freud observes that 
while Jesus was sacrificed to offer atonement to the god father and alleviate the 
worshippers’ guilt, at the same time, he achieved the replacement of the father; 
‘[h]e himself became God, beside, or, more correctly, in place of, the father.’81 
As a result, Christianity achieved two things: firstly, it replaced the memory of 
the primal crime with Jesus’ sacrifice. In a sense, ‘it is a fresh elimination of 
75 Freud, XIII:147.
76 Freud, XIII:153.
77 Freud, XIII:149.
78 Freud, XIII:149.
79 Freud, XIII:153.
80 Freud, XIII:153.
81 Freud, XIII:154.
79
the father.’82 And secondly, it reinstated the ancient totemic meal in the form of 
communion, in which it is the flesh of the son that is incorporated. 
Having followed some of the main arguments Freud made in the final essay of 
Totem and Taboo, let us now consider what is new in the idea of cannibalism 
introduced here. Firstly, Freud associates the origins of civilisation and religion 
with the withdrawal from cannibalism. Contrary to the colonial dichotomy 
that considered the colonised other as a cannibal, Freud theorised the desire to 
overthrow and acquire the powers of the father as part of the psychic make-up of 
the psychoanalytic subject. Moreover, psychoanalytic subjectivity is theorised as 
plagued by guilt and unconscious cannibalistic wishes that constantly undermine 
civilisation; Jacqueline Rose even suggested that ‘the myth of primal murder 
[…] is modern man’s legacy to bear the repressed history of a more primitive 
world.’83 In other words, Freud borrowed the cannibal trope from narratives that 
attach it to the Aboriginal to describe the cruelty and violence of the modern, 
civilised, white subject. In Freud’s myth of the primal horde, cannibalism is 
both a marker of savagery, and, the threshold to civilisation and to subjectivity. 
Secondly, through the myth of the origins of the social, it appears that Freud’s 
theory of identification makes use of the cannibal trope as the model of how 
an individual constructs their own identity and therefore preserves within it an 
ambiguous legacy of racist, colonial thought. 
3.4 Consuming the Past: Aggression 
In the 1920s psychoanalysis entertained world-wide celebration, a growing 
number of admirers, the first training institute in Berlin and its association 
with cultural revolution and modernism (Parisian artists were very fond of 
psychoanalysis).84 Ideas such as primitivism and cannibalism had a strong 
presence in the avant-garde movements in Europe and Latin America. As we will 
see in Chapter Six more extensively, in 1922 during the Week of Modern Art in São 
Paulo, the Brazilian artist Oswald de Andrade launched a short-lived movement 
embracing anthropophagy as part of a conceptual, anti-colonialist resistance. In 
that historical conjuncture, the cannibal trope in Freud’s work carries the memory 
of anti-Semitism, the challenges of fathering the psychoanalytic movement, 
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and enters in dialogue with anti-colonial aesthetic initiatives. Embedded in the 
unconscious of the Western subject the cannibal trope marks a post-colonial 
turn, since it claims an innate savagery that contradicts the subject’s rationality. 
On the other hand, this split is theorised through a racial trope and inserts a 
colonial dynamic within the subject. In this section, I explore how the collectively 
inherited memory of the primal cannibalism informs Freud’s metapsycholgical 
theory.  
One of the most profound moves to establish the continuity of the inherited 
memory of cannibalism and the individual unconscious is encountered in the 
1915 revision of the Three Essays of Sexuality.85 In the revised edition, Freud 
added a section expanding on the previously outlined development of sexual 
organisation—according to which the mouth, the anus, and the genitals 
functioned as erotogenic zones before pubertal sexuality. After 1915, the mouth 
became an orifice through which sexual energy was regulated, and the first body 
part that was equipped with ambivalence: 
These phases of sexual organization are normally passed through 
smoothly, without giving more than a hint of their existence. […] The 
first of these is the oral or, as it might be called, cannibalistic pregenital 
sexual organization. Here sexual activity has not yet been separated 
from the ingestion of food; nor are opposite currents within the activity 
differentiated. The object of both activities is the same; the sexual aim 
consists in the incorporation of the object—the prototype of a process 
which, in the form of identification, is later to play such an important 
psychological part.86
Freud believed that in early life the pleasure from nutrition is undifferentiated 
from sexual pleasure; they both serve the same aim: the incorporation of an 
object. At this stage of development, sexuality aims at having, possessing and 
incorporating, because it is informed by a ‘relic of cannibalistic desires.’87 Freud’s 
adherence to the evolutionist doctrine of stages is apparent in the symmetrical 
relationship of individual development and the evolutionary one, as outlined 
in Totem and Taboo, namely that the cannibal trope appears in the pregenital 
stage of the individual exposing a mutual imbrication of the individual and 
humanity’s past in a racial dynamic, allowing the space for its overcoming via the 
85 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.
86 Freud, 7:116. Emphasis in the original.
87 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.
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establishment of the oedipal prohibition.88 However, there is also an important 
implication from arguing that the oral-phase of development is informed by 
cannibalistic desires. This pre-oedipal aggression is an inherited memory of a 
past long forgotten, but not entirely. As Freud had written earlier in his famous 
Dora paper ‘no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his 
finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.’89 The wish to cannibalise, 
then, cannot be kept a secret; it oozes out in every enactment of identification 
and is confirmed in the process by which one acquires an individual sense of self. 
Having reconstructed a historical event of a collective, fraternal cannibalistic 
sacrifice drawing on a hegemonic Western imaginary, and by analogy having 
inserted a similar cannibalistic tendency to infants, Freud made a third step 
towards the direction of his greatest interest during the First World War: the 
dissection of the contents and structure of the unconscious. This third step 
comes to the fore in Mourning and Melancholia where Freud regards the primary 
cannibalistic wishes as an explanation for depression. Melancholia, for Freud is 
conceived as an impossible mourning. Contrary to the sons who in eating a 
piece of their murdered father assimilated the paternal power into themselves 
and gave birth to laws, prohibitions, cultures, and religions, in refusing to 
acknowledge the loss of the loved one or in being incapable of consciously 
processing it,90 the melancholic consumes herself: ‘The patient represents his 
ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable’;91 
this ‘internal work […] is consuming his ego.’92 To explain why the melancholic 
resorts to an internal, introverted aggression against herself Freud claims that 
the libidinal energy attached to the object is not foregone once the object is lost. 
If it cannot be channelled externally, it is turned inwards and thus ‘the shadow of 
the object falls upon the ego.’93 This in turns results in an internal, unconscious 
split or in a distinct agency which attacks the melancholic’s ego—formulating 
the basis for the concept of the super-ego.  
88 Brickman, Aboriginal Populations in the Mind.
89 Sigmund Freud, Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, vol. VII (1901-1905), The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, A Case of Hysteria, 
Three Essays on Sexuality and Other Works, 1905, 78.
90 Sigmund Freud, Mourning and Melancholia, ed. Angela Richards, trans. Strachey, James, 2nd 
ed., On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 254.
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92 Freud, 255.
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Remarkably, Freud regarded melancholia as a regression to an early 
identification with the object, a state during which any relation to the external 
world is impossible. Confined by an inexhaustible sorrow without any apparent 
explanation (‘one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost’)94 tormented by 
an immense amount of hostility, hatred and guilt, Freud portrays the melancholic 
as in a profoundly a-social state, which is inevitably counter-balanced by a 
manic state in which the ‘ravenously hungry man’ is searching ‘for new object-
cathexes.’95 Echoing the 19th century popular distinction that separated the West 
from the rest by monopolising the privilege of life under a robust, aggregable, 
civilised culture, contrasted with those uncivilised hordes who voraciously 
cannibalise each other, Freud places the melancholic as a psychologically 
debilitated individual, a cannibal vegetating among the civilised. Nonetheless, 
in Mourning and Melancholia, Freud was perplexed by psychic states that firmly 
adhered to uncomfortable truths, as the melancholic has ‘a keener eye for the 
truth than other people who are not melancholic.’96 
In a way, it appears that Freud was also trying to make sense of his own insistence 
on perpetuating uncomfortable truths about the human past, memory, and 
the nature of drives, and his almost manic devotion to the understanding 
of the unconscious—Freud wrote twelve (only five were completed) of his 
metapsychological papers in a ‘seven-week span of furious activity.’97 He had 
abandoned anthropological accounts of collective sacrifices to engage with the 
individual and her battles. In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud adumbrated the 
way psychic life reflects the social one: if the melancholic is glued in a psychic 
debilitation, this is because her psyche is at war with itself. But this assumption 
would only leave a series of questions unanswered: what are these ‘countless 
separate struggles’ that the melancholic is so preoccupied with and becomes 
withdrawn from the social?98 How is this separate agency with attacks the 
melancholic developed? Is it inherited, or is it unconsciously internalised? How 
much further back in the individual and collective history must one look for 
answers? These questions were addressed several years later. But, as often occurs 
in psychoanalysis, they uncannily coincided with the year Freud was diagnosed 
with a severe disease that would plague him until the end of his days: oral cancer. 
94 Freud, 254.
95 Freud, 264.
96 Freud, 255.
97 Makari, Revolution in Mind: The Creation of Psychoanalysis, 303.
98 Freud, Mourning and Melancholia, 266.
83
3.5 Truths Difficult to Swallow: Identification 
While Freud scrutinised the untrodden paths of the human unconscious, he did 
not ignore the impact of the social world in shaping human psychology. A theme 
that emerges throughout his work is the poisonous, unnatural and unavoidable 
incorporations which, coming from the outside, alter one’s inside. In Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego Freud returned to the cannibal trope to 
explain group cohesion as established through a collective incorporation of a 
group’s leader.99 Though he had compared the unconscious contents historically 
and cross-culturally in Totem and Taboo arguing that it is the same wish that is 
universally repressed, in Group Psychology he scrutinised the ‘collective mind’ 
as shaped not only from internal, Oedipal desires, but also from an external 
‘common substance’ that is collectively consumed among the members.100 This 
time, Freud returned to the primal horde vignette, negated its status as historical 
truth and framed it as a ‘just-so-story;’ a not-necessarily actual event, but 
nonetheless a helpful paradigm to think about institutions, where individuals 
come together around a leading figure.101 Aware of the resemblances between 
the function of Christian communion and the collective cannibalisation of 
the prehistoric, Oedipal father, Freud theorised the psychological mechanism 
binding the group as a process of synchronous identifications with the leader. 
Echoing the incorporation of paternal flesh, these incorporations result in 
identification instead of an object-relation; ‘one would like to be’ like the leader 
instead of have him as one.’102 Since the years of his close collaboration with 
Jung, Freud was attentive to the subtle aggression embedded in these processes 
and although he regarded identification as vital for the ego’s development, as a 
process, Freud opined it is fundamentally ambivalent and thus, loving, but also 
dangerous: ‘[I]t can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish 
for someone’s removal.’103 
The interpretation of group cohesion as dependent on the fostering of one’s 
idealised self through an identification with an idealised leader is crucial, 
99 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, trans. James, vol. XVIII (New 
York and London, 1921).
100 Freud, XVIII:110.
101 Freud, XVIII:123.
102 Freud, XVIII:105.
103 Freud, XVIII:105.
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especially if we consider the totalitarian politics that followed a decade later.104 
Identification as an expression of both adoration and extermination has also 
been influential in post-colonial variations working on the same theme. For 
example, acknowledging identification as ambivalent, Homi Bhabha argued 
that one can bypass the problem of impossible colonial identifications (because 
of the irreducible difference inscribed on skin colour) outlining this way that 
if performed as subversive mimicry, identification with the coloniser radically 
challenges his authority.105 Nevertheless, what also arises from Freud’s Group 
Psychology as pertinent to this thesis is that the limit of identification is 
cannibalism. Or rather, to put it better, the figure of the cannibal is the best 
exemplification of the inherent ambivalence of identification: ‘The cannibal, as 
we know, has a devouring affection for his enemies and only devours people of 
whom he is fond.’106 In 1921, while writing Group Psychology Freud had in his 
mind two particular kinds of group—the Catholic Church and the army. Drawing 
on the cannibal trope to flesh out the mechanism of identification that unites 
members of these communities together, Freud exposed the inherent savagery 
in groups that were considered the pillars of civilization and ethics (church), and 
the emerging nation state (army), breaking down the Western impression that 
so-called primitivity and barbarity were monopolised in the colonies: 
In order to make a correct judgment upon the morals of groups, one must 
take into consideration the fact that when individuals come together in 
a group all their individual inhibitions fall away and all the cruel, brutal 
and destructive instincts, which lie dormant in individuals as relics of a 
primitive epoch, are stirred up to find free gratification.107  
Furthermore, Freud seemed to suggest that institutional authoritarianism is 
swallowed up, just like the worshippers swallow Jesus’ flesh, and distorts the self-
image from within; group members are like their idealised leader. What restrains 
this leader from being devoured then is what prohibits the re-enaction of the 
primal crime; the symbolic ritual of the Holy Communion or the projection of 
one’s ambivalence towards their leader to the enemy. This is why, Freud opined, 
the cannibal has a devouring affection for his enemies: because in devouring 
104 Theodor Adorno, “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda,” in The Culture 
Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. Jay Bernstein (London and New York: Routledge, 
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the enemy he is in fact devouring a projected part of the self, of which he is 
(narcissistically) fond. As Diana Fuss put it: ‘at the basis of every identification 
lies a murderous wish: the subject’s desire to cannibalize the other who inhabits 
the place it longs to occupy.’108  
As mentioned earlier, in October 1923 Freud was diagnosed with oral cancer; 
a severe condition which would gradually restrain his ability to speak.109 As a 
manic smoker Freud was painfully aware of the poisonous consequences of some 
forms of internalisations (inhalations). While in Group Psychology he discussed 
identification as a form of developing an idealised sense of self (ego ideal), two 
years later, in The Ego and the Id introducing the structural model of the mind, 
Freud proposed the existence of an agency that arises from an external source and 
holds the inhaled poisonous savagery inside.110 The role of the super-ego was set 
to oversee the ego wishes by imposing a moral framework mapped on individual 
identity: ‘You ought to be like this’ but ‘you may not be like your father.’111 The 
development of a super-ego is fundamental for the individual’s participation 
in the social world—which is why cultural institutions such as the school and 
the church reinforce the overseeing character of the super-ego—112but most 
importantly, it is also a sign of a civilised status. For Freud, it is only the so-called 
‘savages’ or Aboriginal tribes that depend on the external authority of the totem.113 
The introjection of paternal authority is believed to promote individuation and 
independence, and, to shift the source of fear as well; civilised men fear their 
super-ego and their conscience, whereas having not introjected the ‘supreme 
power’ of the father, the so-called primitive men fear external authority.114 
Carrying forward the evolutionary evaluation of the so-called savages as having 
less complex unconscious structures, and therefore, requiring an external form 
of super-ego to impose laws and prohibitions, Freud legitimised the view that 
cultures deemed less evolved, needed to be ruled, exemplifying how deeply 
108 Diana Fuss, Identification Papers, (New York and London: Routledge, 1995) 93. 
109 Makari, Revolution in Mind: The Creation of Psychoanalysis, 350.
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racism is embedded in psychoanalysis.115 On the other hand, in his late writings 
Freud also emphasised that it is precisely the severe judgments of the super-ego 
that cause the suffering of the Western mind, making the task of psychoanalysis 
the alleviation of the moral indictments of this tyrannical consciousness.116 
This begs the question, where does the super-ego acquire its severity from? 
In The Ego and the Id Freud concludes that the role of the super-ego is not 
important only for the individual, but for the ‘species’ too.117 It is not merely 
parental authority that is introjected in the emergence of the super-ego, but a 
history of relations to authority that can be traced back to the genesis of religion, 
morality and culture, since ‘the super-ego […] actually originated from the 
experiences that led to totemism.’118 In Freud’s thinking, the primary experience 
of authority in humanity’s prehistory has left its mark as an unconscious memory 
inherited from one generation to another and ‘born afresh with every child.’119 
As a social agency, the super-ego carries the traces of a violent past act.  
I have tried to show that Freud’s engagement with the colonial fantasy of 
cannibalism was inspired by Jung’s challenges to psychoanalytic theory, and 
it can be read through the perspective of a racial antagonism between the 
two men. However, this is not to argue that Freud engaged with the cannibal 
trope only as a response to Jung’s anti-Semitism. The cannibal trope became 
embroiled in Freud’s metapsychology and brought with it the legacy of a 
‘phylogenetic’ trauma, a collective memory of violence related to questions of 
race. More importantly, Freud proposed the proximity between cannibalism 
and Christianity as a way of working out the psychic mechanism of particular 
groups, like the flock of Christian followers who, just like in authoritarian 
regimes, are concentrated around a sanctified figure with the members feeling 
connected to each other through collective consumption. In Christianity, 
consumption acquires the symbolic form of the Communion, but when it comes 
to authoritarianism consumption becomes a synonym for the identification of 
one’s ego-ideal, one’s idealised sense of self with the leader. Furthermore, both 
115 Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, “The Primitive as Analyst: Postcolonial Feminism’s Access to 
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the church and the army are groups that do not tolerate ambivalence towards 
the leader—which has nothing to do with personal dislike but is premised 
on the inherent ambivalence towards the paternal figure. Such ambivalence 
is, instead, projected outwards. This argument constitutes the basis of Freud’s 
explanation of anti-Semitism through the figure of the cannibal: Cannibals/
Christians foster a devouring sympathy towards their enemies and only devour 
those they are fond of; what is implied therefore is that at the basis of the Judeo-
Christian antagonism and its expression through anti-Semitism, there is envy. 
3.6 The Return of the Repressed: The Cannibal Trope in Moses and 
Monotheism
‘What is all too often missed by his readers,’ Yosef Yerushalmi wrote about 
Freud, ‘is the dialectic that [he] establishes between Judaism and Christianity, 
and the difference in his view of Judaism as a religion and the Jews as a people.’120 
As previously shown, Freud incorporated the cannibal trope, and the colonial 
imagery accompanying it, in the visualisation of identification as a violent, yet 
loving incorporation of an external figure, crucial for individual development. 
In Moses and Monotheism Freud returned to themes he had previously dimly 
explored regarding the relation between race, religion, identity, and their 
individual and collective origins in the primal crime. In the book, Freud rewrote 
the history of Judaic origins by revisiting the history of Moses, but in doing so, he 
made an important intervention in the role and history of Christianity as well. In 
Moses’ second preface it becomes clear that Freud develops previously rehearsed 
arguments: ‘Not that I should have anything to say that would be new or that 
I did not say clearly a quarter of century ago,’ in Totem and Taboo, but ‘it has 
been forgotten in the meantime and it could not be without effect if I repeated 
it to-day.’121 Moses, therefore, is a text about the remembrance and return of the 
forgotten histories of origins that had been pushed away in the psychoanalytic 
unconscious. It has also itself been a text of remembrance and revival of silenced 
arguments within the psychoanalytic history since the times of Totem and Taboo. 
In this final section, I focus on how Freud elaborates on the histories of the 
two religions in relation to a fundamental difference among them: Christianity’s 
revival of the totemic meal. Overall, in Moses we encounter two important 
120 Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable, 50.
121 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (Hogarth Press and the 
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points: firstly, that through the cannibal trope Freud demonstrates Christianity 
as a practice of an earlier evolutionary stage, and secondly, that to combat 
anti-Semitism Freud widely relies on the colonial fantasy of a prehistoric time 
where ambivalence is expressed through the abolition of physical boundaries, as 
exemplified by cannibalism. 
In Moses and Monotheism Freud explores the historical possibility that Moses, 
the founder of Judaism, was an Egyptian prince. ‘To deprive a people of the man 
whom they take pride in as the greatest of their sons is not a thing to be gladly 
or carelessly undertaken, least of all by someone who is himself one of them.’122 
Divesting Moses from his Hebraic origins has, of course, significant implications 
not only in Freud’s understanding of Judaism, but in his thinking about identity, 
race and religion. ‘A blow […] to a certain kind of Jewish narcissism,’ Yerushalmi 
argues, which misplaces and displaces the notion of the origin. What is more, 
it also, by extension, invites the reader to draw a similar conclusion about Jesus 
and Paul: the two most important figures in the Christian tradition were not 
Christian, but Jewish. This is the kind of implicit rationale found in Moses and 
Monotheism that draws on and extends the argument originally presented in 
Totem and Taboo about how civilisation was founded by cannibalistic, savage 
sons; there is no identity that is not founded in and through difference. As 
Edward Said puts it: ‘[I]dentity cannot be thought or worked through itself alone; 
it cannot constitute or even imagine itself without that radical originary break 
or flaw which will not be repressed because Moses was Egyptian, and therefore 
always outside the identity inside which so many have stood, and suffered—and 
later, perhaps even triumphed.’123 Freud’s Moses marked a contemplation on how 
religious groups manage the fundamental openness of identity by exploring how 
they engage with their historical origins.
Having established a theoretical framework of how neurosis marks a return 
of repressed memories through which the path to the traumatic event can be 
pursued, Freud argued that Judaism and Christianity must be understood as 
repetitions of the archaic memory of the primal crime.  In teaching about God’s 
omnipotence, Moses revived the memory of the primal father and eventually 
shared his fate by being slaughtered. The memory of Moses’ murder became 
repressed, and so did the ambivalence towards him; instead, in Judaism 
122 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, 13:243.
123 Edward Said, Freud and the Non-European (London: Verso, 2003), 54.
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ambivalence manifested itself in the illusion of ‘being a chosen people,’124 and 
in a ‘bad conscience for having sinned against God and for not ceasing to sin.’125 
However, Freud argued that it was the emergence of the Christian doctrine that 
fully recovered the memory of the primal crime. A Jewish man, Saul of Tarsus 
(later known as Paul) ‘seized upon this sense of guilt and traced it back correctly 
to its original source.’126 What Paul had understood was that unhappiness and 
remorse were indicators of a crime committed; Freud exposes the unconscious 
content of Paul’s teachings: ‘“[T]he reason we are so unhappy is that we have 
killed God the father.” And it is entirely understandable that he could only grasp 
this piece of truth in the delusional disguise of the glad tidings.’127 Freud explained 
the Christian religion as instituting a sacrificial ritual that offered relief from 
guilt—the celebration of Jesus’ sacrifice that replaced the ‘blissful sense of being 
chosen by the liberating sense of redemption.’128 As argued in Totem and Taboo, 
Freud claimed that Christianity grew out of a father-religion, like Judaism, but 
substituted the father with the son who in taking ‘the atonement on himself, 
became a god himself beside the father and, actually, in place of the father.’129 
Furthermore, as a son-religion Christianity was fashioned as more progressive; 
moving from monotheism to polytheism, worshipping more divine figures, 
and bringing the adoration of women at the centre of religion.130 Nevertheless, 
Freud argues that in fact, these aspects of the new religion ‘meant a cultural 
regression,’131 because—and here is the juicy part—the historical truths carried 
forward by religion, and Christianity in particular revived ‘large portions of 
the past’ ‘in excellent replicas.’132 Freud believed that if Jesus’ sacrifice was the 
necessary step for the absolution of guilt, then the crime from which the guilt 
emanates must have been a murder. Following this logic, it appears that the only 
crime that can be atoned by collective consumption of flesh and blood must 
have been an act of cannibalism. ‘Thus,’ Freud writes, ‘authorities have often 
been struck by the faithful way in which the sense and content of the old totem 
meal is repeated in the rite of the Christian Communion, in which the believer 
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incorporates the blood and flesh of his god in symbolic form.’133 
Overall, Freud seemed to be arguing that contrary to Judaism where the murder 
of the primal father had become forgotten, Christianity was founded upon 
the acknowledgment of this murder, the acceptance of Jesus’ sacrifice as an 
atonement for the crime and last but not the least, the displacement of the crime’s 
responsibility onto the Jews. With the birth of Christianity came the birth of anti-
Semitism. The Christians hate the Jews because they represent a father-religion, 
whereas as a son-religion, Christianity is confined in the psychological position 
of a son constantly managing his ambivalence for his father. The psychology 
of anti-Semitism could be explained by a universal, for Freud truth, which 
he had widely confirmed through his clinical experience: ‘[A]s contributions 
to our understanding of the son’s relation to the father which is of such great 
importance, I need only bring forward animal phobias, the fear which strikes us 
as so strange, of being eaten by the father […].’134
The conclusion that can be drawn from Freud’s text thus is that both religions 
respond to a similar traumatic archaic event. However, Jews have transformed 
their ambivalence for the father into a form of constitutional guilt. Contrarily, 
Christianity has managed ambivalence by enacting it either in the form of a 
symbolic consumption of the figure of origin, Jesus’ flesh and blood, eating away 
otherness within their community, or by displacing their hatred for the father 
onto the ‘father-religion’ in the form of anti-Semitic hatred.135 Freud effectively 
reversed the anti-Semitic dichotomy between spirituality and carnality and 
produced a convincing account of how anti-Semitic hatred was not a matter of 
politics, but a deeply felt conflict about the engagement with otherness—Judaism 
will always symbolize Christianity’s origins in Judaism. ‘Anti-Semitism is not 
incidental but endemic to Christianity, doubly so because of its unconscious 
component.’136 Freud exposed that the unconscious wish of anti-Semitism was 
consumption, murderous annihilation; the historical origins of Christianity 
meant that Jewishness had to be exterminated, just as the colonial enterprise 
had devoured, swept out Aboriginal cultures, which as colonial anthropology 
later argued resembled the past of Western civilisation. 
133 Freud, 13:328.
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Nevertheless, in order to manage anti-Semitism Freud depended on a 
mythological excess that symbolised racial difference and savagery through the 
fantasy of eating away boundaries. The colonial imagery of cannibalism assisted 
Freud’s conceptualisation of the Eucharist as a regression to the era of totemism, 
exemplifying that Christian community bonds are basically structured on 
a shared carnality and essence—contrary to the Jewish spirituality that is 
shaped on partaking in guilt. As previously shown, Freud framed individual 
psychological development as a move away from devouring tendencies, 
blurred boundaries, improper appetites, unacknowledged ambivalence. While 
individual development is engraved on a trajectory away from the colonial 
imaginings of cannibalism, the history of religious evolution presents an 
opposite temporal movement; Christianity, says Freud is in fact a regression to 
an earlier evolutionary stage. Although it is possible to argue that Freud marks 
psychoanalytic subjectivity as moving towards whiteness, he also creates a 
tension towards such advancement; the 1930s Christian subject, taking pride in 
its Aryanism, psychologically is regressed to an earlier stage of darkness. This 
is a crucial contribution towards post-colonialism, and it is one often silenced 
because Freud’s references are rarely studied within their historical context. 
Considering the wider climate of anti-Semitism, Freud’s deployment of the 
cannibal trope as part of the instinctual make-up, leaves racialised subjectivities 
fundamentally open. But at the same time, without acknowledging the racist, 
colonialist discourses that underpin such arguments, psychoanalysis is doomed 
to reiterate the same forms of racial violence, prejudice and subjection that it 
sought to avoid. 
In this chapter, I have argued that although not subject to the same level of 
scrutiny as the taboo on incest, the cannibal trope can in fact be shown to 
reveal the close proximity between an archaic act of cannibalism common to all 
human cultures, and the Christian rituals of communion. Freud’s link between 
Christianity and cannibalism serves as a potential intervention into anti-Semitic 
and racist discourses that project cannibalism onto the figure of the other. But, 
Freud’s attempt to track the omnipresence of cannibalism as an archaic history 
within all human cultures is subject to reproducing a colonialist framework 
popular within European epistemology. Within this Western, colonial culture 
the cannibal has always appeared as the ‘other’ and the cannibal trope has been 
projected on the figure of the colonised. This displacement of the cannibal trope 
serves as the foundation of a colonial framework within psychoanalysis which 
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refuses to let go the forms of racial domination of whiteness. In the next chapter, 
the psychoanalytic heritage of the cannibal trope and its accompanying themes 
as they move away from its paternal subtexts into the mother-infant relationship, 
will be scrutinised according to the greatest psychoanalytic theorist of orality, 
consumption, fluid and devoured boundaries, Melanie Klein. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
Devouring Proximity: 
Melanie Klein and Colonial Fantasies
4.1 Introduction
In one of her earliest papers on the concept of reparation, Melanie Klein recounts 
the story of how a young woman named Ruth Kjär came to become a painter. 
Klein explains that Kjär produced her first painting when a spot on her wall 
was left blank after the removal of one of the paintings, she and her husband, 
owned. For Klein, the empty space in the wall became a symbolic reminder of 
Kjär’s own melancholic emptiness and encouraged her to fill it by producing her 
first self-portrait. After the completion of the painting, her melancholy softened, 
and her creativity evolved into an artistic stream of paintings depicting Kjär’s 
sister and mother. Through this biographical anecdote, Klein justifies the Kjär’s 
creativity as a means to explore and experiment with fantasies about her own 
mother through art. It is telling, for Klein, that Kjär represented her mother 
both in an unfavourable tone, as tired out and aged, and in a realistic manner 
exhibiting her actual imperial and charming posture. While the former painting 
satisfied the painter’s aggression and destructiveness towards her mother, Klein 
argues, with the latter she repaired the damage she had originally provoked. 
Overall, Klein concludes ‘[t]he desire to make reparation, to make good the 
injury psychologically done to the mother and also to restore herself was at the 
bottom of the compelling urge to paint these portraits of her relatives.’1  
However, the importance of Klein’s analysis of the story lies not on what is 
worked through, but on what Klein omits from her analysis; what is brushed as 
merely an unimportant reference. As Klein is focusing on how the reparation of 
the mother is the main aim of artistic production, the content of the first portrait 
Kjär made to fill the ‘empty space’ on the wall is glossed over in a short reference. 
Klein writes that ‘[I]n seeking the explanation of these ideas, it is instructive 
to consider what sort of pictures Ruth Kjär has painted since her first attempt, 
when she filled the empty space on the wall with the life-sized figure of a naked 
1 Melanie Klein, “Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative 
Impulse,” in The Selected Melanie Klein, ed. Juliet Mitchell (New York: The Free Press, A Division 
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negress.’2 
There are a handful of potential explanations for Klein’s obliviousness towards 
the racial difference between the painter and her self-portrait. For example, we 
learn from Klein that Kjär’s mother was Irish and thus, it could be argued that the 
daughter’s identification with her is made with an aspect of her mother’s heritage 
that was considered racialised. As the feminist critic Jean Walton has argued, 
Klein’s ‘suspicious’ silence on race, however, infects her account of reparation 
with an untheorized other: if Kjär painted the portrait of the naked, black woman 
as the ‘prelude to a series of portraits’ that repaired her internalised imagery of 
her mother, then Klein’s theory of reparation depends on this racial silencing 
and becomes a theory of white feminine subjectivity.3  Walton’s Klein is one who 
is overpowered by institutional, epistemological and ideological rigidity to the 
point that she subjects to the silencing of racial difference, as in Kjär’s story: 
‘something about the specific obsessions of psychoanalysis prevented Klein, 
the third white woman in this mise-en-abime of female representations, from 
exploring that significance in such a way that it might seriously transform the 
institution she was both entering and creating.’4 In other words, Walton implies 
that there seemed to be something that did not allow Klein’s psychoanalysis to 
engage with race. 
Walton’s feminist perspective seems to uncover what she calls the ‘unacknowledged 
racialized matrix’ which is inevitably part of Klein’s analysis of reparation.5 
However, Walton is not the only critic to encounter in Klein an instrumental 
use of racial difference to establish her theory of the European subject. Adopting 
Klein’s theory in the context of politics, David Eng makes a case for reparation 
as a Eurocentric concept. Eng argues that reparation implies that all subjects 
are repairable, whereas the history of colonialism manifests otherwise, since 
the catastrophic effects on the colonised people of colour are rarely recognised.6 
Yet, while Walton and Eng have critically taken psychoanalysis as a cultural 
text and explored how black bodies have been swept away from psychoanalytic 
representation, their perspectives fail to move beyond the domain of 
 2 Klein, 93. 
3 Jean Walton, Fair Sex, Savage Dreams: Race, Psychoanalysis, Sexual Difference (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2001), 43.
4 Walton, 36. 
5 Walton, 29.
6 David L. Eng, “Colonial Object Relations,” Social Text 34, no. 1 126 (2016): 1–19, https://doi.
org/10.1215/01642472-3427105.
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representation to examine Klein’s eclectic use of racial imageries. Indeed, despite 
my personal sympathy for Kleinian psychoanalysis, critiques such as by Walton 
and Eng need to be amplified towards the direction whereby racial difference 
becomes a fundamental theme for the construction of psychoanalytic subjectivity. 
As argued in the previous chapter, Freud’s psychoanalytic engagement with race 
resulted in inscribing an implicitly evolutionary framework in development 
which depended on a racialised excess. My focus in this chapter is precisely on 
how Klein transforms, disrupts, or unwittingly perpetuates this framework. I do 
so by exploring the moments in which the colonial imaginings of the cannibal 
trope enter Klein’s analysis.
Melanie Klein’s case study is enticingly full of images of devouring proximity, 
blurred boundaries, and anxieties of being eaten. Hence, she offers a great 
example of how the colonial imagery of transgressing the boundaries of human 
flesh is written into a psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity. By looking at Klein’s 
writing in relation to the colonial and cultural milieu alongside her theory of 
psychosexual development and writings on sexual difference, I argue that Klein 
unwittingly abides with colonial imageries despite being a renowned theorist 
of interiority and unconscious fantasies. The importance of Klein’s work is her 
explicit emphasis on negativity and destructiveness within the subject which 
constantly undoes and threatens its coherence and integrity. However, since she 
frames psychosexual development as a transition from more persecutory and 
split psychic states without solid boundaries into more integrated and gentle 
ones, she does not question how this dichotomy is drawn from the colonial 
example in the first place. Therefore, she theorises the psychoanalytic subject as 
moving towards a state that is tailored in accordance with the imagery of white 
civility. A particular shortcoming here is that she does not account for sexual 
difference outside this colonial dichotomy. While Kleinian psychoanalysis has 
been one of the earliest attempts to write about femininity, she displaces the 
colonial dichotomy onto sexual difference by writing about women as more oral, 
cannibalistic, and melancholic—which forecloses any possibility to theorise 
forms of subjectivity that are both female and non-white.
4.2 Childhood and Race: An Overview
At its simplest  level, Kleinian psychoanalysis is concerned with the unconscious 
world of early childhood. While living with her family in Budapest, Klein was 
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drawn to psychoanalysis as an analysand of Sandor Ferenczi who introduced her 
to Freud’s writings and prompted her to make use of her gift for understanding 
children by becoming involved in infant psychoanalysis. In 1919, Klein was 
admitted to the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society and began her work by 
developing a method of approaching children psychoanalytically. Historically 
speaking, Klein’s interest in early infancy should be read within a wider social 
configuration gradually taking place from the 18th century on, as pointed out 
by Philippe Ariès, according to whom, childhood emerged as a category along 
with the proliferation of the divide between public and private life, society and 
the family, labour and education.7 The concept of childhood, Ariès shows, was 
associated with an age that was lacking sexuality, and which required discipline 
alongside schooling. Accordingly, it also fostered the rise of the nuclear family 
which ‘began to hold society at a distance, to push it back beyond a steadily 
extending zone of private life.’8 In order to understand the reason for Klein’s 
engagement or silencing of race, and the cannibal trope in particular, I would 
like to first expose two themes from the historical context of her work that 
have affected the way she handled racial difference: the racialised dimension of 
childhood and British anti-Semitism along with her own experience of being 
racialised—while elaborating how these discourses become displaced in her 
theory of psychoanalysis.
In her book Race and the Education of Desire, Ann Stoler argues that in imperial 
Europe, children were regarded as the foundations of the bourgeois family, 
whose discipline and conditioning ensured the perpetuation of class and racial 
competencies, and thus, their education was premised upon the avoidance 
of any external ‘contagion.’9 The major source for concern was the company 
of servants to whom the children were exposed, and who presented a threat 
because of their racial and class alterity.10 In this respect, housekeeping manuals 
at the turn of the 19h century invited parents to monitor their children, whose 
sexuality was not considered as a natural form of curiosity but as that of an 
external imposition by corrupt, racialised others: The children ‘were encouraged 
and guided in […] exercises in self-pleasure by servants, not taught to do it by 
7 Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (New York: Vintage, 
1962).
8 Ariès, 398.
9 Ann Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial 
Order of Things (London: Duke University Press, 1995), 153.
10 Stoler, 153.
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themselves.’11 Nonetheless, not unlike the manuals emphasising the exigency for 
intervention in children’s sexuality, natural scientists were similarly inclined to 
study childhood, not necessarily only as a period of innocence, education, and 
discipline, but also as a part of the natural world and the evolutionary history of 
the human mind. 
In her historical investigation of childhood and its reappraisal in British 
psychoanalysis, Denise Riley traces a number of themes tied to the representation 
of the category of childhood as formulated in the 19th century evolutionary 
human sciences. Riley argues that the observation of infantile behaviour, the 
study of Aboriginal cultures, and natural history were the ‘well-ordered steps 
to the fuller knowledge of the “finished” mind.’12 The finished mind here stands 
as the prototype against which racial, cultural, and sexual differences were 
measured—and, just as its gender was masculine, its race was whiteness. Riley’s 
account of the epistemology of 19th century British psychological studies helps 
us identify a paradox: that although the category child held the social structure 
of the family together, it was simultaneously studied in isolation, detached, 
and disassociated from its surrounding adults, i.e. the parents. The child was 
seen as an independent category that was objectified and ‘transposed out of its 
background, usually the family.’13 An account of this is found in Charles Darwin’s 
paper titled A Biographical Sketch of an Infant where he praises babies on the 
grounds of their capacity to acquire language as an indication of human genius.14 
Darwin’s paper takes the child as an individual and studies it developmentally 
through a series of individual traits that are tied to communicative and mental 
functions such as the acquisition of language, the origins and expressions of 
emotions, and the mental use of experience. His work was integrated in several 
strands of specialist study of childhood emerging in Britain in the early 20th 
century which proposed theories of ‘infant management’ based on studies of 
learning processes, educational psychology, and intelligence testing.15 
Most of the time, studies of childhood and children of the late 19th century were 
underpinned by the idea that the child was an accessible object for study, not 
11 Stoler, 155.
12 Denise Riley, War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and Mother (London: Virago, 1983), 47.
13 Riley, 42.
14 Charles Darwin, “A Biographical Sketch of an Infant,” Mind II (1877): 285–94; see also: Riley, 
War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and Mother, 46.
15 Riley, War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and Mother, 59.
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much different from ‘the squirrel or the daisy’ precisely because it is a part of the 
natural world of human development—as Riley puts it, it ‘simply’ was there.16 
Echoing Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, the assumption that an object of study simply 
is, instead of ‘coming into being’ through a set of historical, and social processes, 
is itself emblematic of Western epistemologies.17 That is, social categories do 
not come to being simply by virtue of particular forms of thought; they are 
naturalised and are considered to represent a universal truth. In this sense, the 
category of the ‘child’ was instrumental in the construction of Western accounts 
of gender and race because it was seen as a sexless as much as a raceless period 
in human life, out of which, the adult white male subject emerged.18 Childhood 
was instrumental in the processes of imperial self-making, and by being exempt 
from a racial understanding children helped, in fact, delineate the boundaries 
of racial difference: children were regarded as pure, naïve, and hence in need 
of protection from fraudulent and black others. On the other hand, children 
seemed as not having become fully white and thus provided evidence for (white) 
scientific study. Caught between whiteness and blackness, between masculinity 
and femininity childhood was, above all, the place of intervention, discipline, 
education and pedagogy that would safeguard the perpetuation of racial and 
gendered dynamics. By contrast, while the sociological profile of children was 
one that did not acknowledge any agency, psychoanalysts had a different view. 
Freud’s explicit reference to infantile sexuality radically contradicted the nature 
of the norms surrounding childhood and challenged the social construction of 
infantile naivety and innocence. Suggesting that children were ‘polymorphously 
perverse,’ Freud considered libidinal impulses at work from the earliest years of 
life and highlighted the importance of childhood in the psychology of adults.19
But where Freudian psychoanalysis made theoretical formulations on childhood 
by examining adult neurotics and tracing their historical past, Klein analysed 
children and observed the significance of the early mother-infant experiences 
as the foundations for psychic life. As Jean Pontalis puts it: ‘[F]or Klein it was 
16 Riley, 42.
17 Seshadri-Crooks, “The Primitive as Analyst: Postcolonial Feminism’s Access to Psychoanalysis,” 
195.
18 Interestingly, there were a few psychological accounts that, according to Riley, grasped the 
‘humanising’ implications of this formulation, and they only did so half-jokingly, by arguing that 
getting in touch with a child’s helplessness and dependency was an entirely feminine work since 
it had a ‘softening and mollifying effect’ on the male scientist. Riley, War in the Nursery: Theories 
of the Child and Mother, 48.
19 Freud, “The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905), 191.  
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a matter of coming to meet the child’s psychic reality and measuring adult 
knowledge against it.’20 The point here is that while Kleinian psychoanalysis is 
traditionally associated with interiority and psychic reality, and while she did not 
produce any sociological writings like those of Freud, her psychoanalytic theory 
is organised through dominant discourses on racial difference. That is because of 
her engagement with children, that is, a category with a significant role in racial 
representation. Thus, a social dimension in her work must be acknowledged. 
For example, Klein refers to the work of her contemporary Géza Róheim and his 
analogy of children with the so-called primitive people who, as already argued 
in the white imaginary, were black because they were not conditioned in white 
civility. In her first paper, The Development of a Child (1921) Klein exposes this 
psychoanalytic heritage: ‘Dr Abraham, in his paper […] showed that the origin 
of the formation of sexual theories is to be sought for in the child’s disinclination 
to assimilate knowledge of the part played by the parent of the other sex. Róheim 
pointed to the same source for the sexual theories of primitive peoples.’21 
4.3 ‘She really is Cleopatra’
When Klein arrived in London, she was regarded by some, albeit secretly and 
privately, as a racial other, which, even though not explicitly informing her work, 
must nonetheless be taken into consideration—Klein remained mostly silent 
on the growing anti-Semitic harassments in continental Europe.22 Most of the 
accounts that present Klein as a racial other come ironically from Alix Stratchey, 
the woman whose intervention eventually helped Klein to leave Berlin and settle 
permanently in London in 1926. Stratchey was an analysand of Freud’s, and later 
a psychoanalyst herself as well as a pioneer in the Bloomsbury group—a group 
of intellectuals who contributed to the dissemination of psychoanalysis—and, 
who became a close friend of Klein’s.23 Prior to Klein’s first talk at the British 
20 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, “The Question Child,” in Reading Melanie Klein, ed. Lyndsey 
Stonebridge and John Phillips, trans. Phillip Cullen and Catherine Cullen (London: Routledge, 
1998), 83.
21 Melanie Klein, “The Development of a Child (1921),” in Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other 
Works 1921-1945, vol. 1 (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, 1975), 34.
22 Michal Shapira discusses some clinical cases that she argues, were informed by the invasion 
of Nazis in Austria, but she shows how Klein used this external reality to think about how it 
awakens the patient’s internal fears and anxieties. Michal Shapira, The War Inside: Psychoanalysis, 
Total War, and the Making of the Democratic Self in Postwar Britain (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
23 Phyllis Grosskurth, Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), 133.
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Society in 1925, Alix confided in one of her letters to her husband James: 
By the way, Melanie showed me a hat she’s bought to lecture in London 
and knock her audience […] It’s a vastly, voluminous affair in bright 
yellow with a huge brim and a cluster, a whole garden, of mixed 
flowers… The total effect is that of an overblown tearose… She looks 
like a whore run mad–or, no–she really is Cleopatra… for through it 
all, there’s something very handsome and attractive in her face. She’s a 
dotty woman. But there’s no doubt whatever that her mind is stored with 
things of thrilling interest. And she’s a nice character.24 
The excessive contradiction in Alix’s impression of Klein—the way one can be 
both a ‘whore run mad’ and a ‘nice character’ at the same time seems rather 
remarkable—might on the one hand, reflect Klein’s intense character and 
perhaps her own internal conflicts and splitting, but on the other, one cannot 
fail to notice the subtle anti-Semitism and exoticisation of Klein as ‘Cleopatra,’ 
the queen of Egypt. In another letter from 1925, Alix refers to Klein’s appearance 
and manners—through another Mediterranean figure this time—indicating 
a lack of elegance, refinement and class, in a way, implying a racial sense of 
hot-bloodedness: ‘I was glad not to be with Melanie for she takes the high 
conventional line—a sort of ultra heterosexual Semiramis in slap-up fancy dress 
waiting to be pounced on, etc etc and not stooping to amateur behaviour and 
conversation…’25
Was Klein aware of Alix’s hidden views of her? In her unpublished autobiography, 
written one year before her death in 1959, Klein expresses, in her typically austere 
manner, a very balanced and contained view on her Jewish identity as a cluster 
of inheritance and suspicion: 
Both [my father] and my mother were deeply attached to the Jewish 
race, and that has really remained in me to the present. It did not take 
the same form as they had, because, in the choice of my friends and 
relations, it hardly matters whether they are Gentile or Jewish, but I have 
kept a strong feeling for the Jewish race, though I am fully aware of their 
faults and shortcomings.26 
This emotional impartiality indicates that Jewishness, as a part of her family’s 
24 Grosskurth, 136.
25 Grosskurth, 134.
26 Melanie Klein, “The Autobiography of Melanie Klein,” ed. Janet Sayers and John Forrester, 
Psychoanalysis and History 15 (2013): 136–37.
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history and identity, was an issue Klein would not discuss, or reflect on—at 
least, not in her autobiography—and more interestingly, anti-Semitism was 
nowhere to be found. Yosef Yerushalmi, on the other hand, explicitly refers to 
the ‘genteel Bloomsbury anti-Semitism of Alix Stratchey,’ indicating how subtly 
embroidered in comments circulated among non-Jewish British analysts it was, 
revealing both a sense of discomfort and the impression that language did in 
fact carry racialised references—as in Alix’s comments on Klein as Cleopatra 
and Semiramis. Yerushalmi quotes the following discussion, which took place 
among Ernest Jones, James Stratchey (Alix’s husband), and Joan Riviere on the 
issue of the translation of the German ‘das Es’—as it was transferred from James 
to Alix Stratchey in 1924: 
They want to call ‘das Es’ ‘the Id.’ I thought everyone would say ‘the Yidd.’ 
So Jones said there was no such word in English: ‘There’s “Yiddish,” 
you know. And in German “Jude.” But there is no such word as Yidd.’ 
–‘Pardon me doctor, Yidd is a current words for a Jew.’—’Ah! A slang 
expression. It cannot be in very widespread use then.’27
On a similar note, Frosh argues that at the bottom of the aforementioned 
incident also lies the fact that the refusal of Jewish psychoanalysts to change 
their views and undo their separateness by becoming more assimilated was 
considered, on behalf of some British analysts, as a source of trouble.28 Phyllis 
Grosskurth who in her thoroughly weighty tome on Klein’s biography does 
not include a single reference to the Bloomsbury group’s subtle anti-Semitism 
while giving an animated, if not always flattering for Klein, account of the 
Alix-Melanie pair, in which Klein’s manners and Jewishness come together as 
signifiers of low racial and class status: ‘[T]he two incongruous companions, one 
tall, angular, and Bloomsbury, the other squat, Jewish, and déclassée, must have 
made a curious pair.’29 Klein’s unfavourable portraits—Kristeva also mentions 
her ‘devouring, sadistic character—’30might therefore be read as an unconscious 
response to Bloomsbury anti-Semitism, and the experiences of being marked 
as a racial other, which subsequently informed her theoretical overview (and, 
perhaps, silencing) on race. Overall, for the purposes of this project, this form of 
27 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable (New York and 
London: Yale University Press, 1991), 46.
28 Frosh, Hate and the Jewish Science: Anti-Semitism, Nazism and Psychoanalysis, 46.
29 Grosskurth, Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work, 133.
30 Julia Kristeva, Melanie Klein, trans. Ross Guberman, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001), 29.
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concealed racial discomfort—mostly taking place in private correspondence—
must be taken into consideration particularly in the way Klein makes use of 
the cannibal trope, as another form of racialisation in the context of the infant’s 
unconscious fantasy, and more importantly, in her account of femininity.
4.4 Eat or Be Eaten: Splitting and the Death Drive 
In the interwar period, Freud began considering the possibility of destructiveness 
and death as wishes of the modern subject, contradicting the quest for life of 
sexual forces. In his 1920 study of the human instincts, Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Freud came across the phenomenon of recurring painful thoughts and 
dreams, traumatic memories and repetitive events through which individuals 
relived an experience that they sought to forget in the first place. Freud concluded 
that the tendency to repeat could be justified by an impulse that was not after 
pleasure yet after death: the tendency to destroy, to cut off relations, to withdraw 
to passivity, and to seek return to an ‘inorganic existence […] immanent in 
the organism itself.’31 Freud argued that human instincts could be categorised 
into ‘those which seek to lead what is living to death, and others, the sexual 
instincts, which are perpetually attempting and achieving a renewal of life.’32 
Indeed, Freud’s hypothesis of a life and death conflict was at the core of his bleak 
prognosis for the future of civilisation. ‘We are born with death in our hearts; its 
manifestation, directed outwards as a defence, is in aggression.’33 
One of the most tantalisingly rich and troublesome innovations of Kleinian 
psychoanalysis was her emphasis on the subject’s inherent negativity. Klein 
believed that the physiological nature of the death instinct had a psychological 
effect: It manifested in ‘the primary anxiety of being annihilated by a destructive 
force within.’34 The death drive is a polyvalent force at operation in the subject 
that endangers the relations with the external world. It burdens the individual 
with psychological strain and determines its coping mechanisms. As Stephen 
Frosh highlights, although Klein did not completely negate the importance of 
31 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, On Metapsychology: The Theory of 
Psychoanalysis 11 (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 311.
32 Freud, 318.
33 Stephen Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1999), 
32.
34 Melanie Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms (1946),” in The Selected Melanie Klein, 
ed. Juliet Mitchell (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, 1986), 180.
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the environment in ameliorating or aggravating the inner conflict caused by the 
death drive, she called it at least constitutional:35
In speaking of an innate conflict between love and hatred, I am implying 
that both destructive impulses and the capacity for love are, to some 
extent, constitutional, varying individually in strength. They are 
increased by external circumstances.36
While the death drive is juxtaposed by love, it should not be seen as entirely 
counterbalanced or compensated by it, as some Kleinian followers have 
argued. For example, Hanna Segal, Klein’s most sympathetic advocate, has 
treated the death drive as an ordinary tendency towards disintegration and 
psychic fragmentation expressed in the form of an ‘overwhelming anxiety of 
annihilation,’ characteristic of the early years of life.37 For Segal, the grim picture 
of early infancy that Klein offers prepares the ground for goodness, love, and 
integration, and therefore, tends to remove the excessiveness of early proximity 
with the mother. Segal’s account of the death drive washes away the fundamental 
terror and anxiety that Klein situates within the subject whereas the intensity 
of hostility is only reserved for the realm of pathology.38 This is not to fetishise 
fragmentation and death in the subject, but to argue that when Klein’s death 
drive is seen as an ordinary anxiety which can be resolved, it is easy to lapse 
into normative accounts of development as progressing from psychic conflict to 
resolution. On the contrary, the Kleinian individual does not so much develop 
in a straight line from ‘“A” to “B” […] but is constantly defined and redefined by 
the vicissitudes of anxiety.’39
Critical psychoanalytic thinkers such as Jacqueline Rose and Lyndsey Stonebridge 
have emphasised Klein’s negativity not as a quality of the individual but as a 
void through which the subject emerges: Its actions, relations, and wishes are 
constantly ruptured by itself, and it cannot be put to rest. The Kleinian subject is 
threatened because it is overpowered from its origins by a force which it cannot 
control. ‘She was seen as bringing the death drive under the sway of a subject, 
as making the death drive constitutive of a subject, who is not yet enough of a 
35 Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis, 123.
36 Melanie Klein, “A Study of Envy and Gratitude (1956),” in The Selected Melanie Klein, ed. Juliet 
Mitchell (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, 1986), 212.
37 Hanna Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein (London: Karnac Books, 2008), 26.
38 Segal, 55–57.
39 Lyndsey Stonebridge and John Phillips, eds., Reading Melanie Klein (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 39.
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subject for death to be mastered or controlled.’40 Reading Klein’s death drive from 
this perspective allows us to assess her theory against a historical background: 
the ruins of the two world wars, the fragmentation of the social bond and 
the impact of a colonial myth in the visualisation of origins of development. 
Furthermore, it allows us to explore how the death drive becomes an orifice 
within the subject which challenges its integrity. More troublingly so, it is by 
acknowledging the importance and weight of the death drive that its colonial 
roots can be scrutinised.41
It is clear that Klein’s conception of the character of the death drive is fundamentally 
originating from that of Freud’s. Freud saw the origins of the individual and 
culture as emerging through an act of incorporation (cannibalism) of the 
primal father. Klein also saw the origins of infancy as fundamentally open to the 
incorporation of the external world, coated with a colonial excess according to 
which the infant wants to aggressively devour its primary objects: 
As the individual repeats biologically the development of mankind, 
so also does he do it psychically. We find, repressed and unconscious, 
the stages which we still observe in primitive people: cannibalism and 
murderous tendencies of the greatest variety. This primitive part of a 
personality entirely contradicts the cultured part of the personality, 
which is the one that actually engenders repression.42
It is clear that Klein shaped her psychology as an antithesis where these so-called 
primitive, cannibalistic, and murderous urges are theorised in juxtaposition 
with the ‘cultured part of personality.’ Furthermore, if the character of the 
constitutional drives derives its quality from Freud’s evolutionary and colonialist 
framework, psychoanalytic theories such as Klein’s inevitably become infiltrated 
by an economy of colonial dichotomies alongside rigid and devoured boundaries. 
For Klein, the drives are thought of as affecting psychic mechanisms and being 
managed through relations with external objects, rather than being ‘directionless 
psychic urges.’43 Klein was interested in how the death drive organised psychic 
life in terms of positions: the paranoid-schizoid position, the earliest form of 
40 Rose, 150.
41 Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms (1946),” 183.
42 Melanie Klein, “Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children (1927),” in Love, Guilt and 
Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, 
Inc, 1975), 170.
43 Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis, 122.
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managing destructiveness through splitting, and the depressive position, a more 
complex, integrated organisation. These two positions are successive and describe 
the nature of mental representations of the instincts, in what Klein defined as 
‘phantasy.’ ‘Phantasy’ is the unconscious representation of instincts which takes 
the form of objects from the external, real world: ‘[T]hus an inner world is being 
built up in the child’s unconscious mind, corresponding to his actual experiences 
and the impression he gains from people and the external world, and yet altered 
by his own phantasies and impulses.’44 The idea of phantasy as becoming more 
tolerable as the infant moves from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive 
position is that which renders Klein’s theory of development as an evolutionary 
one, overturning in a way, the pessimism of Freudian psychoanalysis and 
toning down the colonial excesses of the death drive. Klein’s conception of the 
paranoid-schizoid position is overflowing with images of devourment and aims 
at undermining the utopian assumptions of the untroubled, serene early years 
of life.45 The infant, which is equipped with a fragile ego, experiences heightened 
anxiety, which it manages by projecting it outwards on the maternal breast. 
Klein argues ‘that oral-sadistic impulses towards the mother’s breast are active 
from the beginning of life, though with the onset of teething the cannibalistic 
impulses increase in strength.’46 To see the infant’s phantasy in terms of wishes 
to cannibalise the external objects is to fundamentally grasp the character of the 
death drive as the force guiding the object relations. More crucially, Klein asserts
These phantasies, although they are still centred on eating up the 
mother’s breast or her whole person, are not solely concerned with the 
gratification of a primitive desire for nourishment. They also serve to 
gratify the child’s destructive impulses.47 
Overwhelmed by its own death instinct, the infant perceives the object as 
altered, as ‘devouring.’ The devouring breast becomes the primary, threatening 
persecutor. 
44 Melanie Klein, “Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States (1940),” in The Selected 
Melanie Klein, ed. Juliet Mitchell (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, 
1986), 148.
45 Meira Likierman, Melanie Klein: Her Work in Context, 1st ed. (New York: Continuum, 2001), 
2.
46 Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms (1946),” 180.
47 Melanie Klein, “The Early Development of Conscience in the Child,” in Love, Guilt and 
Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, 
Inc, 1975), 253.
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However, Klein also argued that experiences of being fed and held make the 
infant fantasise about a good, gratifying breast which nourishes and strengthens 
it. The primary good breast ‘acts as a focal point in the ego. It […] makes for 
cohesiveness and integration and is instrumental in building up the ego.’48 To 
protect the good from the bad breast the infant splits the object in fantasy. In 
the paranoid-schizoid position, the infant psychologically oscillates between 
two states: one in which goodness of the object becomes introjected and helps 
the infant grow, the other one in which the death drive is deflected (projected) 
outwards and diminishes the ego, hampering growth.49 The good nurturing 
breast is a fantasy of endless and complete gratification, and it is necessary for 
development, as it protects the infant when threatened by the bad, devouring 
breast. The infant takes flight to the fantasy of the good breast ‘as a means of 
escaping from persecutors.’50
It may be noteworthy here to include Klein’s final revision of the paranoid-
schizoid position, as detailed in her 1957 paper Envy and Gratitude. Klein argues 
here that another implication of the death drive is the experience of envy for 
the good breast, since it ‘possesses and enjoys something desirable’ that the self 
does not have.51 Envy forces the infant either to want to be ‘as good as the object’, 
or—when this is not possible—to spoil the object by ruining all its goodness, 
destroying everything that is felt as good about it: to remove ‘the source of 
envious feelings.’52 Since the aim of envy is the spoiling of the primal object, 
by ‘putting badness, primarily bad excrements and bad parts of the self, into 
the mother,’53 it requires an outward process that directs the aggression towards 
the mother’s body: one that is conveyed through a projective mechanism. Klein 
believed that envy is not necessarily consciously expressed, but it can also 
operate in fantasy, attacking an object of pleasure and gratification and hence 
being ‘directed against creativeness.’54 Although there is a biting aspect in envious 
feelings, Klein attributed the oral-appropriating tendency to another emotion, 
often operating alongside with envy: greed. One of the basic differences of the 
48 Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms (1946),” 180.
49 Melanie Klein, “Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict (1928),” in The Selected Melanie Klein, ed. 
Juliet Mitchell (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, 1986), 116.
50 Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms (1946),” 184.
51 Klein, “A Study of Envy and Gratitude (1956),” 212.
52 Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, 40.
53 Klein, “A Study of Envy and Gratitude (1956),” 213.
54 Klein, 219.
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two is that whilst envy concerns the destruction of the goodness of the object, 
greed aims at hijacking and violently appropriating this goodness through the 
mouth: ‘[…] completely scooping out, sucking dry and devouring the breast 
[…] its aim is destructive introjection.’55 Both impulses emerge as soon as the 
good breast is experienced as a source of life. Thus, envious and greedy attacks 
at the breast signify that the object has to be exhausted by any means. In short, if 
envy shows its teeth, it is greed that consumes the object. On the other hand, the 
pleasurable experiences enabled the infant’s feelings of gratitude. By arguing that 
breast-feeding gives rise to feelings of gratitude, Klein portrayed the oral relation 
to the breast as an excessive relationship, namely one that extends beyond the 
temporary bodily satisfaction of distress to a much more enduring emotional 
impact on, and the formulation of, the early self. 
In summary, Klein has the paranoid-schizoid position as one in which both 
external objects and internal ones are split in ways that cannot be compromised: 
the objects are either ideal or persecutory. It is the death drive and its 
constitutional cannibalistic character, heightened during this phase, which 
produces the threatening objects in the first place. Hence, the infant becomes 
compelled to introject the good breast and does so in a vicious way because it 
is under a threat. As a result, the internalisation of the good breast is equally 
hampered by the death drive. Some links with colonial associations arise from 
this excessive splitting and vicious circles of projection and introjection. Firstly, 
Klein sees the infant as analogous to a little cannibalistic monster who cannot 
know any boundaries, who greedily depends on others for nourishment, and who 
fantasises about dismembering, cutting and biting the mother—which sounds all 
too similar with the colonial imageries about what would the cannibals do to the 
imperial, male body of the conquistador. Secondly, for the infant, the absences of 
the mother are interpreted as its destructive impulses have succeeded
A little child which believes, when its mother disappears, that it has eaten 
her up and destroyed her (whether from motives of love or of hate) is 
tormented by anxiety both for her and for the good mother which it has 
absorbed into itself.56
 Yet, despite this racialised portrayal, it is just as possible that the devouring 
55 Klein, 213.
56 Melanie Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States (1935),” 
in The Selected Melanie Klein, ed. Juliet Mitchell (New York: The Free Press, A Division of 
Macmillan, Inc, 1986), 121.
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impulses can pull the infant out of this threatening state, into one that is 
synonymous to whiteness. The fear of losing the mother because of one’s own 
cannibalism is that which creates the precondition of conscience and of the 
depressive position. 
4.5 Depressive Position and Reparation
Klein’s theory of the depressive position is a great example of how the 
dividedness of interwar Britain brought the need for integrated psychic states. 
In her 1935 paper A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive 
States, Klein introduces the idea of the depressive position as one in which the 
split between the persecutory and the idealised object weakens. Objects could 
now be perceived as both loved and hated, ‘and in addition to this […] the real 
objects and the imaginary figures, both external and internal, are bound up with 
each other.’57 In the depressive position the projection of badness into external 
objects becomes mitigated, and the expectation of an idealised, gratifying 
object shattered: thus, the subject builds more complex relationships on the 
basis of ambivalence. For Klein, the depressive position is not a final state or an 
achievement that can be accomplished but rather it involves a constant tension 
and negotiation of one’s aggression. This is because unlike the paranoid-schizoid 
position where the death drive can be dealt through splitting (it can be projected 
elsewhere so any engagement with it is avoided), in the depressive position, the 
death drive is being worked through. The depressive position is founded on the 
tension created by the death drive, giving rise to a persistent unsettlement—
one that enables the emergence of ethical relations to others and allows greater 
possibilities for love, reparation, recognition, and awareness. Not only does this 
reading of the depressive position run counter to psychological utopias and 
dystopias (such as persecutory or idealised states and uninterruptedly gratifying 
objects), but also it hampers any effort to idealise the depressive position per 
se exposing it as a position. Thought this way, the depressive position allows 
the possibility of an ethical relation to the object since the subject takes 
responsibility for their aggression and experiences guilt for the other’s well-being. 
A question emerging thus, is what enables to transition from the more simple 
and uncomplicated management of the death drive in the paranoid-schizoid 
position to the more complex handling of ambivalence—I am using the words 
57 Klein, 141.
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‘simple’ and ‘complex’ here cautiously since as Brickman has showed they 
are heavily charged with evolutionary assumptions.58 Perhaps it would be a 
misunderstanding to assume that the transition from happens abruptly. Despite 
not being clearly spelled out, Klein implies that there is an in-between phase 
of fluctuations from which the depressive position arises. This psychic phase is 
characterized by defences ‘directed against the “pining” for the loved object.[…] 
I formerly termed some of these methods manic defences, or the manic position 
because of their relationship to the manic-depressive illnesses.’59 The purpose of 
this phase is to build defences to cope with the depressive anxieties that gradually 
emerge: These are omnipotent phantasies both of a destructive and a reparative 
quality. It is clear that the possibility of love and reparation emerges only in 
relation to innate destructiveness: ‘Only when consideration has been given to 
the part that destructive impulses play in the interaction of hate and love,’ Klein 
wrote in 1937, ‘is it possible to show the ways in which feelings of love and 
tendencies to reparation develop in connection with aggressive impulses and 
in spite of them.’60 The death drive sets the foundation of experiences of guilt 
and the emergence of conscience. The infant’s fundamental fear is that in its 
attempt to internalize the mother, it has ended up devouring her. The loss of the 
mother—Klein thinks of the loss in terms of weaning—creates a vicious cycle 
whereby the infant finds herself guilty for having ‘eaten’ the mother, and thus 
losing the object on which she depends: 
He finds himself constantly impelled to repeat the incorporation of 
a good object, partly because he dreads that he has forfeited it by his 
cannibalism—i.e. the repetition of the act is designed to test the reality 
of his fears and disprove them—and partly because he fears internalized 
persecutors against whom he requires a good object to help him.61 
To better understand how the loss of objects works in Klein’s theory, I turn 
to the work of Judith Butler who, despite not being a psychoanalyst, adopts a 
sympathetic and critical perspective towards Kleinian psychoanalysis, and 
highlights its implications for the social. Butler has noted that there are two stages 
in the experience of the loss of the mother: first, the mother is lost externally 
(the mother goes away from the infant), and second, the mother lost internally 
58 Brickman, Aboriginal Populations in the Mind. 
59 Klein, “Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States (1940),” 151.
60 Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945, vol. 1, The Writings of 
Melanie Klein (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, 1975), 306.
61 Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States (1935),” 119.
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becomes the mother ‘anew, lost as introjected object.’62 For Klein, when the 
maternal object is precariously possessed, her physical absence makes the internal 
object lost as well. This is because in the earliest stages of development there is 
an ‘excess of cannibalistic impulses in the subject’ which leads her introjection 
to miscarriage.63 Remarkably, for Butler, the negativity of Kleinian theory means 
that there is no possibility to possess the mother in a non-precarious way (as we 
will see later, there is only the possibility to deny the loss), the introjected object 
is always precariously possessed because the death drive constantly prevents 
security. ‘Introjection, for Klein, cannot be sustained […] in effect the ego, in its 
cannibalism, consumes the introjected object.’64 Therefore, Butler’s account of 
Kleinian development does not take as its aim the secure possession of internal 
objects and the victory of love over hate. Instead, it proposes the possibility of 
the psychoanalytic subject in the depressive position as having the capacity to 
check its innate sadism and withdraw from destruction. Butler explained that 
once the introjected object is lost, the infant has no one else to blame but itself. 
Guilt, rage, and aggression are thus channelled against the infant’s own hatred 
creating the capacity for a self-reflection that holds the ego accountable for the 
impact of its aggression. 
Every ego carries the potential to destroy the objects that form the world 
of its psychic attachments, and so every ego must have its sadism put in 
check by a super-ego that turns out to be nothing other than the reflexive 
rerouting against the ego of that primary aggression.65 
For Klein the experience of losing the mother then, triggers the emergence of 
the super-ego, which is eventually the agency that keeps aggression and hostility 
inwards, and restrains the death drive. Remarkably, for Klein the cannibalistic 
component of the death drive is preserved and—echoing Freud—makes 
aggression a force of self-devourment: 
The child himself desires to destroy the libidinal object by biting, 
devouring and cutting it, which leads to anxiety, since awakening of 
the Oedipus tendencies is followed by introjection of the object, which 
then becomes one from which punishment is to be expected. The child 
then dreads a punishment corresponding to the offence: the super-ego 
62 Judith Butler, “Moral Sadism and Doubting One’s Own Love,” in Reading Melanie Klein, ed. 
Lyndsey Stonebridge and John Phillips (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 180.
63 Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States (1935),” 117.
64 Butler, “Moral Sadism and Doubting One’s Own Love,” 180.
65 Butler, 182.
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becomes something which bites, devours and cuts.’66 
What Butler puts to the fore is that the concern for the other’s preservation, 
‘anxiety […] about the safety of the object of love,’67 is the primary step for the 
mitigation of the death drive. Thought this way the Kleinian psychoanalytic 
subject—through Butler—is one structurally capable of being ethical, and even 
more, agency means recognising that survival depends on the preservation of 
the other. 
But, as briefly mentioned previously, there is another response to the loss of 
the mother, which Klein explains in the context of manic defences and manic 
reparation. Prior to the emergence of the depressive position, the perception of 
the maternal object is still a partial one: hence, the mother that is experienced 
as lost is not the whole mother of  the depressive position, but the idealised, 
blissful and gratifying breast of the paranoid-schizoid position. Once the 
idealised mother is experienced as lost, Klein writes in The Psychogenesis of 
Manic-Depressive States, ‘[t]he ego feels impelled (and I can now add, impelled 
by its identification with the good object) to make restitution for all the sadistic 
attacks that it has launched on that object.’68 ‘Not until the object is lived as a 
whole can its loss be felt as a whole.’69 The loss of the partial object does not 
trigger the ethical responses and reparation of the depressive position, but what 
Klein calls ‘manic reparation,’ which has to do with ‘the desire to control the 
object, the sadistic gratification of overcoming and humiliating it, of getting the 
better of it, the triumph over it.’70 In fact, Klein writes that this type of reparation 
might be overwhelmed by the desire to control the object that ‘the benign 
circle started by this act becomes broken.’71 This is because this early process of 
mourning concerns the lost idealised object. This mourning process is doomed 
to fail because the idealised object does not exist, and hence, it can never be 
repaired. Therefore, for Klein it all boils down to how much of the mother has 
to be introjected: too much introjection, and she is devoured (cannibalism), too 
66 Klein, “Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict (1928),” 71.
67 Butler, “Moral Sadism and Doubting One’s Own Love,” 183.
68 Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States (1935),” 120. My 
emphasis. 
69 Klein, 118.
70 Klein, “Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States (1940),” 153. Emphasis in the 
original. 
71 Klein, 153.
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little and the ego is helplessly unable to grow.72 In the latter version the ego falls 
ill of melancholia whereas, in the former, an object relation with the mother 
founded upon domination and annihilation is initiated. 
What is important for the argument of this project, however, is the way Klein 
constructs the psychoanalytic fantasy of manic-reparation. While the subject 
in the manic position is ‘hungry for objects,’ which means that a defense 
mechanism enables her to introject good objects in order to manage the death 
drive, ‘the manic subject denies the different forms of anxiety associated with 
this introjection.’73 It is thus enmeshed in the tension between the indispensable 
dependence on external objects and the denial of the precariousness dependence 
on the social world entails. What the manic subject denies, Klein expounds, is 
‘his own concern for the object’s safety.’74 This denial manifests as contempt and 
disparagement for the introjected object, which Klein describes as ‘a cannibalistic 
way’ of incorporation—no object can be good enough as the primary, idealised 
breast.75 What the ‘cannibalistic’ adds to the introjection here, is that once the 
mother has not been experienced as whole, the subject is incapable of forming 
ethical relations—she is entrapped in a vicious circle of control, domination, 
sadism and contempt which, according to Klein, resemble a racialised canon of 
cruelty. The question following from this is who is this manic subject or who is 
the subject to whom whole objects are not available? 
On the one hand, Klein’s theory seems to address the racialised subjects who in 
the white imaginary can only be perceived as partial; idealised or persecutory—
perhaps just as Klein herself was perceived as an ‘exotic’ Egyptian princess and 
a ‘madwoman.’ In this sense, the contribution her theory makes is that in the 
racialised imaginings brought by colonial racism, the fragmentation of the social 
world and the partial objectification of the bodies of colour limits their capacity 
to be mourned, as much as it limits their capacity to be introjected as whole. 
Furthermore, it is the subject of manic reparation, of cruelty and domination 
to whom Klein attributes a racialised savagery, turning colonial racism on its 
head. On the other, Klein proposes that if the experience of mourning for the 
72 In the latter case, Klein argues that the infant takes refuge in the mechanism of manic 
reparation: a desperate response to control the loved object since it is not securely attached inside 
and is constantly under the threat of annihilation. Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of 
Manic-Depressive States (1935).”
73 Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States (1935),” 163.  
74 Ibid. 
75 .  
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loss of the whole object are the only preconditions for keeping the death drive 
at bay, the depressive position then, perhaps approaches a post-colonial form 
of subjectivity: one that is fundamentally incomplete, imperfect and structured 
around the ordinary melancholic acknowledgment of this loss (what in Lacanian 
theory would be understood as a fundamental ‘lack.’ However, for Klein, this 
process entails the moderation of racialised forces, wishes and object-relations 
within the subject. Since the depressive position is dependent on the withdrawal 
of cannibalistic fantasies, it follows that it is a position of an incomplete and 
precarious whiteness. Vexed in the politics of reparation in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, Klein’s ethics leave the question of race—as exemplified by 
the cannibal trope—unresolved.
4.6 ‘She’s a Man-Eater’: Femininity and Motherhood 
So far, we have seen how, for Klein, the cannibal trope becomes the prototype 
of the messiness, intensity, and intrusiveness of the early mother-infant 
relationship. Not surprisingly for the ‘idyll of early fusion with the mother,’ Klein 
offers ‘proximity as something which devours.’76 Contrary to Freud, in Klein, it 
is the mother, not the father, who is the central figure of development. However, 
her account of femininity and motherhood has been criticised by feminist 
theorists as recuperating patriarchal views.77 Klein’s views towards women 
were not particularly sympathetic. Her biographer, Phyllis Grosskurth argues 
that Klein’s theories of femininity and motherhood have been irrecoverably 
influenced by her personal experiences of being a daughter, a mother and a 
mother of a rapidly growing psychoanalytic movement in London, challenging 
the Freudian, paternal heritage.78 Klein’s relations with the women of her life had 
been difficult and troubling—she was the least wanted child in her family, she 
had a disquieting relationship with her mother Libussa, and an equally troubling 
relationship with her daughter Melitta Schmideberg (whom Klein had analysed 
as a child), and who as well became a psychoanalyst, though not a Kleinian one.79
Klein believed that while the Oedipus complex ordinarily resulted in a male 
76 Rose, “Negativity in the Work of Melanie Klein,” 140.
77 Amber Jacobs, “The Potential of Theory: Melanie Klein, Luce Irigaray, and the Mother-
Daughter Relationship,” Hypatia 22, no. 3 (2007): 175–93; Luce Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter 
with the Mother,” in The Irigaray Reader, ed. Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 1991).
78 Grosskurth, Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work.
79 Grosskurth.
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subjectivity complete and secure, the female one would always remain incomplete 
and unfinished. The reason for this fundamental difference was the gendered 
identifications during the Oedipal phase. Until the emergence of the Oedipal 
phase, children went through the ‘femininity phase’ in which they identify with 
the mother—in a stark opposition to Freudian development who believed there 
was no maternal identification. In that phase the father is only understood as a 
partial paternal object—as another source of care and comfort that can substitute 
the unbearable loss of the breast. ‘The father’s penis quickly becomes both to the 
little girl and the little boy an alternative object of oral desire to be turned to 
away from the breast.’80 However, in the transition from the oral to genital stage 
the gendered trajectories change. For the boy the transition from the mouth to 
the genitals means that he develops a desire to penetrate the maternal body, to 
combat, and vanquish ‘his father’s penis inside [the mother] by means of his 
own penis.’81 The boy needs to establish a good relationship with the mother 
and build a good internal maternal object which results from the victory over 
the maternal penis—‘a victory of this kind would also be a proof that he is able 
to get the better of the internalized assailants in his own body as well.’82 For 
the boy, the femininity phase dissolves when the identification with the father 
begins to counterbalance his anxiety about being castrated by the mother. Due 
to the anatomically visible sameness of the penis, Klein argues, the boy is ‘made 
in the image of ’ his ideal, and therefore, the modelling of the boy in accordance 
with the father’s image ‘is not unattainable.’83 The identification with the father 
strengthens the boy’s sexuality and moderates its innate sadism. 
For Klein, the vagina presents a similar receptive tendency as the mouth, and 
thus, the girl’s desire to introject the penis—either as an object of gratification, or 
as an Oedipal one—is much greater than that of the boy. In addition to that, the 
omnipotence of thoughts characteristic of the early Oedipal conflict leads the girl 
to the belief that she has actually incorporated the father’s penis. The Kleinian 
formulation of female development involves stronger Oedipal incorporation 
which makes the girl ‘more subordinated to her introjected father.’84 To 
counteract the internalised father, and to acquire a gendered identity, the girl 
80 Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, 110.
81 Melanie Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, trans. Alix Strachey (New York: Grove Press, 
Inc., 1960), 331.
82 Klein, 331.
83 Klein, “Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict (1928),” 81.
84 Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, 274.
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introjects the mother which instils in her the maternal super-ego. However, this 
identification is hampered ‘on the basis of an anatomical resemblance, owing to 
the fact that the internal organs […] do not admit of any investigation or test by 
reality.’85 The formation of the super-ego from the same-sex parent in the girl 
does not occur through genital identification (Klein here echoes Freud when 
seeing the external, female genital as an absence, which does not provide a solid 
basis for gendered identification), which results in a fundamental difference 
between the emergence of the female and the male self. Due to the unattainable 
genital identification with the mother, the girl attempts to identify through their 
internal similarity: the role of motherhood and the capacity to have babies. 
However, this too turns into an ‘unsatisfied desire for motherhood,’ ‘since the 
mother’s femininity is invisible and her interior is threatening,’86 due to oral-
sadistic projections which render the maternal object into a threatening object, 
and her dreadful internal as a potential source for retaliation. Female anxiety is 
not counteracted, as in the male, through the reality of the penis for the male 
position: The girl’s ‘inability to know anything about her position’ aggravates her 
fears of her internal objects as destroyed or damaged.87
It is crucial to note that Klein regarded this theory as an unconscious 
representation of male and female psychosexual development, ignored the 
socially constructed assumptions around genital characteristics, and instead 
assumed the penetrating and receptive capacities to be ordered by a biological 
character. Moreover, contrary to Freud’s view of the female super-ego as 
significantly weaker, Klein believed that the female ‘super-ego becomes raised 
to very great heights […] and that her ego looks up, and submits itself to it.’88 
The female ego is much more submissive to the super-ego and hence frequently 
censored and restrained, tied from birth to a state of precariousness: ‘Thus 
whereas in the man it is the ego and, with it, reality-relations which mostly 
take the lead, so that his whole nature is more objective and reasonable, in the 
woman it is the unconscious which is the dominating force.’89 The excessive 
orality attributed to the girl that is amplified due to anatomical receptiveness 
and the incapacity to identify with the mother on the basis of genital similarity, 
allows the formation of two female positions: one that submits the unconscious 
85 Klein, 319.
86 Kristeva, Melanie Klein, 2:124. Emphasis in the original. 
87 Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, 287.
88 Klein, 320.
89 Klein, 320. My emphasis. 
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dominating force to the harshness of the super-ego ‘the melancholic woman’, 
and the other that eschews it through identification with the masculine and the 
‘imaginary ownership of the penis’90: the phallic-woman. Female subjectivity is 
then seen as constitutionally incomplete and condemned to a state of discontent. 
Klein vividly illustrates the relation between the cannibal trope as a gendered 
trope that makes the female subject more sexually threatening and aggressive. 
Her body resembles a devouring mouth or a vagina dentata and ‘her phantasies 
[are that] her vagina and body as a whole are destructive to her partner and that 
in fellatio she will bite off his penis and tear it to pieces.’91 
The only way to counter her constitutional cannibalistic nature is to achieve 
a positive incorporation of the paternal penis with which she can repair the 
damage done to the mother.92 Therefore, not only is the identification with the 
mother unattainable, but also the retreat of devouring sadism into the depressive 
position is equally impossible to achieve (unless adopting a masculine position), 
leaving the female confined in the in-between of the paranoid–schizoid and the 
depressive positions, that is, the body that is tied into an incomplete development. 
In this sense, the female mind cannot work through psychic conflicts internally 
without the equipment of the phallus, and is condemned to a developmental 
standstill which resembles, but is not identical to, what in the colonial imagery 
is represented by the racist smear of the primitive mind.
Furthermore, in Klein’s theory we find recurring fantasies of a devouring, 
omnipotent mother which enters the infant’s mind and colonises it. This motif 
sits close to the one suggested by Jean Laplanche whereby the infant is on the 
receiving end of enigmatic signifiers from the adult parent. For Laplanche, 
the infant is engaged in a process of ‘translation,’ a meaning-making process 
initiated from the parent in the form of an ordinary, albeit traumatic, seduction.93 
90 Klein, 293.
91 Klein, 281.
92 Klein, 299–300.
93 Laplanche also draws a distinction between what he calls ‘implantation’ and ‘intromission’; 
while the former constitutes an ordinary trauma for the infant, caused by being exposed into 
the unknowability of the adult world and experiencing its signifiers as invitations to decipher 
meaning, intromission is a much more violent form of seduction. Laplanche describes it as a 
form of high-jacking the infant’s mind, which went far beyond the ‘psychophysiological skin,’ 
and affected the mechanisms of understanding and translating the signifiers per se. While Klein 
does not make this distinction, still it is helpful to see their theories in a dialogue suggesting 
an ongoing relevance for the ‘colonising motif.’ Jean Laplanche, Essays on Otherness, ed. John 
Fletcher (London: Routledge, 1998), 136.
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The maternal body becomes either ‘a kind of storehouse which contains the 
gratification of all […] desires’94 or a container of dreadful or threatening objects 
that persecute, castrate, and devour the child. Regarding the latter, feminist 
critics have argued that the representations of the mother as a devouring monster 
of Kleinian theory unravel the masculine symbolic structures through which 
the mother is understood. In addition to that, the violence against the maternal 
body which through projections makes her into a cannibalistic retaliatory figure 
belongs to a historical continuity of an archaic projection onto the mother of 
unacknowledged exploitation. ‘The mother has become a devouring monster 
as an inverted effect of the blind consumption of the mother.’95 Apart from 
the theorisation of motherhood within the phallocentric symbolic structures, 
the representation of the mother as devouring has also another significant 
implication for Kleinian psychoanalysis. By bringing together the cannibal 
trope, the incomplete female subject and the threatening nature of the maternal 
figure, Klein crafts a representation of femininity and motherhood reminiscent 
of a colonial dichotomy, which comes to light not when we focus on the mother-
daughter relationship that feminist scholarship has advocated for,96 but on the 
mother-son. 
In one of her earliest accounts of the Oedipal conflict, in 1928, Klein discussed 
how the invisible inside of the mother’s body becomes the object of the child’s 
curiosity. The point is that the mother, who is not yet recognised as a whole 
person, is seen as containing all the good objects the infant desires. This feeling 
is supported by the infant’s innate curiosity since it wishes both to explore 
and ‘appropriate the contents of the womb,’ and to take possession of them.97 
Interestingly, in this passage, the previously implied gender-neutral ‘child’ 
suddenly shifts to the one of a universal male in the exact following sentence, 
creating a gendered dynamic through the female, maternal body as a container 
of the objects of the first male conquest:98 ‘He thus begins to be curious about 
94 Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, 284.
95 Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter with the Mother,” 67.
96 Amber Jacobs, On Matricide: Myth, Psychoanalysis, and the Law of the Mother (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007); Irigaray, “The Bodily Encounter with the Mother”; Jessica 
Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1988).
97 Klein, “Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict (1928),” 72.
98 I am borrowing this observation from Sánchez-Pardo, Cultures of the Death Drive: Melanie 
Klein and Modernist Melancholia, who made use of the prompt transitions from male to female 
subjects in the Kleinian text as an index of the text’s unconsciously communicated utterances.
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what it contains, what it is like, etc. So the epistemophilic instinct and the desire 
to take possession come quite early to be most intimately connected with one 
another […]’99
In The Psychoanalysis of Children, written a year later, the dominating aspect of 
the mother-son relationship becomes even more explicit: ‘[H]er body will be 
a desirable place, though a place which can only be conquered with greater or 
less risk to himself.’100 Klein makes clear that the precarious erection of a male 
subjectivity is dependent upon the risk of the conquest—which in this passage is 
linked to the benign desire for knowledge and for possession—of the maternal 
body. While the subject that cannot identify with the mother on the basis of 
reality that cannot contain objects without destroying them, and, that can love 
only melancholically and is characterized by excessive orality is essentially 
female, the infant that explores with curiosity the maternal body and exercises 
its desire for knowledge is essentially male. Conversely, the cannibal trope is 
one with which feminine subjectivity is invested whereas masculinity, instead 
of being considered as violently trying to possess the mother, is celebrated as 
having an epistemophillic tendency. The gender of the subject that explores and 
conquers is necessarily male just as the gender of the subject that devours and 
cannibalises is necessarily female. Even more, the male desire for domination 
and possession has always as object one reminiscent of the maternal. 
In her 1937 paper Love, Guilt and Reparation Klein discusses the ‘wider aspects 
of love’ by explaining how the mother-infant dyad becomes displaced from the 
domain of the individual onto the social world.101 This is evident in the ways 
we speak about ‘motherland’, but more significantly, it manifests in the attitude 
towards the colonial exploration of new countries. In a profound maternal 
analogy, Klein offers an utterly nostalgic account of a brutal litany of colonial 
exploitation: ‘In the explorer’s unconscious mind, a new territory stands for a 
new mother, one that will replace the loss of the real mother. He is seeking the 
“promised land”— “the land flowing with milk and honey.”’102 By arguing that 
colonised territories stand for the maternal body, Klein addresses a particular 
power dynamic at play in the colonial discourse. This far too idealised and 
99 Klein, “Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict (1928),” 72. My emphasis.
100 Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, 335. My emphasis. 
101 Melanie Klein, “Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works (1921-1945),” in The Writings 
of Melanie Klein, vol. 1 (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, 1975), 333.
102 Klein, 334.
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romanticised version of the motivation for brutal colonial exploitation conceals 
the malign ways with which colonized lands were objectified and feminised. The 
proximity here is blatant. In the colonial male phantasy, the colonized lands—
reminiscent of the maternal nostalgic blissful dyad—were treated as threatening, 
devouring and were fantasised as populated with cannibals. Similarly, in 
Kleinian psychoanalysis the mother of the infantile phantasy is experienced as 
a dreadful and devouring figure, a cannibal. This remarkable analogy between 
psychoanalytic theory and colonial practice reflects the depth of the influence of 
the socio-symbolic structures to the theoretical representations of the feminine 
and the maternal. The penetrating and sweeping force of the colonialist discourse 
manifests in the profound ways it shaped Kleinian psychoanalytic knowledge, 
which is riddled with the trope of cannibalism. The maternal body is a racialised 
body, which can be colonised and conquered. The female body is also racialised 
in the sense that it is presented as having a devouring capacity which she has 
to turn either against herself (melancholia), or against others (and become a 
phallic, conquistador). 
To sum up, I have tried to map the theoretical sites that are invested with the 
colonial trope of cannibalism and to argue that in Klein the cannibal trope 
becomes the trope of femininity per se. Instead of a castrated woman, Klein repairs 
the Freudian harm done to the female body with a woman and a pre-Oedipal 
mother–castrator, believed to hold a phallic omnipotence in the introjected 
penis in her womb. However, the inheritance of such femininity entails the 
inheritance of phallic power and forecloses possibilities for a separate symbolic 
role of the female.103 Psychoanalytically speaking, the devouring capacity of the 
female invests the psychoanalytic excess in a gendered fashion: that which has to 
be repressed also appears to be threatening and capable of undoing the subject. 
Femininity thus moves from a Freudian mystery (what does a woman want?) to 
a Kleinian space of death and negativity that has to be foreclosed or it threatens 
to undo and to devour masculinity.104
4.7 Conclusion
In the beginning of this chapter, I cited a story from Klein’s early paper Infantile 
Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art, where, to highlight the daughter’s 
103 Jacobs, On Matricide: Myth, Psychoanalysis, and the Law of the Mother.
104 Rose, “Negativity in the Work of Melanie Klein.”
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reparative tendencies towards the mother through a series of portraits, Klein 
avoids commenting on the daughter’s self-portrait as a black woman in the first 
place. Jean Walton has examined Klein’s silencing of racial difference in this 
instance, and especially in the context of her theory of femininity. According 
to Walton, Klein displaces the racial difference within the unconscious fears 
of the daughter for a mother who is as vindictive as she is black (as in the 
daughter’s identification): ‘[T]he white female imaginary is occupied not only by 
a fantasized retaliatory white mother but also a racially differentiated other. This 
other is not male, not white.’105 The Kleinian female psychoanalytic subject is 
fantasised as a racialised otherness or regards the mother as a racialised other—
an idyllic body to be conquered and its fruits and goodness to be consumed, 
or, as a devouring figure that colonises and has to be resisted. Although Klein’s 
psychoanalysis offers one of the first systematic accounts of female sexuality 
and identity, femininity comes to the centre of analysis in a perverse way: it 
either silences black femininity or reclaims a colonial trope which makes women 
aggressive, hostile and guilt-ridden. This means that Klein offers an account 
of female subjectivity where she relies either too much or too little on race as 
illustrative of difference. Should we need to take into consideration the Kleinian 
psychoanalysis for post-colonial ends, then we are presented with a treadmill 
of racialised representations that cannot be bypassed, and more crucially, they 
do not allow room for racial difference as a lived experience, and not as an 
unconscious impulse. 
In this chapter, I wanted to show how pervasive the cannibal trope is in Kleinian 
psychoanalysis. Klein is the most obvious thinker to discuss alongside fantasies 
of boundary transgression and entering the other’s mind. Having examined 
the main pillars in Klein’s theory of psychosexual development, I have traced 
how Freud’s evolutionary framework has survived in Klein, theorising infancy, 
as the origin of subjectivity, through the colonial mythology of cannibalism. 
Furthermore, I have also looked at how Klein pursues the assumption of a 
biological predisposition to transgressing the boundaries of the other, and how 
in using the cannibal trope as a prototype for mother-infant proximity, Klein 
brings race under the sway of the subject. Klein’s developmental theory is 
structured as a racial achievement: The transition from the paranoid-schizoid 
position into the depressive position is marked as a transition away from 
cannibalistic impulses, irrational fantasies, and persecutions towards an ethical 
105 Walton, Fair Sex, Savage Dreams: Race, Psychoanalysis, Sexual Difference, 36.
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subjectivity that is fundamentally white. Last but not least, I focused on how 
racial difference is managed in the context of Klein’s account of sexual difference. 
Looking at the Oedipus complex for the boy and the girl as crucial processes in 
gendered subjectivity, I argued that, in Klein, sexual difference is also a form of 
racial difference. The cannibal impulse informs the infant’s fears of its mother, 
the girl’s sexual impulses towards the male body, the mother’s power against her 
baby, and as a result, Klein leaves us with categories that cannot be thought of 
as separate, but as linked through racial forms of domination, as in, femininity 
and masculinity, black woman and white woman, the mother and the infant. In 
the following chapter I will examine how the psychoanalytic inheritance of the 
colonial imagery of the cannibal trope, from Freud’s mythology of origins to the 
mythology of the mother-infant relationship, is carried in a colonial context. 
I will focus on the work of Géza Róheim, the first anthropologically trained 
psychoanalyst, and his theory of the psychosexual development of Australian 
Aboriginals where black motherhood is considered to be literally cannibalistic. 
CHAPTER FIVE
‘A Child is Being Eaten’: 
Géza Róheim and the Ethnic Psychoanalytic Subject   
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5.1 Oedipus, Culture and Universality 
While the previous chapter draws out the logic of the cannibal trope in Melanie 
Klein’s theory of psychosexual development as racialising development and 
informing sexual difference, this chapter inquires into the case of Géza Róheim 
and places the cannibal trope in the conversation between psychoanalysis and 
anthropology. The debate between psychoanalysts and anthropologists was 
inaugurated in the mid-1920s by the Polish anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski 
who regarded psychoanalysis as fallacious in its dependence on the patriarchal 
character of the Oedipus complex.1 In his anthropological fieldwork in the 
Trobriands of New Guinea, Malinowski claimed to have found evidence for a yet 
unexplored sociological component in psychoanalysis that made it problematic 
for non-European use. That is to say, more precisely, Malinowski showed that the 
Trobriands were a matrilineal society where the father’s role is not as the mother’s 
husband. The children belong to the mother’s community and it is the uncle who 
represents ‘the principle of discipline, authority, and executive power within the 
family.’2 Paternal kinship is not recognized but remains as a social relationship 
to which the children turn ‘only for loving care and tender companionship.’3 
Malinowski then concluded ‘the hate is removed from the father and placed 
upon the maternal uncle.’4 Without explicitly opposing the Oedipal function, 
Malinowski’s anthropological observations posed a compelling challenge to 
psychoanalysis regarding the ‘sociology’5 of Freud’s schema because the Oedipus 
complex was too dependent on patriarchal family structures: ‘[I]n our type of 
family we have the authoritative, powerful husband and father backed up by 
society. […] he is the bread-winner,’6 thus, raising questions about the cultural 
1 Bronislaw Malinowski, Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1937); Bronislaw Malinowski, “Psychoanalysis and Anthropology,” Psyche 
4 (1924): 293–332.
2 Malinowski, Sex and Repression in Savage Society, 11.
3 Malinowski, 11.
4 Malinowski, 139.
5 Malinowski, 94.
6 Malinowski, 11.
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relativity of psychoanalysis. 
While Malinowski’s questioning of the applicability of the Oedipus complex 
beyond a European context hit home, his critique remained misleadingly foreign 
to psychoanalysis. Malinowski missed the point of the unconscious altogether 
in ‘looking for facts and for conscious, rational reasons for the patricidal act.’7 
He ignored the metaphorical nature of psychoanalytic concepts and privileged 
observation over interpretation: ‘After all neither group-marriage nor totemism, 
neither avoidance of mother-in-law nor magic happen in the “unconscious;” they 
are all solid sociological and cultural facts, and to deal with them theoretically 
requires a type of experience which cannot be acquired in the consulting room.’8 
In 1924, three years before Malinowski’s notorious challenge to the Freudian 
Oedipal universality, a young Hungarian anthropologist and analysand of 
Freud’s cordial friend and colleague Sandor Ferenczi wrote a paper on applied 
psychoanalysis, titled Australian Totemism. The paper was a tribute to Freud’s 
theory of totemism, and by following the steps of its inspirer, it reviewed 
ethnographical material on the Australian Aboriginal culture, the study of 
myths, rituals and magic to provide support to the Freudian theory by arguing 
for the validity of the psychoanalytic hypothesis of the primal crime.9 The author 
claimed to have found evidence of the acting out of the murder and cannibalism 
of the father in Australian mythology, and thus a proof for Oedipal wishes in a 
non-European context. However, he argued that given that Freud’s primal crime 
marks the passage to culture, religion, and language, it is highly unlikely that 
myths can capture the historical reality of a pre-language epoch.10 Instead, the 
only possible way for this to happen is through a projection of the cultural role of 
the father to the prehistory of mankind: ‘[T]he general tendency is the projection 
of ontogenetic into phylogenetic beginnings.’11 Without cancelling the Freudian 
hypothesis, he supported the view that the story of civilisation’s origins is a myth 
drawing its validity from the role of the father in the child’s life. The author was 
Géza Róheim, and his paper received the International Literary Prize for Applied 
Psycho-Analysis as awarded by Freud, and it was published in English in 1925. 
It was also presented at the 6th International Psychoanalytic Congress in Hague, 
and Ernest Jones, in Freud’s biography, briefly describes it as follows: ‘Róheim 
7 Rosine Jozef Perelberg, Murdered Father Dead Father: Revisiting the Oedipus Complex, The New 
Library of Psychoanalysis (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 99. My emphasis.
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gave an astonishing extempore address in English on Australian totemism.’12 
The enthusiastic reception of Géza Róheim’s essay by psychoanalysts was not 
matched in the responses from anthropologists. A review published in the 
journal Folklore three years later, written by the colonial anthropologist and 
administrator in Africa, N.W. Thomas, points out that the lack of unmediated 
engagement with the studied population undermined the paper’s argument. 
‘When some qualified person,’ Thomas prophetically writes, ‘has investigated the 
unconscious of the uncultured peoples, and has shown that their mental make-
up agrees in every important point with that of Freud’s subjects, it will be quite 
time enough to begin to apply psychoanalysis to anthropological problems.’13 
Another review, published anonymously in the Royal Anthropological Institute 
of Great Britain and Ireland (then named Man) shared the uncomfortable sense 
of reviewing a work that does not sit well with the contemporary inquiries of 
anthropology which were concerned with the question of to ‘what extent the 
facts or theories of psycho-analysis can legitimately be used to explain the beliefs 
and habits of the less advanced people.’14 A few years later Freud, Ferenczi, 
and Vilma Kovacs (the mother of Alice Balint) with the financial support of 
the Princess of Greece and Denmark, Marie Bonaparte, prepared a series of 
fieldworks that would aim at ‘the direct testing of psychoanalytic theory in the 
ethnographic field and the chance to collect empirical data.’15 In the words of 
Sydney’s Sunday Pictorial of 13th January, 1929, Géza Róheim ‘WILL ANALYSE 
PRIMITIVE MAN.’16
In 1929 Róheim and his wife, Illona, departed for an ethnographic expedition 
with the Aboriginals of Central Australia. Subsequently they visited Melanesia, 
12 Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, ed. Lionel Trilling and Steven Marcus, 3rd 
ed. (New York and London: Penguin Books, 1993), 497.
13 N.W. Thomas, “Review: Australian Totemism. A Psycho-Analytic Study in Anthropology by 
Géza Roheim,” Folklore 36, no. 3 (1925): 302.
14 C. G.S., “Review: Australian Totemism. A Psycho-Analytic Study in Anthropology by Géza 
Roheim,” Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 26 (n.d.): 61.
15 Franz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein, and Martin Grotjahn, eds., Psychoanalytic Pioneers (New 
York and London: Basic Books, INC., 1966), 274.
16 John Morton, “‘Less Was Hidden among These Children’: Géza Róheim, Anthropology and 
the Politics of Aboriginal Childhood,” in Growing Up in Central Australia: New Anthropological 
Studies of Aboriginal Childhood and Adolescence, ed. Ute Eickelkamp (New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2011), 15.
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Somalia, and Arizona in the United States.17 His ethnography of Australia, on 
which this chapter focuses, was the most significant and extensive of his studies 
on this expedition. This is for several reasons: Firstly, Róheim was already familiar 
with literature on Australian totemism, and therefore, he dedicated the greater 
part of his ethnographic journey to Central Australia where he stayed for ten 
months while he spent significantly less time in Somalia and Arizona—from one 
to three months, respectively.18 Secondly, Australia seems to hold a special place 
in the psychoanalytic imaginary both as a fantasy of the European prehistoric 
past and also as the place over which the racial conflict between Freud and Jung 
unfolded. As previously shown, Freud based his argument about the Oedipal 
origins of society in Totem and Taboo drawing on anthropological literature 
about Australia. Freud used the figure of the so-called primitive to juxtapose 
Jung’s emphasis to Christianity with a myth that demonstrates the longevity of 
Oedipal wishes and claims to be the precursor of the Christian meal. If anything, 
Australia symbolised the imaginary space where racial differences and Oedipal 
tensions can be brought to light. 
Róheim’s anthropological training alongside his psychoanalytic background 
meant that he could introduce a different perspective onto practices that were 
traditionally perceived as racially specific, such as cannibalism, by working 
from the interstices between the two disciplines. While anthropologists were 
more attentive to questions of race and racial differences because of their direct 
engagement with non-white cultures, cannibalism was a thorny issue for them. 
Cannibalism hardly lost its grip in the fieldwork of Róheim’s contemporaries 
such as Malinowski, Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict in the South Seas 
tribes, enriching them with sensationalist narratives. As Arens puts it, it is 
rather remarkable how anthropologists ‘live among people eaters, but never get 
17 Weston La Barre, “Géza Róheim: Psychoanalysis and Anthropology” in Psychoanalytic 
Pioneers, eds. Frantz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein, Martin Grotjahn, (London: Basic Books, 
1966), 272-281. 
18 Géza Róheim, “Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types,” International Journal of Psycho-
Analysis 13 (1932): 2.
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eaten.’19 On the contrary, as an anthropologically trained psychoanalyst, Róheim 
was educated in a system of thought that entertained wider norms permitting 
him to regard cannibalism as evidence for unconscious aggression and not to 
baulk at the existence of ‘real cannibals in the immediate family.’20 Not only was 
Róheim keen on recognising the cannibal trope as an imaginary dynamic within 
the family, but also he situated it in the relation between the mother and the 
infant—and not the father and the son as Freud had argued. As was Melanie 
Klein, Róheim was analysed by Ferenczi (1915-1916)—in fact, the two analyses 
coincided. Róheim later became a full member of the Budapest Psychoanalytic 
Society. Despite his enthusiastic support for Freudian ideas, Róheim’s thought 
was also shaped by the emphasis of Hungarian psychoanalysis—and Ferenczi’s 
novelty—on the shift from the Oedipal conflict to the primary relation between 
the mother and the infant.21
One final issue that emerges from the contextualisation of his work is the 
psychoanalytic encounter with a non-European culture in the context of colonial 
domination. This is because the assumption that Australian Aboriginals have 
an unconscious, and thus can be analysed, creates a series of ethical dilemmas 
that need to be examined. Critical re-evaluations of Róheim’s fieldwork have 
suggested that his early texts were largely founded on a colonialist framework 
which makes his psychoanalytic theory a prime candidate for a ‘colonisation 
pursued by other means.’22 Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, for example, make 
the case that Róheim’s work legitimises the universality of the Oedipus complex 
through his ignorance of the paradoxical character of psychoanalysis. For 
19 Walter Arens, The Man-Eating Myth, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 97. 
For example, Margaret Mead who was Róheim’s contemporary, as influenced by his work, in her 
1935 ethnography Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Tribes writes about a tribe of head-
hunters and cannibals called Mundugumor who lived in the Eastern part of Papua New Guinea. 
Mead refers to this tribe as a particularly ‘gay, hard, arrogant people’ who were accustomed to 
eat members of a neighbouring tribe as part of a polemical feast that revealed their ferocity and 
ensured their domination in the area. Remarkably, in a footnote, she explains: ‘Here, as in all the 
discussions of war, head-hunting, and cannibalism, it must be remembered that the present tense 
is used merely stylistically, and the [Department of Home and Territories of the Commonwealth 
Australia] government has suppressed these practices.’ Margaret Mead, Sex and Temperament in 
Three Primitive Societies (London: George Routledge, 1935), 211–12. 
20 Géza Róheim, Children of the Desert: The Western Tribes of Central Australia, ed. Werner 
Muensterberger (New York: Basic Books, INC., 1974), 72–73.
21 Judit Meszaros, Ferenczi and Beyond: Exile of the Budapest School and Solidarity in the 
Psychoanalytic Movement During the Nazi Years, The History of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac 
Books, 2014).
22 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Classics 
(London: Penguin, 2009), 171.
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Deleuze and Guattari, psychoanalysis is dependent on the axiomatic character of 
the unconscious—believing in it becomes a ‘modern way of […] being pious.’23 
There is not ‘truth of the unconscious,’24 but only the interpretation attributed to 
what is assumed as a ‘symbolic lack,’ a ‘dead father’ or the ‘Great Signifier;’ ‘the 
latent presence of Oedipus appears only through its patent absence, understood 
as an effect of psychic repression.’25 Once this absence is accepted (for them, 
this absence is not a given), then, the Oedipus complex can be understood as 
obscuring the manufactured character of the unconscious: ‘[It] is a mystification 
of the unconscious that has only succeeded with us by assembling the parts and 
wheels of its apparatus from elements of the previous social formations.’26 Overall, 
just by assuming an unconscious structure, Deleuze and Guattari declare that 
the Oedipus complex becomes a self-explanatory and evident structure precisely 
because it resonates with already existing cultural grammars. For this reason, 
they argue that while Róheim examined through the psychoanalytic lens the 
colonised tribes, the affirmations about an Oedipus complex among them lie in 
the eye of the beholder: ‘[T]he tribes, daughters of the ethnologist, do not say 
Oedipus, although it is Oedipus who makes them speak.’27 While their critique 
rightly acknowledges the colonising element in assuming the universality of 
the Oedipus complex and the psychoanalytic subject, it fails to account for the 
complexities and contradictions in Róheim’s work as well as the nuances of 
his ethnic psychoanalytic subject, resulting from his refusal to fully apply the 
Freudian model. 28
On the contrary, critics sympathetic to psychoanalysis such as Joy Damousi 
have pointed out that in his effort to deploy a ‘European model of analysing 
the self ’ to unfold ‘the mystery of the primitive other,’ Róheim proposed a 
psychological similarity which humanised and attributed complexity to the 
Aboriginals whilst he contested the psychoanalytic figuration of the Aboriginal 
23 Deleuze and Guattari, 175.
24 Deleuze and Guattari, 175.
25 Deleuze and Guattari, 171.
26 Deleuze and Guattari, 175.
27 Deleuze and Guattari, 175.
28 It is beyond the possibilities of this project to address the cataclysmic critique Deleuze and 
Guattari voice against psychoanalysis as a method and an epistemology. I will only juxtapose the 
already rehearsed argument about the emotional damage and pain of individuals where there is 
no such ‘patent absence’ or ‘symbolic lack.’ Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis (London: MacMillan 
Press Ltd, 1991); Anthony Elliott, Concepts of the Self, 3rd ed. (Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 
2014).
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as representing the child-like state of pre-civilized humanity.29 Róheim neither 
aimed to psychoanalyse the Aboriginals in order to cure them, nor did he intend 
to dissect the Aboriginal mind to test the Oedipal hypothesis in accordance with 
other European colonial epistemologies. Rather, applying a European model 
of analysis of the self, Róheim implied that the Aboriginal has the capacity to 
speak of himself about his own experiences, and paradoxically offered ‘a level of 
interrogation and analysis that renders indigenous subjectivity more complex 
than any other theorist writing at the time.’30 
So far, I have highlighted some of the tensions and contradictions that shaped 
the first ethnographically-informed theorisation of the psychoanalytic subject 
conducted by Géza Róheim. My aim has been to show how Róheim’s work is 
historically situated in the interstices between epistemological dichotomies 
such as psychoanalysis and anthropology; universality and particularism; 
the Freudian emphasis on the father and the Hungarian shift to the mother; 
the European and the Aboriginal unconscious. Navigating across these fluid 
boundaries, Róheim’s project is as fascinating as much as it is problematic. 
That is because Róheim was not interested in exploring the junctures of these 
dichotomies while he invested in examining new ways of being, new forms of 
social organisation, and sexual regulation away from the discontents of Western 
civilisation.31 Throughout Róheim’s work, we encounter an alleged superiority 
of the non-European societies compared to the European ones on the grounds 
of their less pathological sociological structures. In a sense, Róheim used the 
Aboriginal as a paradigm to admit to the importance of culture and environment 
for the individual’s well-being, which sounds rather idealistic, given the violence 
of colonial domination. This is Róheim: 
But if the testimony of anthropology indicates anything, it shows 
that primitive man is free, untrammelled, and truly self-reliant in 
comparison with Medieval or Modern Man. […] We, however, do not 
grow up as simply as that. The ‘introjected object’ is not only something 
we assimilate (and thereby increase our powers), it is also something in 
29 Joy Damousi, “Géza Róheim and the Australian Aborigine: Psychoanalytic Anthropology 
during the Interwar Years,” in Unconscious Dominions, ed. Warwick Anderson, Deborah Jenson, 
and Richard C. Keller (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), 88; Joy Damousi, 
Freud in the Antipodes: A Cultural History of Psychoanalysis in Australia (Sydney: University of 
New South Wales, 2005), 96–98.
30 Damousi, “Géza Róheim and the Australian Aborigine: Psychoanalytic Anthropology during 
the Interwar Years,” 89.
31 Robinson, The Sexual Radicals: Reich, Róheim, Marcuse.
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us that says ‘No’ to whatever we are trying to achieve. Nor is it necessary 
to belabour the point that the very marked specialization and division of 
labour which are characteristic of complex societies do not make for any 
blithe self-reliance.32 
In this chapter, I explore Róheim’s theory of the ethnic psychoanalytic subject 
as it emerges from his ethnography of Central Australia. Firstly, I examine the 
colonial and patriarchal policies in Australia targeting Aboriginal motherhood 
as cannibalistic. Secondly, I trace how the colonial discourse of the cannibal trope 
becomes amalgamated in Róheim’s theory of Aboriginal motherhood. I explain 
Róheim’s account of Aboriginal narcissism as strongly dependent on access to 
the maternal breast. I then investigate how Róheim shapes the psychosexual 
development of the Australian Aboriginal and especially the relation between 
the mother so-called cannibal and male subjectivity. I argue and address that 
while Róheim’s ethnic psychoanalytic subject challenges the dominant colonial 
and psychoanalytic discourse, since he regards the Australian Aboriginal 
as happy and unrepressed, his theory is too dependent on the racialisation, 
dehumanisation, and silencing of the black Aboriginal mother through the 
trope of cannibalism. Therefore, in Róheim, we encounter a creative application 
and development of psychoanalytic ideas from the perspective of the colony 
alongside the sheer dependency on a subject who poses a cannibalistic threat.
5.2 Róheim in the Antipodes: Battleground and Laboratory 
In her book, White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism 
and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 
Margaret Jacobs suggests a radical rereading of settler colonialism in Australia 
through the prism of gendered and racial violence aiming at the effective 
elimination of Aboriginals by an institutionalised targeting of the mother-child 
relationship. To the colonial regime, Aboriginal tribes were a prime example 
of an uncivilised, contagious, and bestial people, the so-called ‘dark races,’ 
who hampered possibilities of national unity and social progress.33 They were 
regarded as threatening to the white settlers: Their parenting and domestic 
lives were not compliant with Western rules, and therefore, their existence 
32 Géza Róheim, Magic and Schizophrenia, ed. Werner Muensterberger and S.H. Posinsky (New 
York: International Universities Press, 1955), 51.
33 Margaret D. Jacobs, White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and 
the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-1940 (Lincoln& 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 26.
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presented an imperative to regulate and document their lives, their marriages, 
their families, and their communities. The Northern Territory that Róheim 
visited in 1929 had appointed, since 1927, as Chief Protector of the Aborigines, 
a man named Cecil Cook, who implemented harsh monitoring policies by 
fingerprinting all the Aboriginals, obliging them to wear identity tags (according 
to Jacobs, the Aboriginals called these ‘dog tags’), to live in segregated areas, 
and forcing marriages between white men and Aboriginal women with the aim 
of extinguishing the black population and biologically absorbing them into 
whiteness, i.e. a process the Australian officials called ‘breeding out the colour.’34 
Aboriginal parents, consistent with what would be expected of a racist view 
of black culture, were seen as parasitic and inferior, exemplifying an infantile 
mental status, less complicated and incapable of reaching the depths of the white 
mind, which inevitably threatened the advancements of whiteness.
Margaret Jacobs highlights the role of gender alongside race in the establishment 
of a socio-political colonial structure in which the black Aboriginal women were 
systematically silenced, denigrated, raped, and had their children removed, that 
is to say, they had their agencies robbed by being portrayed as cannibal-mothers. 
More precisely, through the work of white women reformers, Aboriginal women 
were evaluated as incompetent mothers based on their inaccessibility to food, 
their inadequate housing, and their lack of hygiene and clothing which all added 
up to the convincing evidence for their failure to follow the rules and mores 
of the Victorian tradition, making them prime candidates for child-removal 
policies.35 A major tactic to exterminate the outgrowth of the black population 
in the continent was interracial marriages and removal of the so-called ‘half-
castes’ children—children born from an interracial marriage—from their 
mothers. The children were educated in government-run boarding schools or 
religious missions which were believed to erase their savage background and 
absorb them into the white society.36 In reality, according to Jacobs, what these 
boarding schools produced were an ‘industrious class of domestic servants and 
“respectable poor.”’37 But above all, what these child-removal policies effected 
were a racial and gendered set of white women’s activists groups (known as 
34 Jacobs, 26.
35 Jacobs, 88–98.
36 Jacobs, White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of 
Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-1940. See especially Chapter 3, 
The Great White Mother. 
37 Jacobs, 62.
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‘maternalists’) who saw an opportunity to fabricate white motherhood as both 
the superior model to look up to, and to become responsible for the protection 
of the Aboriginal children whose mothers were considered unfit.38 
One example of an advocate of child-removal policies was the case of an Irish 
journalist and anthropologist, and later Commander of the Order of the British 
Empire, Daisy Bates whose anti-Aboriginal racist politics made her the most 
famous author of cases of Aboriginal maternal cannibalism.39 Bates moved to 
Queensland, Australia in 1883 to work as a governess. Until her death in Adelaide 
in 1951, she built an impressive career in journalism and anthropology. Having 
spent several years traveling around the Australian continent with her husband 
John Bates, a drover, she became acquainted with the indigenous tribes, their 
languages, and rites, and subsequently in 1904 she was asked by the Western 
Australian government to assist in collecting ethnographical material on the 
Aborigines. In 1910, she was invited to join the Cambridge University expedition 
led by the anthropologists A. R. Radcliff Brown and E.L. Grant in the North-
west Australia, which fell apart after a few months.40 Between 1935 and 1941, 
while working as a reporter for several Australian newspapers, she maintained 
the column under the title My Natives and I,41 which was incorporated into a 
book titled The Passing of the Aborigines (1938).42 Bates was a controversial figure 
and notoriously eccentric. She famously procured accusations of indigenous 
infanticide and cannibalism in an attempt to create ‘sensational portrayals of 
poor Aboriginal mothering.’43 She claimed to have encountered mothers killing 
and eating their babies as early as 1900.44 In 1911, she was photographed with nine 
aboriginal women at Peak Hill, and the picture’s caption read ‘every one… killed 
38 Jacobs, White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of 
Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-1940.
39 Jacobs, 108–9; Ann Standish, “Daisy Bates: Dubious Leadership,” in Seizing the Initiative: 
Australian Women Leaders in Politics, Workplaces and Communities (Melbourne: The University 
of Melbourne, 2012), 93; Daisy Bates, The Passing of the Aborigines: A Lifetime Spent Among 
the Natives of Australia, 2nd (web) (Adelaide: The University of Adelaide, 2014)., see especially 
Chapter 9. 
40 Jacobs, 108–9. 
41 Bates, The Passing of the Aborigines: A Lifetime Spent Among the Natives of Australia; Standish, 
“Daisy Bates: Dubious Leadership,” 92.
42 Bates, The Passing of the Aborigines: A Lifetime Spent Among the Natives of Australia.
43 Jacobs, 124.
44 Bob Reece, Daisy Bates: Grand Dame of Desert (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 
2007), 86.
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and ate her new-born baby, sharing it with every other woman in her group.’45 
A year later, the state government offered her an unpaid position as ‘honorary 
protector of Aborigines.’46 However, her book The Passing of the Aborigines was 
not well received. It was criticised as an indication of sensationalist journalism 
and self-obsession with the extremity of Aboriginal practices,47 which made her 
lose her credibility and respect as an anthropologist because of her insistence 
on Aboriginal cannibalism.48 In 1930, she collected broken bones and skulls 
which she believed were the remnants of a cannibalistic feast, and sent them 
for investigation at the University of Adelaide.49 J.B. Cleland, a professor of 
pathology claimed that ‘she was misled by informants’50 and the investigation 
showed that the bones were ‘undoubtedly those of a domestic cat.’51 Despite her 
sensational and imprudent character, Bates’ work and ideology forged a picture 
of black motherhood as ‘virtually pathological,’ which informed local governance 
policies promoting the removal and institutionalisation of black children.52 Just 
as importantly, Bates’ work, like that of several other white women, was defined 
against the infantile character of the Aboriginal psyche. Namely, within the 
patriarchal structures of colonial administration, white women used Aboriginals 
to gain social and public position in the Australian colonialist regime. At the 
same time, Bates’ obsession with maternal cannibalism mirrors a process of racial 
discrimination toward the Aboriginals by separating them into those whom can 
be exploited by the colonial settlement (mostly Aboriginal children and men), and 
those, the black mothers, who allegedly represented the most savage of the savages. 
The discourse of race and gender in colonial oppression in Australia was 
bolstered by psychological assumptions about the Aboriginal tribes. Besides the 
colonial policies that aimed at the elimination of Australian Aboriginals, liberal 
concerns about the gradual decrease in the indigenous population equally 
contributed to the colonial assimilation. Since the 19th century, evolutionary 
theorists had established the view that Aboriginal tribes in Australia held 
historical, cultural, and scientific value, and thus, had to be preserved by means 
45 Reece, 87.
46 Jacobs, 143.
47 Standish, “Daisy Bates: Dubious Leadership,” 99; Reece, Daisy Bates: Grand Dame of Desert, 
87.
48 Jacobs, 131.
49 Reece, 88; Jacobs, 124.
50 Reece, 87.
51 Jacobs, 124.
52 Jacobs, 131.
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of study and taxonomy.53 In Central Australia in particular, the fear of Aboriginal 
extinction led to an increasing attraction of European scientists who delved into 
‘psychophysical testing, psychometrics, and Freudian analysis’ of the Aboriginal 
mind and body.54 More precisely, Anderson suggests that psychologists studying 
Central Australian tribes presupposed a ‘common mental apparatus, or 
biological matrix’ that was shared between the European and the non-European 
mind.55 For example, the neurologist Henry Kenneth Fry and the Australian 
psychologist Stanley D. Porteus used physiological and psychometric tests of the 
Aboriginal mind and body.56 Fry and Porteus were preoccupied with the mental 
capacities and the intelligence of the natives, their physical particularities, and 
their resistance to pain. They submitted the Aboriginals to tests with mazes, 
jigsaw puzzles and line drawing to evaluate arithmetic understanding, spatial 
perception, and orientation. 
Beneath the apparent neutrality and objectivity of these researches, they firstly 
situated the Aboriginal mind in relation with the European one, and secondly, 
they aimed at explaining the psychological status of the natives by means of the 
innate, natural inferiority of racial difference. For example, Fry believed that the 
reason why Aboriginals could not adjust to the colonial regime was not because it 
was toxic but because they held the ‘standard of intelligence of a white adolescent’ 
which prevented them from becoming incorporated to white civilisation.57 
Psychological researches offered evidence for racial inferiority as allegedly 
associated with low intelligence and lack of complexity of the Aboriginal mind. 
At the same time, they disengaged any correlation between colonial domination 
and psychological agony. ‘Investigators saw Arrente and others confronting 
hunger, dispossession, child removal, and family destruction—yet they could 
not let these struggles intrude on psychological assessment. […] It just did not 
seem relevant.’58 This significant denial of the colonial regime’s responsibility 
for the decay and decline in Aboriginal populations also permeates the work of 
Géza Róheim. 
53 Jock McCulloch, Colonial Psychiatry and “the African Mind” (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 49.
54 Warwick Anderson, “Hermannsburg, 1929: Turning Aboriginal ‘Primitives’ into Modern 
Psychological Subjects,” Journal of the History of Anderson, 129. The Behavioral Sciences 50, no. 
2 (2014): 127–47.
55 Anderson, 142.
56 Anderson.
57 Anderson, 135.
58 Anderson, 144.
134
The only dissident voice was the British psychologist W.H. Rivers who associated 
the population reduction with the psychological impact of colonialism, having 
participated in the Cambridge Torres Straits Anthropological Expedition, 
that is, the first systematic anthropological and psychological examination of 
colonised tribes in the turn of the century. Rivers argued that the reason why 
Aboriginals were ‘dying out’ was caused either by the introduction of opium 
and alcohol, or the modifications of the native customs (clothing, housing, and 
so on) and prohibition of acts that were contrary to the ‘principles of morality’ 
(head-hunting in the Solomon Islands, separation of sexes in Fiji islands), which 
caused great changes in their everyday lives: The indigenous were basically 
‘deprived of nearly all that gave interest in their lives.’59 
When Géza Róheim arrived in the Hermannsburg Mission in Central Australia, 
he spent ten months in the company of Fry and Porteus. While my aim is not to 
explore to what extent he was influenced by the discourses of racial psychology 
of his colleagues, I would like to suggest that Róheim’s work is caught in similar 
tensions and contradictions as those of his contemporaries. On the one hand, 
there is the tension between the naturalisation of racial difference, and on the 
other hand, the constructed cultural difference; the violent and oppressive colonial 
system and the displacement of savagery onto the Aboriginals, the apparent 
neutrality of European epistemologies and the racist bias of their conclusions. 
Last but not least, the tension between the universality of psychoanalysis and the 
anthropological particularity of kinship structures, cultural and religious rituals. 
And similarly, the tension between analyst and analysand: 
[Y]our savage informant is not a patient. He does not come to you with 
a conflict that he desires you to help him with and he is certainly not 
willing to pay for the privilege of relating his dreams. In order to get into 
touch with him at all you must invert the usual analytic proceeding and 
offer him something instead of making him see the value of your work 
by paying for it. […] Talking especially about himself means work for a 
primitive man he would not do it day after day without any recompense. 
Not only that primitive man is not a patient, but the amount of psychical 
strain he can bear is far smaller than a civilised man is prepared to cope 
with.60
A certain relation between the ‘privilege’ of analysing one’s dreams and ‘the 
59 W.H.R. Rivers, “The Psychological Factor,” in Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia, ed. 
W.H.R. Rivers (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 93–94.
60 Róheim, “Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types,” 15.
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amount of psychical strain he can bear’ is presumed in this passage, a relation 
that Róheim persistently pursued in his writings. In speaking and writing as 
a psychoanalytic authority, and at the same time, calling for the financial 
recompense of his informants, Róheim makes known that there is indeed an 
asymmetrical exchange between the white observer and the native colonised 
subject which must be bridged through the reversal of the financial relationship.61 
On the one hand, Róheim recognises that psychoanalysis has nothing to offer 
to the natives. Instead, he seems to be arguing that it may only take something 
away from them, namely, their time and the luxury of not having to think and 
reflect about one’s self. On the other hand, for Róheim the white psyche, albeit 
keener to cope with a great amount of psychical strain, seems to have gone a 
little too far in the process. 
5.3 Aboriginal Narcissism, Orality and the Mother 
In his work, Róheim puts forward two theses: Firstly, the Australian Arrente were 
a happy and psychologically content population because their culture was far 
less repressive than the European one. Secondly, this fundamental economical 
difference in happiness was due to the different upbringing of children. To 
explain cultural difference and its impact on psychology, Róheim explored early 
childhood experiences, and in particular, how the Arrente children related to 
their mothers during their first years of life:
All observers agree that the natives of Australia are a singularly pleasant 
people, easy to get on with, helpful to those who are in distress, and as 
unneurotic and free of anxiety as any human being could be. The strength 
of the mother-child tie explains this fully and confirms the psychoanalytic 
view on the decisive significance of the infancy situation.62
Among the Arrente, good mothering is the reason for the wider culture of 
happiness. Despite growing up in an environment of scarcity and deprivation 
that ‘can hardly be called favourable,’63 the Aboriginals never display anxiety for 
61 Three decades after Róheim’s research expedition, the pioneer trio of ethnopsychoanalysis 
Paul Parin, Goldy Parin-Matthèy, and Fritz Morgenthaler embarked on long fieldwork trips in 
West Africa, and suggested that their informants–analysands receive reimbursements for their 
time. The rationale was that the long conversations informants engaged with analysts were at the 
expense of their daily work in farming, harvests, or markets. Dagmar Herzog, Cold War Freud: 
Psychoanalysis in an Age of Catastrophes (London: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 185–87. 
62 Géza Róheim, Psychoanalysis and Anthropology: Culture, Personality and the Unconscious, 2nd 
ed. (New York: International Universities Press, 1968), 57.
63 Róheim, “Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types,” 78.
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‘tomorrow’s meal.’64 ‘That the native […] is never worried about the future, and 
[…] regards nature as a bountiful mother, is too well known to need further 
proof. This well-known optimism is oral, i.e. derived from the behaviour of the 
mother in the nursing situation.’65 From Róheim’s perspective, the Aboriginal 
mothers are extremely kind, lenient, and do not impose any form of boundaries 
on their young children. Mothers keep their children in close physical proximity, 
carrying them tied on their bodies; rocking and caressing them ‘much like a 
European mother does, by tenderly clutching it in both her arms.’66 While 
Róheim acknowledges the existence of structures of communal motherhood that 
created a web of support during and after birth—camps where women would go 
to recover after birth—67he, nonetheless, describes them as ‘yielding’ and ‘good 
and non-resisting,’ selfless and unconditionally caring, always available for the 
(male) child: ‘[H]e can always get the nipple when he wants it and he is never 
weaned until he weans himself.’68 Women who breast-feed also offer their breasts 
to children other than their own.69 This ‘state of communal motherhood,’ which 
guarantees that the child will not starve if the biological mother is not directly 
available,70 is identified by Róheim as the reason why children do not experience 
deprivation and develop what he saw as a ‘healthy foundation of narcissism.’71 
More precisely, Róheim connects narcissism with food and illustrates how the 
relation to the mother becomes not only the basis of the development of the ego 
but also determines the child’s well-being and his resilience to frustrations from 
the external environment. Róheim believed that infantile anxiety is not linked 
to an inner conflict between life and death drives but is ‘centered around object 
loss and food trouble.’72 Breast-feeding fosters the ‘incorporation of the mother 
or the identification with the mother,’73 which strengthens the ego and prepares 
the child to protect himself against the trauma of separation from her. Although 
Róheim lacks a detailed account of how this process takes place psychologically, 
he mentions that ‘the internalized object is really the internalized mother—or 
64 Róheim, 78.
65 Róheim, Psychoanalysis and Anthropology: Culture, Personality and the Unconscious, 59.
66 Róheim, 57.
67 Róheim, Children of the Desert: The Western Tribes of Central Australia, 65–66.
68 Róheim, 75.
69 Róheim, “Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types,” 75.
70 Róheim, 75.
71 Róheim, 106.
72 Róheim, Magic and Schizophrenia, 222.
73 Róheim, 223.
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rather, the internalized body contents of the mother.’74 His logic is that when the 
initial blissful breast-feeding does not impose the loss of the breast yet happens 
naturally (the child weans himself), the child develops a strong internal object 
to which he recurs when reality becomes traumatic. 
Róheim did not fetishise this narcissistic stage arguing that there is no separation 
from the mother. Instead, he highlighted that due to varieties in cultural 
upbringing, it is possible that this loss is less damaging. After all, it is only that 
‘a minimal degree of inevitable frustration is enough to achieve this result.’75 The 
Aboriginal children did separate from the maternal breast but their experiences 
of frustration were significantly less intense. ‘The Australian is the direct 
opposite of our civilization with its schedules for feeding the baby and enforced 
training.’76 To put it differently, Róheim conceived aggression as invoked by oral 
frustration, that is to say, when the child does not experience a satisfying feeding 
and is interrupted by the mother, the maternal breast turns from a good object 
into a bad one. In these cases, the child aims to regress to the maternal unity. 
‘Insufficient object love on the part of the mother is compensated by a fantasied 
identification with her.’77 For Róheim then, when mothers allow the children to 
wean themselves, as in among the Arrente, ‘frustration on the oral level is at a 
minimum.’78 This is the reason why he considered them, despite their profound 
destitution, as generous and ‘oral optimists.’79
Róheim argues that the mother is not only ‘unambivalently good’ just as ‘the 
son [is not] as generous as it might seem.’80 Drawing on Daisy Bates, Róheim 
incorporates in his ethnography the view that Aboriginal mothers eat their 
children for various reasons. Arriving from the European psychoanalytic circles 
to the Lutheran Mission set up in Hermannsburg in Central Australia, one would 
not suspect that Róheim was unfamiliar with the imagery of excessive appetites 
74 Róheim, 222.
75 Róheim, 30.
76 Róheim, Psychoanalysis and Anthropology: Culture, Personality and the Unconscious, 147.
77 Róheim, Magic and Schizophrenia, 198.
78 Róheim, Psychoanalysis and Anthropology: Culture, Personality and the Unconscious, 149.
79 Róheim offers an additional psychoanalytic explanation as to why the children are not 
traumatised by their mother’s cannibalism. According to an old custom of the Arrente, he notes, 
only every second child was eaten ‘to increase the strength and growth of the others.’ Quite 
unexpectedly, Róheim explains that this ritual does not harm the child narcissism because of 
sibling rivalry. Rather, on the opposite, it bolsters it since the mother eliminates the newly born 
rival. Róheim, 61–62. 
80 Róheim, 63.
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among the so-called primitives. But, unlike Freud who linked cannibalism with 
the father, Róheim sees it as a predominantly maternal practice:
Daisy Bates writes: ‘baby cannibalism was rife among these central-
western people as it is west of the border in Central Australia. In one 
group east of the Murchison and Gascoyne Rivers, every woman who 
had a baby had killed and eaten it, dividing it with her sisters, who in 
turn killed their children at birth and returned the gift of food, so that 
the group had not preserved a single living child for some years. When 
the frightful hunger for baby meat overcame the mother before or at 
the birth of the baby, it was killed and cooked regardless of sex’. But the 
mother never ate a child that she had allowed to live at the beginning.81 
Róheim finds cannibalism an explicitly feminine issue: it is the manifestation 
of the black mother’s destructive desire that harms younger generations. The 
role of Aboriginal culture is to regulate this desire by situating the child within 
the family’s history—once a child had received the ‘ancestral name,’ it became ‘a 
person independent of its mother,’82 which prohibited the mother from eating it. 
In several cases, he associates cannibalism with forced abortion. For example, 
he writes:
Patjili, a Ngali woman, told us that the Ngalis and Yumus eat their 
children or procure an abortion out of ‘meat hunger.’ They pull the child 
out by the head. Then they burn the placenta, roast the child, and eat 
it. The infant is eaten by the mother and the other siblings. The other 
children are supposed to eat it so that they may grow bigger, the mother 
does it because she is hungry […].83 
That which is particularly remarkable about this passage is how Róheim does 
not see a more logical explanation: a woman procures abortion to protect her 
living children because of food deprivation (‘meat hunger’), not because of 
her desire to eat them. In writing about Aboriginal motherhood, post-colonial 
feminist scholars have outlined that, in some cultures, mothers manifest their 
power to control their own bodies through their control over their choices 
regarding foetuses.84 Infanticide was in many cases a statement of autonomous 
action and independence as well as an indication that motherhood means to be 
81 Róheim, 62.
82 Róheim, 62; Róheim, Children of the Desert: The Western Tribes of Central Australia, 72. 
83 Róheim, 61.
84 Lynette Russell, “‘Dirty Domestics and Worse Cooks’: Aboriginal Women’s Agency and 
Domestic Frontiers, Southern Australia, 1800-1850,” University of Nebraska Press 28, no. 1/2 
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confronted with ethical dilemmas and responsibilities that are not always easy 
to deal with. Contrary to Róheim’s perspective, Margaret Jacobs offers the voice 
of another contemporary anthropologist, Mary Montgomery Bennett, whose 
explanation for maternal cannibalism and infanticide was more attuned to the 
real injunctions and hardships of colonised motherhood:
[A] woman can carry one child in her long hunting day’s trail; and that 
is a severe test of enduring love. It may be twenty miles to the evening 
meeting place. […] If there are a child of two years and a new baby, what 
is their mother to do? She knows that if she tries to carry both children 
none of them will reach the meeting place. She kills the baby rather than 
leave it to the crows.85
Róheim uncritically drew on the colonial discourse of the cannibal trope 
to illustrate Aboriginal mothers as ambivalent: cruel but passive figures 
who allowed their bodies to be sucked and consumed for the child’s healthy 
narcissism to emerge, divested of any form of agency. Ignoring how it is the 
colonial administration that tore Aboriginal families apart and forced the 
indigenous populations into dispossession leads Róheim’s theory to suggest an 
explanation that reiterates cannibalism as a racial and gendered predisposition—
as a maternal hunger. This shift of savagery from the colonial institutions to the 
Aboriginal mother’s nature matches the psychoanalytic canon since, as argued 
in the previous chapters, the cannibal trope functions as a form of otherness 
that defines the psychoanalytic subject. As it is argued more thoroughly through 
the rest of the chapter, this foundation of ambivalent motherhood allows 
Róheim to rephrase Freud’s theory by situating at the core of a healthy non-
aggressive masculinity a passive but cannibalistic mother. Lastly, to better grasp 
why children’s narcissism is not affected by maternal cannibalism, we need to 
examine how Róheim views Aboriginal cultural structures that while allowing 
fantasies of punishment, castration, devourment, and threat, guide and protect 
children without oppressing them.
5.4 On Myths, Demons and Children’s Play 
The sense of passivity and permissiveness that permeates the first years of the 
Aboriginal child’s life is juxtaposed with a rich mythology that is used to enforce 
prohibitions. Myths, Róheim believed, were constructed fantasies projected 
85 Mary Montgomery Bennett, Hunt and Die: The Prospect for the Aborigines of Australia 
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into the outside world which actually originate from within the Aboriginal self. 
Their function is to contain ‘a projection of hostility felt by the adults regarding 
the infants.’86 In his later work, he rephrases this to include infantile aggression 
too: ‘[T]he demons verge towards two types: the child demon (child’s hostility 
to parents), and the giant demon (parent’s hostility to the child).’87 As Róheim 
reflected on the significance of cannibalistic myths for the Aboriginals’ psychic 
structures, he pointed out that they form a continuum between inner and 
exterior reality, and thus, they satisfy innate aggression by splitting off the aspect 
of the bad parent and maintaining it externally. Róheim writes: 
It is not necessary to stress the parental quality of the monsters. They are 
frequently called by parental or grandparental terms, and they obviously 
represent the child’s view (and projection) of the highly aggressive and 
sexual parents. The symbolism is not especially complex… The tales 
abound, in fact, with themes of castration, cannibalism, murder and 
coitus.88 
In his fieldwork observations, Róheim referred to one of the most important 
figures of Australian life and mythology, a sexually excessive and avoidant 
figure—ambivalently gendered, frustrating and complex: the alkarintja woman—
literally meaning ‘eyes turn away’ […] ‘women who will not look at men, who are 
wild and run away at the sight of a male being.’89 He described her as a mythical 
woman, an actual feminine trope and a ‘conventional façade to be cast aside as 
soon as the opportunity presents itself.’90 Analysing the dream of a member of 
the Arrente tribe, Yirramba Banga, Róheim claimed that alkarintja women ‘are 
supposed to resist the amorous advances of the men.’91 These figures, however, 
are particularly persecutory: when these women appear in dreams, the dreamer 
must wake up immediately, alternatively the alkarintja woman ‘cohabits with the 
man, but she takes the role of the male and makes the man play the part of the 
female.’92 Among the Arrente, the alkarintja woman is believed to be a creature 
that ‘satisfies all sexual aspirations,’ a mother with a penis,’ an archetypical figure 
86 Róheim, 79.
87 Róheim, Psychoanalysis and Anthropology: Culture, Personality and the Unconscious, 60.
88 Géza Róheim, Children of the Desert II: Myths and Dreams of the Aborigines of Central Australia, 
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which existed ‘at the commencement of things.’93 
Of particular note, in this regard, is his interpretation of the latent content of the 
alkarintja concept: ‘[F]irst, and most important, the alkarintja is a representative 
of the mother-imago. The “eyes-turn-away-woman” is the mother who resists the 
demands of her son.’94 Róheim believed that the particular way Arrente viewed 
the alkarintja woman was connected to a traumatic experience of childhood, 
according to which Aboriginal mothers slept on top of the child, ‘like the male 
on the female in cohabitation.’95 Although the mothers argued that they covered 
their children with their bodies during the cold winter months, Róheim interprets 
this habit as the cause of the primary experience of masculine anxieties of being 
engulfed and excited by the maternal body as ‘a loss of his masculinity.’96 ‘Such 
a habit,’ Róheim writes, ‘must clearly excite libidinal desires in the boys which 
they are not yet old enough to satisfy. It nearly fulfils their Oedipal wishes, but 
not quite […].’97 This physical contact with the mother stimulates the infant, 
producing a great amount of pleasure, which however, is ‘too much for the ego,’ 
and therefore it becomes traumatic.98 The alkarintja in myths and dreams is 
therefore evidence for the unconscious, sexual, repressed fantasy projected into 
the outside world. She is created to fulfil the oedipal infantile wish: ‘[…] [S]he is 
inaccessible to the desires of her son. […]’ and in accordance with the son’s wish, 
she is also ‘inaccessible to the love–making of his father.’99 
For Róheim the Arrente are regarded as a sophisticated culture which fully deals 
with the challenges of kinship and sexuality through mythology. He believed that 
the rich Aboriginal mythology of sexualised demons and cannibals helped the 
separation between sexuality and sadism whilst at the same time contributing to 
the disciplining and regulation of infantile sexuality. This splitting between good 
and bad parents is maintained throughout childhood, and it is only after the 
initiation ceremonies when the ‘re-introjection of these beings occurs […] then 
they are changed from anthropophagous and phallic demons into protecting 
ancestors who are removed from all contact with women; anxiety gives way to 
93 Róheim, 53.
94 Róheim, Children of the Desert: The Western Tribes of Central Australia, 148.
95 Róheim, “Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types,” 53.
96 Róheim, The Riddle of the Sphinx or Human Origins, 165.
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reverence, love and identification.’100 
5.5 Sadism, Latency and the Super-Ego
Before showing how Róheim links children’s sexuality with the emergence of a 
super-ego, it is worth highlighting Freud’s views on the latency period since it 
appears to be a phase not only exclusively motivated by psychic and biological 
drives but also dependent upon cultural influence. Freud’s psychoanalytic 
account of latency defines it as the period between the ‘early efflorescence’ of 
infancy and the emergence of pubertal sexuality during which the ‘reaction-
formations of morality, shame and disgust are built up.’101 It is a time when the 
‘polymorphously perverse’ infantile sexuality becomes repressed, the early 
affectionate impulses become ‘inhibited in their aim or sublimated,’ and this in 
turn explains why sexuality in children is seen as absent whereas Freud stresses 
that it is repressed. 102 Repression endorses the ‘wishful legend of the asexuality 
of childhood’ and alleviates the child from the impulses of sexuality which are 
instead channelled in ‘cultural activities of every kind.’103 In a footnote added in 
1935, Freud includes the assumption that latency is culturally dependent: ‘[T]he 
period of latency is a physiological phenomenon. It can, however, only give rise to 
a complete interruption of sexual life in cultural organisations which have made 
the suppression of infantile sexuality a part of their system. This is not the case 
with the majority of primitive peoples.’104 The degree of interruption of sexuality, 
therefore, is directly dependent upon pedagogy, and it seems to be related not 
only to cultural differences but to ‘racial’ ones as well. As argued in Chapter 
Two, primitivity signified a condition of more liberty, less complexity, and a 
more natural expression of sexuality. Although Freud did not follow through the 
thread linking latency and the economical intensity of the super-ego, Róheim 
did: ‘The main difference between Central Australians and Europeans lies not in 
the id, but in the range, depth, and function of the superego.’105 
During his fieldwork, Róheim spent several play analytic hours with children 
100 Róheim, The Riddle of the Sphinx or Human Origins, 157.
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both living in the desert away from the mission and subjected to European 
pedagogical methods—the chief in the implementation of these was Reverend 
Albrecht. Róheim documents a few cases when Missionaries punished 
Aboriginal children, for instance, by locking one ‘in the boy’s house. The child 
roared and screamed for about an hour, at which point the Missionary gave him 
a beating.’106 In response, the parents ‘threatened to kill the Reverend because he 
had been beating a child—an unheard-of thing.’107 Róheim pointed out that while 
Aboriginal parents scolded their children, and frightened them by talking of 
demons that kidnap and eat children, their methods were effectively far from the 
‘deliberate infliction of pain, the sadistic pedagogy of the white man.’108 Aboriginal 
schooling ‘never means restrictions, giving up an infantile paradise, giving in to 
regulations dictated by the adults.’109 This instead should not be misunderstood 
as an idealised state since Róheim’s argument is not that Aboriginals were ‘happy 
because they never had problems,’ rather, he is suggesting that they were far 
less prone to guilt.110 Intimidation and prohibition were very much part of the 
initiation processes, as we will see later, and therefore, they concerned much 
older children. Róheim concludes: 
We have been dealing with two  groups  of children both belonging to 
the same race. The mission children go to school and although they are 
still in many respects real children of the desert they have undoubtedly 
been modified in certain respects. Out in the bush they run, wrestle, roll 
about and perform coitus, but I have never seen anything like the sadistic 
and masochistic games in which Depitarinja indulges. He has frequently 
been punished for the perfectly natural manifestations of his libido and 
these functions have thus become associated with the idea of torture and 
of being tortured. For the native may have an aggressive but he has not 
got a sadistic character. He will roar at a child or hurl a boomerang at 
him in a sudden fit of anger, but he will never deliberately punish him. 
Thus, the child in the bush will never introject a sadistic super-ego and 
never enjoy the game of punishing or of being punished.111 
It is the exposure to a sadistic pedagogy and the cultural repression of sexuality 
which modified the children’s behaviour and fostered the internalisation of a 
106 Róheim, Children of the Desert: The Western Tribes of Central Australia, 73.
107 Róheim, 73.
108 Róheim, 75. Emphasis in the original. 
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much more violent form of prohibition. It is not that the Aboriginal children do 
not have a super-ego but they do not have ‘much of it.’112
Even within the terms of a theory of a less harsh super-ego, which is understood 
to have resulted from lenient schooling and a supportive mythological system, 
Róheim’s admission of the racial and gendered dimension is problematic. 
The fact that the cultural theory of a weaker super-ego is predicated mostly 
on examples from boys, whose sexuality is either fiercely punished or freely 
expressed, indicates that it is eventually a theory of an Aboriginal masculinity. 
Róheim’s different economical model has been valorised for offering a radical 
alternative to the European super-ego because it is never as inexorable, vicious, 
and as punitive, neither is it synonymous with an immoral character as Freud 
saw it.113 However, something about the psychoanalytic inheritance regarding 
female sexuality and the anthropological situatedness of Róheim, as the white 
man in the field, prevented him from exploring further the implications of his 
significant and radical contribution. 
5.6 Masculinity and Sexual Difference
Though Róheim is not predominantly concerned with developing an explicit 
theory of male sexuality, he became struck by the observation of the Australian’s 
profound ‘hypermasculinity.’114 His anthropological observations present the 
sexual difference in Central Australia as similar to the European one: ‘[…] [T]he 
relation of the sexes to each other is very near to what we should call normal from 
the psycho–analytical point of view. The male is a male with emphasis, the female 
is happy in subordination.’115 He observed the strong ‘patriarchal tendencies’ 
dominating sexual life in Central Australia through several exemplifications of 
‘vigorous masculinity.’116 For instance, he mentioned that men tended to marry 
much younger women, or ‘beat them into obedience.’117 As for the women, he 
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These Children’: Géza Róheim, Anthropology and the Politics of Aboriginal Childhood”; Shaul 
Bar-Haim, “Revisiting the Post-Colonial Critique of Psychoanalysis: Géza Róheim and the 
Primitive” (Psycho-Politics: The Cross-Sections of Science and Ideology in the History of Psy-
Sciences, Central European University, Budapest, 2015); Damousi, Freud in the Antipodes: A 
Cultural History of Psychoanalysis in Australia.
114 Róheim, The Riddle of the Sphinx or Human Origins, 165.
115 Róheim, “Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types,” 48.
116 Róheim, 40–43.
117 Róheim, 40–43.
145
regarded their role exclusively through motherhood as the ‘fundamental thing 
in the life of a female.’118 Róheim suggested that it is not the Oedipal conflict 
that structures the Aboriginal’s psyche, thus enabling cultural sublimation, but 
the separation from the mother, which in being so traumatic, demands the 
development of an excessive masculinity.
On the psychic level, Róheim acknowledged that the purpose of initiation 
rites was to mark symbolically the transition from boyhood to masculine 
adulthood, and thus, they played a very important role in the visualisation of 
the shifts occurring in the (male) Aboriginal’s unconscious psychic structures.
The transition from boyhood to masculinity exposes how Róheim conceives 
sexual difference in terms of hunger. Boys have to be initiated, otherwise, they 
transform into cannibalistic creatures. Róheim writes: ‘[I]f a boy were not initiated 
something terrible might happen. He might become an erinjta, i.e. devil, fly up 
into the air and kill and eat all the old men of the tribe. This is what the ritual 
must prevent.’119 As previously argued, Róheim viewed these demonic figures 
as projections of the child’s aggression externally, which the initiation had to 
mitigate. Róheim believed that the way the Arrente dealt with the re-introjection 
of aggression was through the symbolic enactment of the separation of the boy 
from the mother and the physical inscription of this loss, through circumcision: 
When the boy’s foreskin is cut off we see him sitting there, very sad about 
his loss. Immediately […] the men tell him, ‘now you are like us, you 
have a lendja […].’ The symbol of the protecting genius and ancestor is 
given to the boy after the circumcision and, at the same time, he is told 
what not to do while simultaneously he introjects (drinks) the blood of 
the old men […]120 
Róheim highlights the ‘compensatory nature’ of the ritual, ‘one thing given, the 
other taken away,’121 which aims at a symbolic recreation of the severance of the 
mother-child dyad. ‘The Aranda boy, never weaned forcibly from the mother as 
a child, is now separated from the mother (nipple) symbolically.’ 122 Another ritual 
that is involved in the initiation rites translates the severance of this dyad into the 
development of an amalgamated gendered self, which Róheim calls ‘“a combined 
118 Róheim, 44.
119 Róheim, 72.
120 Róheim, Psychoanalysis and Anthropology: Culture, Personality and the Unconscious, 89.
121 Róheim, 86.
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parent” imago, man and woman in one person.’123 The rite involves the opening 
of a subincision hole, which in pouring blood, mimics female menstruation and 
demonstrates a mutual physical wound with that of women. In many myths and 
songs, ‘the subincision wound is called “vagina”.’124 The important point here is that 
Róheim describes initiation rituals as withdrawing the boy from the primordial 
unity with the mother by firstly symbolically severing the attachment, and 
secondly, by creating a feminine mark on the male body. The boy, in other words, 
becomes a man when he manages the separation from the mother by accepting a 
physical similarity to her body (for example, mimicking female menstruation). 
Finally, Róheim argued that the nature of initiation rites exposed different 
anxieties shaping masculinity, which are not centred around castration, but the 
anxiety of being cannibalised. For example, Róheim writes that the castration 
complex in European patients is often accompanied by anxieties around the size 
of the genitals through which feelings ‘originate in the passive-feminine attitude 
toward the father, and in the castration complex.’125 On the contrary, Aboriginal 
men were not afraid of castration, and instead they demonstrated what Róheim 
calls ‘the big penis complex.’126 Róheim argued that competition among the 
Arrente took the form of qualifying which man has a smaller penis: ‘They say, 
“mine is quite small, but your is as big as a demon’s.’127 The bigger the penis, the 
greater the fear of being captivated by the vagina: ‘They believe that women can 
hold fast to the penis by hooking the rim of the cervix around the glans penis.’128 
For Róheim, the theoretical context of these observations is Freud’s articulation 
of the phallic phase which is marked by the libidinal organisation around the 
boy’s genitals. For Freud, this phase effectively enabled the dissolution of the 
Oedipus complex. The boy’s narcissistic investment on the penis was countered 
either by an external voicing of a castration threat, or by the discovery of the 
girl’s lack of the penis.129 As a result, the maternal sexual object is given up. For 
Freud, the boy’s castration anxiety is unconsciously structured upon the fantasy 
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of the girl’s physical inferiority. As a result, the narcissistic wound imposed by the 
Oedipus complex leads to the unconscious repression of the fear of turning into 
a woman through castration. For Freud, masculinity relates through a precarious 
opposition to femininity—whilst from a physical point of view masculinity is 
organised around genital difference, from the perspective of psychic reality the 
boundaries between masculinity and femininity can be easily blured through 
the threat of castration. This has complications not only for the theorisation of 
female agency but also for the male since difference is perceived only through 
the binary penis, no-penis. As a result, in the male imaginary of Freudian theory, 
sexual difference becomes terrifying: ‘[T]he boy, seeing the female’s lack, fears 
the possible loss of his own. This is the distinguishing moment between the 
sexes.’130
The discrepancy between Freud and Róheim here is significant. For Róheim, the 
Aboriginal male fantasy about female sexuality is not the lack of the penis but 
the possession of a threatening vagina. The powerful female figures in mythology 
and the anxiety of the captivated penis manifest a form of masculinity that is 
established as a psychic defence against the fear of being devoured by women. 
Róheim maintained Freud’s emphasis of sexual difference as threatening 
the integrity of the male body, and the penis in particular, but in the colonial 
context, Róheim stressed that the fear is not of castration but of engulfment. 
The Oedipus complex among the Arrente is managed when this threat is being 
managed: the boy’s masculinity becomes identified with the world of men and 
the ancestors and is symbolically separated from the mother. Celia Brickman has 
noted that, for Freud, so-called primitivity is a not yet developed masculinity, a 
‘protomasculinity:’ ‘This is because, for psychoanalysis, femininity is a diverted 
masculinity whereas primitivity is a proto-masculinity.’ […] ‘The primitive had 
not yet achieved the masculinity that the female must pronounce.’131 By declaring 
that despite their fear of women, or rather because of their fear of women, 
Aboriginal men were hypermasculine, Róheim contradicted Freud’s patriarchal 
model of sexual difference. Nevertheless, to do so, Róheim sees the Aboriginal 
mother through the colonial smear of cannibalism and exposes how intricately 
connected is the theorisation of sexual difference with hegemonic narratives of 
race.
130 Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical Reassessment of Freudian 
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5.7 The Ethnic Psychoanalytic Subject 
The thrust of Róheim’s theory of the ethnic psychoanalytic subjectivity is to 
acknowledge the possibility of a patriarchal cultural structure where Oedipal 
desires operate within the individual as they become amalgamated in a 
masculinity that is deprived of sadism. His contribution for the discourse of 
colonialism was significant. Róheim’s theory suggests that Aboriginal men were 
more kind, generous, content, and masculine than the European ones. They have 
a healthy narcissism which makes them emotionally resilient, and, their super-
ego protects them from destructive acts within the community whilst allowing 
them a fuller experience within their culture. ‘[E]very individual is technically a 
master of the whole culture, or where certain modest qualifications are necessary, 
of almost the whole culture. In other words, each individual is really self-reliant 
and grown up.’132 While psychoanalysts tend to emphasise the inner experiences, 
conflicts, and psychosexual developmental stages as determining the individual, 
Róheim brought forward the affirmation that culture could significantly restrict 
brutality. ‘The central message of Róheim’s work was that we have paid too high 
a price for civilization. The primitive despite the obvious hardships he faced, had 
solved the problem of communal life in a much more satisfactory manner than 
his civilized brother.’133 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to isolate his account of the Aboriginal self from the 
feminised and sexualised figures that threaten, define, and demarcate him. ‘Why 
are they more masculine than others?’ he asks towards the end of his fieldwork 
exposition only to add in the form of a footnote the question posed in a different 
way: ‘Why are their mothers better mothers?’134 As an outside observer, Róheim 
witnessed the centrality of the relation to the mother since the delayed infancy 
of humans radically added to the prolonged vulnerability and dependence on 
the mother for emotional and physical development. However, this is a maternal 
figure that has no agency or boundaries, just destructive desires. The mythology 
of cannibalistic Aboriginal mothers in Róheim’s ethnography contradicts their 
idealised representation. Cannibalism becomes the dark side of the black 
mother—it is from her that the child has to separate and enter the world of 
non-cannibalistic adult men; it is her threatening and devouring sexuality that 
is reflected in the mythology of the alkarintja, and it is for her that cultural 
132 Róheim, Magic and Schizophrenia, 51.
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advancements are being made. 
‘Unconsciously, we always believe that victories can be achieved on the basis 
of past victories and that the world will take the mother’s place.’135 In a sense, 
if we think sexual and racial difference together in Róheim’s ethnographical 
psychoanalysis, he seems to suggest that a healthy and less oppressive patriarchal 
culture depends on a racialised figure (the cannibal mother) whose role is dual: 
on the one hand, to ensure a content male narcissism, and on the other, to 
represent the physical threat that would bolster his masculinity. That is, Róheim’s 
ethnic psychoanalytic subject offers a novel insight into the psychological 
motivation of colonialism per se. ‘[C]ivilization’ he writes, ‘is a huge network of 
more or less successful attempts to protect mankind against the danger of object-
loss, the colossal efforts made by a baby who is afraid of being left alone in the 
dark.’136 There seems to be a direct link between masculinity, colonialism, and 
cannibalism, according to which, to manage the separation from the mother (the 
fear of being left alone in the dark), ‘mankind’ needs to believe in the existence 
of a threatening racialised female figure which sexually excites, and at the same 
time, prohibits any sexual wish because she is threatening, too. This is the reason 
why, through Róheim’s argument, the colonial unconscious is strongly informed 
with fantasies about cannibalistic figures, and also why Róheim’s theory depends 
on the racist smear of Aboriginal mothers as cannibals. In a sense, the colonial 
infrastructures (what Róheim calls ‘civilization’) embody the ‘more or less 
successful’ attempts to replenish object-loss, and, to foreclose the possibility of 
being left without knowing ‘in the dark.’
In this chapter, I explored a particular case in the history of psychoanalysis 
where psychosexual development is not formed through clinical examples of 
children and adults but it is produced through a psychoanalytically-informed 
ethnography of Australian Aboriginal subjectivity. Géza Róheim’s example 
constitutes an effort to theorise subjectivity from within a different cultural 
realm which in the European unconscious was both racialised and feminised. 
As argued, the purpose of Róheim’s anthropological expedition was to affirm the 
universality of the incestuous impulses towards the mother as manifesting in the 
Oedipus complex. However, in Australia, Róheim plunged into the colonial myth 
of cannibalistic Aboriginal mothers. Contrary to the colonial administration 
135 Róheim, Magic and Schizophrenia, 83.
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that demonised these women to abduct their children, Róheim, in accordance 
with the wider psychoanalytic framework of norms, did not consider their 
alleged cannibalism unnatural. Instead, he regarded it as a symptom of a 
mother’s failure to separate from her child, linked to the absence of a weaning 
period (Róheim argued that the children weaned themselves). Drawing on the 
colonial imagery of the cannibal trope Róheim argued that Aboriginal mothers 
were not unambivalently good—they are aggressive and threatening for their 
children too. But, Aboriginal culture was fashioned in such a way so as to enable 
children to manage the separation from their mother (characteristically, Róheim 
is not concerned about how the mother manages the separation from her child) 
to survive the threatening adult world and grow into considerably happier, 
less sadistic and repressed, and more masculine individuals. In my discussion 
of Róheim’s account of the role of myths, rituals, and the Aboriginal cultural 
regime in general, I have stressed that the ethnic unconscious that Róheim’s 
psychoanalysis offers is directly informed by social structures. Therefore, contrary 
to the psychoanalytic subject that Freud left us with—plagued by a memory of 
paternal cannibalism, compelled to violently incorporate those whom he envies—
Róheim’s psychoanalytic ethnic subject is structured around fears of being 
devoured, and is nursed by a mother that is as aggressive as much as she is fulfilling. 
Nevertheless, while Róheim’s ethnic unconscious has been regarded as a 
humanising perspective towards the Australian Aboriginals, his profound 
blindness and neglect towards the colonial living conditions of extreme 
deprivation and humiliation fail to open a dialogue about the impact of 
colonisation on individual psychology. Instead, I have argued that, in ascribing 
psychological validity to the idea of cannibalistic impulses of the Aboriginal 
mothers, Róheim’s ethnographically-informed psychoanalytic theory becomes 
complicit in the perpetuation of a colonial mentality about the fearful feminised 
other. While he proclaimed that in Australian culture ‘the whole culture is built 
on the repression of the woman,’137 he ignored the irony in his own statement by 
neglecting the manner in which his theory does the same to the woman of colour. 
Róheim’s ethnic psychoanalytic subject is dependent on the colonial grammar 
of the cannibal trope to establish sexual difference between aboriginal men and 
women through a racial formulation. The cannibal trope becomes consolidated 
as a practice of black motherhood because of her hunger and desire, suppressing 
once and for all her possibility for having a voice, a consciousness and a desire 
137 Róheim, The Riddle of the Sphinx or Human Origins, 165.
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that, in the white imaginary, is not perceived as threatening, idealised and, 
sexualised.
Overall, although Róheim’s project expanded the psychoanalytic horizon to 
cultural difference, and made a case for the ethnic unconscious, his contribution 
to the decolonisation of psychoanalysis from the colonial smear of the cannibal 
trope remains limited. This is because the cannibal trope becomes attached 
to the body of the black female colonised subject. Róheim’s idealisation of 
the Australian Aboriginal is a politically intriguing statement, especially 
when juxtaposed to the atrocities of the Second World War: a culture where 
cannibalism was allegedly on the table, is one in which aggression is more 
contained and sadism is absent. But, I have argued that it also translates into 
a culture where cannibalism was allegedly a feminine trait, that is, the one in 
which masculinity is less sadistic. Without a critical attitude towards colonial 
dehumanisation, however, Róheim not only silences Aboriginal women but also 
nails the association between motherhood, blackness, trauma, and death, which 
as we will see in the Chapter Seven widely incorporated in the post-Freudian 
tradition. But before that, it is key to explore a major decolonising voice for 
psychoanalysis who wrote from a non-European context as well, and critiqued 
psychoanalysis from a non-psychoanalytic angle: the psychiatrist Frantz Fanon.
CHAPTER SIX
The Return of the Repressed: 
Frantz Fanon and the Post-Colonial Unconscious
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6.1 Fanon, Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis
While Géza Róheim theorises the ethnic psychoanalytic subject by focusing 
on cultural difference and ignoring the impact of colonial oppression, Frantz 
Fanon dealt explicitly with how the domination of the colonial culture over the 
indigenous dramatically shapes unconscious life. Fanon employs a scathing and 
poetic form of writing to expose the oppressed psychology of the colonised, 
whose claims to an individual identity, wholeness and integrity are radically 
undermined. Fanon was born in Martinique in 1925, studied medicine and 
psychiatry in Lyon and between 1952 and his death in 1961, worked in psychiatric 
clinics in France and France’s then colonies Algeria and Tunisia. His experience 
from the psychiatric settings radicalised his thinking towards the view that 
madness was not a biological predisposition, an innate, psychological defect, 
but an effect of colonial power. Fanon’s work emphasises the interconnectedness 
of psychic and emotional development with social oppression. What is more, 
the psychiatric establishments and institutionalisation of madness that Fanon 
experienced as a psychiatrist in Northern Africa enforced his life-long anti-
colonial commitment and his view that only by social change and decolonisation 
could people of colour entertain a conflict-free psychic life. His commitment 
to anti-colonial struggles becomes apparent in the politics that accompany 
his psychiatric practices. He joined the Front Liberation Nationale (FLN) a 
militant party fighting for the national liberation of Algeria against the French 
government, and even when banned from the country, he moved to Tunisia and 
participated in the dissemination of resources and the organisation of resistance 
against the French colonial forces among North African countries. For his 
political activism, Fanon’s life had been targeted by French secret services; 
several, unsuccessful assassination attempts against him were organised.1 Whilst 
he was ill with leukaemia and had to be transferred to the United States for 
treatment, he was captured and interrogated in the United States by the CIA, 
before being offered any medical support. 
1 Lewis R. Gordon, What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought 
(London: Fordham University Press, 2015), 95.
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In her essay, To Cure and to Free, Françoise Vergès places Fanon against the 
Western psychiatric establishment, which persistently associated psychic 
pathology with cultural and racial difference. Colonial psychiatry, Vergès shows, 
effectively competed with ‘the other components of the colonial discourse, 
because it advocated a progressive assimilation through seduction, rather than 
a subjugation by force.’2 Colonial psychiatrists and psychiatric diagnosis aimed 
at luring the native’s soul into assimilating the European mentality—anything 
that did not comply with a white colonial mentality was doomed pathological, 
and there was little if any space accounting for cultural and racial difference. As 
Vergès shows, Fanon was at odds with this tradition: ‘he believed that psychiatry 
could become an emancipatory therapy, a means among other means of political 
and social emancipation, that its institutions could offer to disturbed persons a 
site in which to learn to be free again.’3 
In their ‘long overdue’ and extensive examination of Fanon’s psychiatric writings, 
Decolonising Madness, Neil Gibson and Roberto Beneduce have exposed the 
incongruities Fanon was experiencing in his role as a Western-trained medical 
doctor.4 Gibson and Beneduce argue that his transformative psychiatric practice 
and clinical writings, alongside his political action, were recourses stemming 
from Fanon’s discomfort with Western modes of psychological education and 
training.5 In a way, Fanon was seeking ‘an epistemological and clinical approach’ 
that was a ‘critical, self-questioning discipline that rejected the thesis of innate 
racial difference and the pitfalls of ingenuous cultural relativism.’6 For this reason, 
Fanon’s psychiatric practice and his ambivalent relationship to conventional 
symptom reading and diagnosis, tends to obscure his place in the psychiatric 
establishment. In fact, Lewis Gordon stressed that the uneasiness with Fanon’s 
transformative politics in the conventional psychiatric world, becomes apparent 
in the tendency to conceal his capacity as a psychiatrist, and substitute it with 
the one of a cultural and political theorist.7 Gordon sustains this point quoting 
Jacques Postel, Fanon’s friend and colleague from Lyon’s medical school: 
‘when our colleague Frantz Fanon died, psychiatric journals remained silent… 
The Fanon story was so outrageous that the psychiatrists sought to repress it 
4 Nigel C. Gibson and Roberto Beneduce, Frantz Fanon, Psychiatry and Politics (London and 
New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2017).
5 Gibson and Beneduce,  21.
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(London: Fordham University Press, 2015), 103.
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altogether, so that people eventually forgot that Fanon was a psychiatrist.’8 
Fanon’s ambivalence to mainstream psychiatry is of particular relevance here. 
Like Róheim who was situated in-between psychoanalysis and anthropology, 
Fanon’s psychiatric training grants him a position of tension to psychoanalysis. 
Fanon never received any psychoanalytic training, nor underwent psychoanalysis 
himself, but he maintained a sceptical interest in psychoanalytic thinking, which 
is one of the thorny issues among his critics and supporters.9 Firstly, Fanon 
drew on both Freud and Lacan, as well as Jung, Adler, Mannoni and Sartre. 
However, he did so in a fragmented and not fully worked through way. In 
secondary literature, Homi Bhabha’s work stands out as one of the first instances 
linking Fanon to Lacanian psychoanalysis. Bhabha used Fanon’s work, alongside 
Lacan’s, to theorise a post-colonial subjectivity that would not be founded upon 
coherence and integrity, but on ambivalence, mimicry, and alienation. In his 
1987 essay What does a black man want, Bhabha stressed the convergence 
between Lacan and Fanon in the context of how difference and otherness are 
inherently embedded within every subject, through the language of desire.10 
Bhabha argued that every identification, every process of acquiring a sense of 
self, effectively passes through the ‘differentiating force of the Other’ ‘the process 
of the subject’s signification in language and society’s objectification in Law’—
in other words, desire (‘what the black man wants’) is not differentiable from 
particular historical moments and thus colonial structures.11 
Despite Bhabha’s powerful articulation of post-colonial subjectivity, critics 
have argued, Bhabha overlooked Fanon’s inherently ambivalent relationship 
to Lacanian, and non-Lacanian, psychoanalysis. For example, Mrinalini 
Greedharry has pointed out that Bhabha actually misses the fundamental 
incompatibility between Fanon’s thought and psychoanalysis, which becomes 
apparent in Fanon’s ‘eclectic’ use of psychoanalysis.12 Greedharry emphasises that 
although for Fanon psychoanalysis comes in the service of his project, it exposes 
8 Gordon, 103.
9 For a detailed account of Fanon’s clinical practice and his use of psychology as a pedagogy 
see: Erica Burman, “Fanon, Foucault, Feminisms: Psychoeducation, Theoretical Psychology, and 
Political Change,” Theory & Psychology 26, no. 6 (2016): 706–30. For Fanon’s misrecognition as a 
psychoanalyst see: Gibson and Beneduce, Frantz Fanon, Psychiatry and Politics, 3–5. 
10 Homi K. Bhabha, “What Does the Black Man Want?,” New Formations 1 (1987): 118–24.
11 Bhabha, 121.
12 Mrinalini Greedharry, Postcolonial Theory and Psychoanalysis: From Uneasy Engagements to 
Effective Critique (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 16.
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its limitations as a discourse incapable of grasping the psychological experience 
of black men, precisely because of an innate, undertheorized experience; that 
of the colonised subject.13 Like Greedharry, Derek Hook and Ross Truscott 
regard Fanon’s relation to psychoanalysis as ‘strategic,’ in the sense that Fanon 
does not only call for an uncritical application of psychoanalytic concepts in 
the context of the colonized, effecting a fundamental misapprehension of the 
colonial psychology—like Róheim’s initial motivation to find the Oedipus 
complex in the Australian tribes. Rather, Fanon puts forward the need for a 
critical interrogation of the very structures, past and imagery of psychoanalysis, 
making possible a reading that ‘foregrounds the coloniality and/or racism of 
psychoanalytic thinking itself.’14 
Another issue that is raised regarding Fanon’s complex and ambivalent relation 
to psychoanalysis is the question of authority, namely who can talk, write and 
argue psychoanalytically. Fanon’s lack of psychoanalytic training confined him 
to the position of an underdog in relation to the European psychoanalytic 
institutes. Fanon was not only not psychoanalytically trained, but also a 
political revolutionary, a member of anti-colonial movements and a supporter 
of the Algerian armed struggle. So, given that Fanon was not a psychoanalyst, 
and he maintained an ambivalent relation to the discipline, why turn to him 
here? His biographer, David Macey described his work as a ‘bricolage,’15 an 
amalgamation of concepts and structures from European epistemologies 
that weaved together through Fanon’s poetic and radical voice, engendered 
new cross-disciplinary formulations that ruptured the rigid boundaries and 
revealed untheorized gaps in psychoanalysis. It is voicing his critique from the 
position of marginality that bolstered his insights on the psychology of racism. 
Fanon’s exteriority to psychoanalysis offers critically examined and evaluated 
psychoanalytic applications in the context of colonial Algeria. In his earliest 
work Black Skin, White Masks, he outlined the project as follows: ‘one should 
investigate the extent to which the conclusions of Freud or of Adler can be 
applied to the effort to understand the man of color’s view of the world.’16 Fanon, 
unlike Róheim, did not focus on how cultural difference can produce alternative 
forms of psychoanalytic subjectivity. Grounding his critique on the constructed 
13 Greedharry, 16.
14 Derek Hook and Ross Truscott, “Fanonian Ambivalence: On Psychoanalysis and Postcolonial 
Critique,” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 33, no. 3 (2013): 157.
15 David Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Biography, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Verso, n.d.), 160–61.
16 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 141.
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irreducibility of racial difference, Fanon examined how psychoanalysis accounts 
for the phenomenological difference of the black and the white subject, which 
is inscribed on the body and is plain on the skin. In this sense, Fanon’s starting 
point in interrogating psychoanalysis becomes the very surface of the body and 
how this is recognised, seen, denied, used and objectified, submitted in the field 
of vision. 
What separates Fanon from the previous psychoanalytic thinkers that I have 
explored is his emphasis on the body as a threshold surface, as both a sexual 
and a racialised entity, which as one commentator put it in Fanon becomes a 
‘site of incessant material negotiations between the external world […] and the 
internal world of the psyche.’17 The in-between position of the skin, which both 
protects and separates the external world from the internal as a shell and is the 
site where racial difference is marked is Fanon’s contribution to the investigation 
of colonial subjectivity. According to this logic, how does Fanon deal with the 
cannibal trope, as the fantasy of racial difference in the white imaginary? How 
is the racist fear of otherness as devouring viewed from the perspective of the 
colonial subject?
To address these questions, I explore the inherited narratives featuring the 
cannibal trope from an anti-colonial perspective. Apart from its traces in 
psychoanalytic representation, cannibalism was a critical weapon in the aesthetic 
arsenal of anti-colonial modernist and avant-garde movements in Brazil and the 
Caribbean. In the first section of the chapter I trace the role cannibalism is called 
to play in the short-lived Brazilian avant-garde movement Anthropophagia and 
the poetry of Fanon’s school teacher Aimé Césaire. In these cultural texts, the 
self-representation of the colonised as a ‘cannibal’ fabricated a post-colonial 
identity that aimed to destabilise and threaten the hegemonic Eurocentrism. By 
comparing and contrasting the two artistic uses of the cannibal trope, I discuss 
the intricacies of colonial dehumanisation that allowed or refrained the colonised 
to appropriate this polemical, anti-colonial form of identification.    
Secondly, I move on to discuss how cannibalism was deployed in the psychology 
of colonialism, and especially in the formulation of colonial desires as 
annihilating the oppressed other. But for Fanon, it is impossible to grasp desire 
without looking at the role of the body; since desire is always embodied. Both 
17 Teresa de Lauretis, “Difference Embodied: Reflections on Black Skin, White Masks,” Parallax 
8, no. 2 (2002): 57.
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the subject and the object of desire are formulated in racial and sexual terms. 
Lastly, I consider how Fanon looks at racism by focusing on how cannibalistic 
imagery has accompanied people of colour through the psychoanalytic 
concept of phobia (or as a form of an inverted desire). The fear of the black 
man, Fanon believed, exposes that which cannot be articulated or expressed in 
the white, orthodox Oedipal structure: latent male and female homosexuality. 
Therefore, Fanon links racism with homophobia arguing that the reason why 
black men were systematically regarded as practicing cannibalism is because 
the whole infrastructure of colonialism has been unconsciously motivated 
by an unexpressed, concealed homosexuality. Fanon’s argument situates the 
cannibal trope entirely in the white unconscious. Nevertheless, while Fanon 
created a dialogue between psychoanalysis and race to deconstruct the colonial 
unconscious, his own reductive reading of racism as closeted homosexuality 
marks some untheorized gaps for the post-colonial unconscious. 
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‘I give you my quick words
consume and wrap
and as you wrap kiss me with a violent trembling
kiss me until I am the furious WE
kiss, kiss US
but also bite
bite to draw blood from our blood!’
Aimé Césaire, The Return to the Native Land
‘Cannibalism alone unites us. Socially. Economically. Philosophically.’
Oswald de Andrade, Cannibalist Manifesto
6.2 Uncanny Cannibals in Brazil and the Antilles  
Brazilian avant-garde art offers a great example of how the colonial objectification 
of indigenous representation has been re-appropriated through aesthetics. More 
precisely, Brazilian avant-gardists reclaimed the European trope of cannibalism 
to rewrite colonial subjectivity for anti-colonial purposes. In May 1928, a 
group of avant-garde writers and artists in São Paulo founded a short-lived 
journal called Revista de Anthropophagia (Review of Anthropophagy), calling 
for aesthetic projects to reconstruct Brazilian identity from the perspective of 
reclaiming the colonial myth of Brazilian cannibalism. Since the 1922 Week 
of Modern Art at São Paulo, which marked the emergence of modernism in 
Latin America, Brazilian artists had experimented with ideas of excavating and 
recovering histories of Brazil’s earliest, pre-colonial inhabitants to tackle the 
advances of European reason and modernity. The movement dissolved during 
the 1929 financial crisis because of a wider political shift to the right, but before 
its decline, it exposed important questions about cultural origins, authenticity 
and national identification. A pioneer member of the anthropophagia movement, 
was a ‘white,’ bourgeois18 artist named Oswald de Andrade. In his famous 
18 There is little information regarding Oswald de Andrade’s ethnic background, and available 
images of him do not provide enouch clarity so as to confirm with certainty his whiteness. 
However, local texts indicate that he was born in a wealthy family and was sent to Europe to 
study between the ages of 22 to 27. Given Brazil’s socio-political context in the 1920s, these class 
indications point to the same direction. Therefore, I consider Oswald de Andrade as ‘white’ not 
in the strict terms of skin colour necessarily, but in terms of whiteness as performativity. And I 
have to thank my friend, Aline Souza-Martins and PhD candidate in Clinical Psychology at the 
University of São Paulo for her help and insights on this matter.  
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Manifesto Anthropófago published in the first—and last—issue of the Revista 
de Anthropophagia, he deployed the form of cannibalism as a synthesis of the 
colonial dialectic which was solidified in the mutually exclusive figures of the 
civilised and the primitive. In her extensive investigation of Brazil’s colonial 
history and culture, Darlene Sadlier translates Andrade’s project as an invitation 
to ‘ingest European influences insofar as they could be regurgitated in the form 
of something new and Brazilian for export.’19 
Andrade understood the oppression of the native as the mere possibility for the 
perpetuation of colonial power, and thus what he put forward in his manifesto 
was that the power of the Brazilian anthropophagus relied on the fact that 
primitivity, savagery and cannibalism were the condition for the emergence of 
the universality of European subjectivity. To this, he juxtaposed an anti-colonial 
resistance: ‘We want the Carib Revolution. Greater than the French Revolution. 
The unification of all productive revolts for the progress of humanity. Without 
us, Europe wouldn’t even have its meagre declaration of the rights of man.’20 
However, the Manifesto is also a lament, since it exposes the penetrating 
capacity of colonisation as having destroyed every possibility for return to a pre-
colonial past. Andrade seemed to be aware of the intricacies of such a return. 
In an exemplar of regurgitation of the highest cultural advances of European 
culture, he wonders: ‘Tupi or not Tupi that is the question.’21 The Tupi was a 
short name for the Tupinambá, a tribe living near Rio de Janeiro allied to the 
French. The Tupiniquim, on the other hand, inhabited in the area of São Paulo, 
and aided the Portuguese—as Sadlier explains, they were the pre-colonial tribes 
living in Brazilian ground. The tribes became famous through a German named 
Hans Staden who was captured by the Tupinambá tribe. Although Staden 
was released safe and sound, he produced a graphic narrative about how the 
Tupinambá consume their enemy prisoners, after dismembering them, which 
had ‘the greatest impact of any of its time.’22 Sadlier points out the irony in one 
of Staden’s chapter titled ‘How the Tupinambá Treat their Prisoners upon their 
Return’ accompanied with woodcuts of mutilations and anthropophagy.23 In his 
19 Sadlier, Brazil Imagined: From 1500 to the Present, 190.
20 Oswald de Andrade, “Canibalist Manifesto,” trans. Leslie Bary, Latin American Literary Review 
19, no. 38 (1991): 39.
21 Andrade, 38.
22 Sadlier, Brazil Imagined: From 1500 to the Present, 26. 
23 Sadlier, 24.
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book Cannibal Modernities Luís Madureira argued that Andrade and his circle 
were working through the melancholic impossibility of returning to a Brazilian 
pre-colonial history: given that Portuguese colonialists had destroyed most of 
the Tupi’s cultural artefacts, they also symbolised the ‘tragically unavailable […] 
“native informants”.’24 Andrade saw the reclamation of cannibalism as a defence 
against the melancholic realisation of the inevitability of European colonialism—
which meant that even the dilemma of deploying the histories and cultures of 
the Tupi would essentially have to be articulated through a European symbolic 
structure.  
But Shakespeare was not the only reference in Andrade’s Manifesto Anthropófago—
he deployed an arsenal of European references, from Hegel, to Rousseau, to 
Marx, and to Freud, among others. Finding common ground in cannibalism, the 
movement captured on the one hand the sweeping force of colonialism which 
allows no space for otherness, and on the other, appropriated Brazil’s dominant 
representation in the European imagery. For critics regarding the movement 
with scepticism, the cannibal trope was nothing but a meaningless analogy 
that reduced Brazilian culture into a ‘mirror culture,’ making absolutely no 
contribution to the reinvention of Brazilian identity.25 Schwarz’ s critique helps 
us expose this crucial point about the movement of Anthropofagia. In reclaiming 
cannibalism, Andrade exposed that there is nothing essentialist in this form of 
identity—it is premised on a non-solid ground, it is arbitrarily sustained and 
separates essence or material existence from representation. Andrade, in fact, 
went as far as claiming that departing from the ground of cannibalism, one can 
‘eat away’ modernity’s rigid and incompatible binaries, like the civilised and the 
cannibal, but one can do so even on the level of the unconscious. 
The Struggle between what we might call the Uncreated and the 
Creation—illustrated by the permanent contradiction between Man 
and his Taboo. Everyday love and the capitalist way of life. Cannibalism. 
Absorption of the sacred enemy. To transform him into a totem.26 
Andrade was referring to Freud’s work Totem and Taboo published the 
previous decade, in which (as we have seen) Freud discussed the transition 
24 Luís Madureira, Cannibal Modernities: Postcoloniality and the Avant-Garde in Caribbean and 
Brazilian Literature (U.S.A: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 13.
25 Roberto Schwarz, “Brazilian Culture: Nationalism by Elimination,” trans. Linda Briggs, New 
Left Review I, no. 167 (1988): 82.
26  Andrade, “Canibalist Manifesto,” 43.
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from totemism—an externally projected conglomeration of paternal power—
to taboo—the unconscious internalisation of prohibition. Therefore, what 
Andrade proposed was the reversal of this internalisation: to project paternal 
power externally, to re-signify (Portuguese) patriarchy. 
There is no need to enter into further detail about the Manifesto here, it suffices 
to recall Madureira’s comment about how ‘the future Anthropofagia sets out to 
contrast adheres in large measure to the familiar contours of western discourses 
of emancipation.’27 In a way, one could read the poem as building bridges with 
other oppressed groups establishing a common language and network for 
decolonisation. Overall, Andrade’s manifesto is an early instance of post-colonial 
criticism along the lines of what Paul Gilroy suggested in his book Black Atlantic: 
a criticism premised upon the reversal between the periphery and the centre, as 
a form of shifting the hegemony of European, modern thought and culture from 
within its margins. 28
Without understanding the distinct use of the cannibal trope in the context 
of anti-colonial struggles and aesthetics, it is difficult to appreciate Fanon’s 
contribution to the decolonisation of psychoanalytic imagery. His transformative 
approach to the role of the body, and the skin, as the locus where race is being 
played out cannot be fully grasped without understanding what cannibalism 
meant in Antillean poetry. For example, when Andrade invokes the imagery of 
the colonised as being ‘cannibalised’ by the coloniser, he speaks from the position 
of a white, bourgeois artist. The same does not hold true for the Antillean poet 
Aimé Césaire, who exposes a fundamental difference on how anti-colonial 
critique is voiced, and what aesthetic tools and tropes can become available 
from the perspective of a black man. Césaire was a very prominent Antillean 
poet, theorist and politician, and before the Second World War, Fanon’s school 
teacher at the Lycée Schoelcher in Fort-de-France. Césaire had studied English 
literature in the École Normale Supérieure in Paris and returned to Martinique 
in 1939. In fact, Fanon recalls that Césaire’s return to Martinique brought along 
the possibility of blackness as proclamation, which until then could only be 
understood as a naturalised state of being. As Fanon notes in his essay West 
Indians and Africans (1955) 
27 Madureira, Cannibal Modernities: Postcoloniality and the Avant-Garde in Caribbean and 
Brazilian Literature, 13.
28 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (London: Verso, 1993).
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For the first time, a lycée teacher—a man, therefore, who was apparently 
worthy of respect—was seen to announce quite simply to West Indian 
society “that it is fine and good to be a Negro”. To be sure, this created a 
scandal. […] Two centuries of white truth proved this man wrong. He 
must be mad, for it was unthinkable he could be right.29 
Whilst in Paris, Césaire composed his first poem titled Notebook of a Return to 
the Native Land, which became a key text for the movement of Negritude—a 
cultural, aesthetic, socio-political and transcontinental movement which voiced 
the intricacies of the experience of being colonised, alongside the political 
and personal complexities. In the poem, one of the startling observations 
Césaire makes, upon his return to the native land, is the alienated landscape of 
Martinique, the zombifying everyday life and the severed social bonds between 
the island’s inhabitants. ‘In this disowning town, this strange crowd which does 
not gather, does not mingle: this crowd that can so easily disengage itself, make 
off, slip away. This crowd which doesn’t know how to crowd.’30
In his thorough examination of Césaire’s contributions to the politics and 
contradictions of decolonisation, Gary Wilder portrays Césaire as a figure with a 
‘pragmatic relationship to colonial emancipation and political freedom.’31 Wilder 
argues that we should think of Césaire’s politics of decolonisation as humble 
and modest: neither as a set of utopian and romantic promises about what post-
colonial freedom would carry along, nor as a means of doctrines and ‘ready-
made a priori certainties’ that fetishized political means.32 Instead, Césaire 
requires us to think decolonisation through a set of realistic possibilities, which 
could be actualised and executed through a combination of means, within the 
present conditions.33 This non-utopian, non-conservative, and non-ideological 
approach to Antillean politics entailed also a perceptive and insightful gaze at 
what challenges and obstacles the colonial infrastructure enforced. Keeping 
this in mind, we examine his poetry alongside similar lines. This is not to 
suggest, however, that his poetry should be read through a crude realism or as 
29 Frantz Fanon, “West Indians and Africans,” in Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays, 
trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 21. Empasis in the original.
30 Aimé Césaire, Notebook of a Return to My Native Land, trans. Mireille Rosello and Annie 
Pritchard (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Bloodaxe Books, 1995), 75.
31 Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization and the Future of the World (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2015), 21.
32 Wilder, 21.
33 Wilder, 21.
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a concrete, militant or politicised form of art. Quite the contrary. It is a form 
of aesthetic pluralism, which according to Césaire’s biographer, Gregson Davis, 
must be conceived as an undogmatic ‘drama of self-exploration in which the 
speaker typically impersonates differing versions of the self and holds them up 
to merciless scrutiny.’34 Césaire withdraws himself and allows his voice to be 
multiplied and interpolated by a plethora of racial selves, ‘masks of negritude’35—
as Gregson puts it, implying the ways Césaire’s work anticipated Fanon’s Black 
Skin, White Masks.36 Similar to Fanon, as we will shortly see, Césaire speaks 
from the position of racialised subjects that have historically functioned as 
‘universal scapegoat[s]:’37 ‘as there are hyena men and panther-men, I would 
be a Jew-man/a Kaffir-man/ a Hindu-man-from Calcutta, /a Harlem-man-who-
does-not-vote […].’38 Césaire, Wilder cautions us, does not aim at multiplying 
the representation of black subjectivity, but in rehearsing different perspectives, 
to explore the boundaries and the ‘impossible dilemmas concerning colonial 
racism, alienation, and emancipation.’39 
While as I indicated earlier, Madureira suggested that the movements of 
Anthropofagia and Negritude in their deployment of the cannibal trope expose 
their convergence in the wider project of ‘provincializing the west’ by attempting 
not only ‘to reveal, but more crucially, to undo’ the process of the native’s erasure,40 
a closer juxtaposition shows otherwise. For Andrade the appropriation of 
cannibalism is the key to social cohesion (‘cannibalism alone unites us’), whereas 
for Césaire the crowd that doesn’t know how to crowd remains as an unresolved, 
troubling question. Andrade claims cannibalism as a militant appropriation 
in the sphere of language and imagination—like reclaiming Shakespearean 
quotes. Césaire’s poem is less calculated, rarely involving political injunctions 
but unravelling the psychological arena of anti-colonial hatred and how it affects 
34 Gregson Davis, Aimé Césaire (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 27.
35 Davis, 27.
36 A very beautiful and indicative passage is the following: ‘My mouth will be the mouth of those 
griefs which have no mouth, my voice, the freedom of those that collapse in the dungeon of 
despair […] And above all beware, my body and my soul too, beware of crossing your arms in 
the sterile attitude of the spectator, because life is not a spectacle, because a sea of sorrows is not 
a proscenium, because a man who screams is not a dancing bear.’ Césaire, Notebook of a Return 
to My Native Land, 89.
37 Davis, Aimé Césaire, 27.
38 Césaire, Notebook of a Return to My Native Land, 85.
39 Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization and the Future of the World, 22.
40 Madureira, Cannibal Modernities: Postcoloniality and the Avant-Garde in Caribbean and 
Brazilian Literature, 215.
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the responses of people of colour: ‘Because we hate you, you and/your reason, 
we claim kinship with/dementia praecox with flaming madness/with tenacious 
cannibalism.’41 Reclaiming madness and cannibalism is presented as a form of 
resistance, but unlike Andrade, not exclusively. Césaire’s poem makes a different 
contribution to the movement of negritude; departing from the lived experience 
of immigration, exile and return, and through its unfinished form, the poem 
contemplates the fundamental openness and unfinished process of returning.42 
Perhaps this view is best echoed in Davis when he describes Césaire’s homecoming 
as ‘a recurrent event that is continually in the process of rehearsal,’43 which 
effectively highlights the inherent plasticity of Negritude. But also, in a profound 
similitude with contemporary critical theory and philosophy, the reading of 
Césaire’s poem which I am suggesting here, sits well with a psychoanalytically-
informed understanding of ‘giving an account of one’s self ’—echoing the title of 
Judith Butler’s work—which is based on the lived experience of the impossibility 
of identity and the centrality of alienation. As Butler put it: ‘In the making of the 
story, I create myself in new form, instituting a narrative “I” that is superadded 
to the “I” whose past life I seek to tell. […] My account of myself is partial, 
haunted by that for which I can devise no definitive story.’44 
The difference between the way Andrade and Césaire use the cannibal trope 
lies precisely in what Butler calls that for which no story can be written about, 
unless it is about how it haunts accounts of one’s self; in psychoanalytic terms, 
the unconscious. Andrade argues for the necessity to reclaim cannibalism as a 
form of colonial otherness to produce a new copy of peripheral primitivism. 
This is what Bhabha described as when ‘the observer becomes observed’ a 
process which ‘the look of surveillance returns as the displacing gaze of the 
disciplined,’45 which makes mimicry a disturbing and even threatening means 
in the anti-colonial arsenal. Mimicry here must be understood not as a process 
of simply imitating the colonizer’s manners, habits and intellectual knowledge; 
but as an active reciprocation of the colonial gaze that places mimicry closer to 
41 Césaire, Notebook of a Return to My Native Land, 93.
42 What better example of this repetition of Césaire’s self-narrative than the ‘four separate 
published versions of the poem,’ which demonstrate, as Davis put it ‘a long-term engagement in 
revision that testifies to his creative obsession.’ Davis, Aimé Césaire, 21.
43 Davis, 22.
44 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 40. I 
must thank my friend and colleague Aline Souza-Martins who pointed out to me this text and 
with her insightful comments informed my understanding of it. 
45 Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” 129.
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mockery. More precisely, ‘[I]n order to be effective, mimicry must continually 
produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.’46 By copying the colonizer’s 
capacity for representation, Andrade’s manifesto can challenge its ‘power to 
be a model;’47 therefore, his suggestion for an anti-colonial aesthetic does not 
result in the consolidation of European epistemologies ‘but rather in their 
displacement:’48 turning the discourse of savage exoticism on its face. This is 
because mimicry works as a ‘metonymy of presence.’49 Mimicry reproduces the 
colonizer’s ethos, values, aesthetics, or style and through this mimicking act the 
colonizing power is partially there, perhaps in the form of an optical illusion or 
a bad copy: ‘almost the same, but not quite.’50 This is precisely the radical excess 
produced by Andrade’s use of the cannibal trope: the avant-garde cannibal is 
an emancipatory and empowering solution because s/he is not the same as the 
cannibal produced by the colonial discourse. Andrade’s proposition to reclaim 
savagery and cannibalism raised the question of who can legitimately speak 
about the subaltern as anthropophagic, therefore challenging ‘the authorization 
of colonial representations;’51 namely, who has the right to produce cannibals 
and what kind of cannibals are these? To paraphrase Bhabha this is the effect of 
a flawed colonial mimesis, in which to be able to be cannibalized (that is play the 
role imposed by the colonial gaze), is emphatically not to be a cannibal.52
Césaire’s use of the cannibal trope, on the other hand, can only be used to 
explain, or diagnose the profound alienation he comes across whilst returning to 
his homeland. There is no place from where to counter what he calls ‘this ancient 
dream of my cannibal cruelties.’53 For Césaire the essence of racism is that it 
completely shoehorns the black subject into a position of an allegedly deserved 
dispossession: ‘to be a good nigger he must believe honestly in his unworthiness 
and never feel any perverse curiosity to check those fateful hieroglyphics.’54 It is 
the impossibility of developing a space from where to counter colonial power that 
46 Bhabha, 126.
47 Bhabha, 128.
48 Madureira, Cannibal Modernities: Postcoloniality and the Avant-Garde in Caribbean and 
Brazilian Literature, 41.
49 Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” 126.
50 Bhabha, 126.
51 Bhabha, 131.
52 The original phrase goes like this: ‘to be Anglicized, is emphatically not to be English.’ Bhabha, 
128.
53 Césaire, Notebook of a Return to My Native Land, 70.
54 Césaire, 87.
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differentiates Césaire and Andrade, and additionally, a psychic space that is not 
infected with colonial hatred. It is the same ‘impossibility’ that Fanon borrows 
from Césaire’s poetry and incorporates into his own work. In West Indians and 
Africans, Fanon wrote about the Notebook: ‘Until 1939 the West Indian lived, 
thought, dreamed (we have shown this in Black Skin, White Masks), composed 
poems, wrote novels exactly as a white man would have done. We understand 
now why it was not possible for him, as for the African poets, to sing the black 
night, “The black woman with pink heels.” Before Césaire, West Indian literature 
was a literature of Europeans. The West Indian identified himself with the white 
man, adopted a white man’s attitude “was a white man”.’ 55
6.3 Colonial Desires 
It is in the context of his effort to trace the impact of colonialism in the psychology 
and the unconscious of the colonised, that Fanon writes his 1952 book Black 
Skin, White Masks, originally submitted as his medical doctorate dissertation. In 
this book Fanon draws on phenomenology, existentialism and psychoanalysis to 
explore the psychic structures of colonialism and argues that it is the blindness 
towards or the impossibility of recognition of the black individual’s humanness 
that colonialism is founded upon.56 The colonial native subject is a sub-product 
of the colonial condition that is constructed both through reason and fantasy, 
as deprived of a separate agency, as an object: it is not only the black body, but 
the psyche that has been colonised. As Fanon put it ‘what is often called the 
black soul is a white man’s artefact.’57 This statement made early on in his work 
echoes a rather pessimistic entry point into the domain of colonial psychology, 
which, however, I argue Fanon made strategically—to separate entirely the white 
man’s desire, and how his desire has shadowed and foreclosed any possibility for 
the black man’s desire. ‘What does a black man want?’ Fanon asks, ‘at the risk 
of arousing the resentment of my colored brothers, I will say that the black is 
not a man.’58 While his wider tactic is to document, identify, and illuminate the 
psychology of the black man under colonialism, starting from the point of non-
existence (‘not a man’) leads Fanon into devising a position of speaking from the 
margins: a position that assumes that the representation of blackness in Western 
55 Fanon, “West Indians and Africans,” 26.
56 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, 2nd ed. (London: 
Pluto Press, 2008).
57 Fanon, 16.
58 Fanon, 10.
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literature is a white man’s artefact.
Fanon dedicates a whole chapter, titled The So-Called Dependency Complex of the 
Colonized Peoples, to closely examine the argument of a Lacanian psychoanalyst 
and ethnographer, Octave Mannoni who having lived in the French colony, 
Madagascar, published in 1950 one of the first works about the psychology of 
colonialism, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonisation.59 Mannoni 
was among the first psychoanalysts to tackle issues of discrimination in the 
colonial societies, but he did so by considering the role of racialisation as 
irrelevant. ‘France is unquestionably one of the least racialist-minded countries 
in the world; also, colonial policy is officially anti-racist.’60 In significant contrast 
to Mannoni, Fanon situated race not only at the centre of political and economic 
relations, but psychic too: ‘what M. Mannoni has forgotten is that the Malagasy 
alone no longer exists; he has forgotten that the Malagasy exists with the European. 
The arrival of the white man in Madagascar shattered not only its horizons but its 
psychological mechanisms.’61 In response to Mannoni’s approach  Fanon implied 
that in the aftermath of the colonial invasion the Malagasy becomes aware of 
his ‘Malagasyhood’ and is shoehorned into a position which the discriminatory 
white coloniser pushes him towards: ‘I begin to suffer from not being a white 
man to the degree that the white man imposes discrimination on me, makes me 
a colonised native, robs me of all my worth, all individuality, tells me that I am 
a parasite on the world, that I must bring myself as quickly as possible into step 
with the white world.’62 
Nonetheless, Mannoni wrote about colonialism by exploring the psychic affect 
and the unconscious desires that underpin the relationship between the coloniser 
and the colonised, by deploying a Shakesperean dyad and framing it in terms 
of complementary psychological structures that forms a foreclosed system: 
‘dependency and inferiority form an alternative; the one excludes the other.’63 
Mannoni’s dyad consisted of an insecure, fragile figure, keen on dominating 
and imposing himself on others, and a dependent and submissive other, who 
requires guidance and governance. He therefore indirectly implied that there 
59 Octave Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, trans. Pamela 
Powesland (London: Methuen & Co, Ltd, 1956).
60 Mannoni, 110.
61 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 2008, 97.
62 Fanon, 98.
63 Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, 40.
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must be some unconscious desire that grants consensus to the coloniser for the 
imposition of colonial power and oppression—otherwise this schema would 
collapse. David Macey pointed out, quite provocatively, that ‘by the same logic, it 
can always be proved that the rape-victim was essentially consenting.’64 Macey’s 
comment unravels a layer of reading in Mannoni’s text which inferred that the 
colonial dyad Mannoni suggests is inscribed on sexual difference. Τhe Malagasy’s 
desire to be dominated and submit to mastery suggests that for Mannoni, the 
state of being colonised is a feminine state per se. This is a point of convergence, 
as I will later show between Fanon and Mannoni, but for the moment, it suffices 
to say that despite its apologetic character Prospero and Caliban makes a crucial 
point about the colonial condition. As Ranjana Khanna, Jock McCulloch and 
mostly Christopher Lane have underlined, Fanon missed an important point 
about Mannoni’s argument, namely that personality traits are not biologically 
inherited positions but the only conditions of possibility of colonial subjectivity.65 
McCulloch argues that ‘[T]here is no constitutional imperative governing the 
Malagasy’s dependence complex. If a Malagasy were brought up in Europe he 
would exhibit inferiority and not dependence.’66 If Mannoni wrote about the 
colonial situation with the certainty of the rigidity of the colonial structure as a 
lived reality, he also saw individuals and groups as underpinned by unconscious 
forces that cannot be predicted. Mannoni emphasised that an unconscious 
desire to dominate motivates the coloniser to pursue a vocation from which they 
‘derive some inner solace’67 and ‘psychological satisfaction;’68 he did not conclude 
that these desires are necessarily fulfilled. As Khanna stresses, for Mannoni ‘the 
colonial situation can satisfy neither the inferiority of the European nor the 
dependency of the Malagasy, it is coming undone.’69 
While Mannoni writes about the colonial situation without taking into 
consideration the construction of racial difference, Fanon recognised that the 
lived reality of racism exists in the field of vision and representation. Mannoni 
used the conventional imagery of cannibalism to designate the native’s 
64 Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Biography, 188.
65 Christopher Lane, “Psychoanalysis and Colonialism Redux: Why Mannoni’s ‘“Prospero 
Complex”’ Still Haunts Us,” Journal of Modern Literature 25, no. 3/4 (2002): 127–49.
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(London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 23.
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Duke University Press, 2003), 165.
169
psychology, as a form of a draining dependency that consumes the coloniser and 
infantilises the Malagasy. Fanon, on the other hand, gives a prominent place to 
cannibalism, suggesting that it has consistently been amongst the most popular 
forms of black objectification: ‘I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, 
intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else, 
above all: “Sho’ good eatin”.’70 Whereas Mannoni suggested that colonialism 
effectively stems from conflicts within the European psyche per se, his use 
of Prospero and Caliban as the main figures to impersonate this relationship 
already imply unconscious identifications at work, which although disavowed 
or repressed, actually demonstrate that in his work, there is a profound presence 
of a colonial unconscious. In fact, we could relate Mannoni’s use of the imagery 
of Caliban along the lines of the classic psychoanalytic argument of racism as 
projection: 
If we look at a black man we shall perhaps find out something about our 
own unconscious—not that the white man’s image of the black man tells 
us anything about his own inner self, though it indicates that part of him 
which he has not been able to accept: it reveals his secret self, not as he 
is, but rather as he fears he may be. The negro, then, is the white man’s 
fear of himself.71 
Nonetheless, this is not a thesis sustained coherently throughout Mannoni’s 
work, but it is precisely the kind of thesis—the ‘negro as impersonating the 
white man’s unconscious fears’ that Fanon draws upon. Analysing dreams 
collected from his native Madagascar informants, Mannoni finds feelings of 
anxiety expressed in the form of being chased by aggressive animals and in 
fears of fragmented or devoured body parts.72 These images, Mannoni claims, 
express Oedipal anxieties and fears of being castrated by symbolic father figures, 
like bulls, oxen or soldiers. For Fanon, on the contrary, the colonised did not 
entertain the privilege of experiencing Oedipal anxieties—‘the discoveries of 
Freud are of no use to us here.’73 His response to Mannoni is focused on the lack 
of historical context surrounding the dreams—instead of offering disastrous 
arbitrary interpretations, Fanon contends, Mannoni could have recognised the 
fragmented social body, the thousands of native deaths, ‘at the centre of which 
no real relationship can be established, where dissension breaks out in every 
70 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 1986, 84–85.
71 Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, 191.
72 Mannoni.
73 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 1986, 152.
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direction.’74 Instead, Fanon insists that the disintegration of the social bond has 
much more concrete effects, which cannot be repressed and condensed in the 
work of the dream: ‘the rifle of the Senegalese soldier is not a penis but a genuine 
rifle, model Lebel 1916.’75 These effects can be nowhere more visible than in the 
body of the colonised per se.
6.4 The Body as Threshold
During Fanon’s professional experience as a psychiatrist in medical establishments 
in France he came across a series of cases of intense psychosomatic symptoms, 
with no profound medical explanation. In an essay written during the same time 
as Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon documented medical encounters between 
French doctors and Arab immigrants, in France and exposed the centrality of 
fear, dispossession and uncertainty that dominated the realities of some of his 
immigrant patients.76 Titled The North African Syndrome the essay argues that 
this syndrome was an exegesis provided from doctors that erased the patient’s 
pathology and avoided questioning the limitations of a Western, positivistic 
medicine. Instead of questioning the treatment proposed, doctors dealing with 
Arab patients dismissed their symptoms and nullified them as individuals. ‘In 
the face of this pain without lesion, this illness distributed in and over the whole 
body, this continuous suffering, the easiest attitude, to which one comes more 
or less rapidly, is the negation of any morbidity. When you come down to it, the 
North African is a simulator, a liar, a malingerer, a sluggard a thief.’77 Through 
these psychosomatic symptoms, Fanon identified the effects of racism emerging 
from social dispossession—‘without a family, without love, without human 
relations, without communion with the group’—and becoming transformed into 
a physical dispossession: ‘he will feel himself emptied, without life, in a bodily 
struggle with death […] and what is more pathetic than this man with robust 
muscles who tells us in his truly broken voice, “Doctor, I’m going to die”?’78
Reminiscent of Freud’s treatment of hysteria, Fanon cautions us that we must 
put forward the body, which never lies in isolation from the racist gaze. Gibson 
and Beneduce go further and argue that what Fanon suggests is that the medical 
74 Fanon, 104.
75 Fanon, 106.
76 Frantz Fanon, “The ‘North African Syndrome,’” in Toward the African Revolution: Political 
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encounter is never free of politics—‘a drama is played out.’79 The vagueness in 
symptoms of pain and illness make the African body ‘opaque, unintelligible and 
suspect.’80 Because the Arab male body cannot be penetrated by the Western 
positivistic gaze of the doctor, in a context where trust and cooperation are 
fundamental for the deployment of treatment, the black body is rendered 
impenetrable and therefore suspicious, guilty of its otherness and thus, nullified, 
objectified, threatening, ‘phobogenic.’ According to Gibson and Beneduce, Fanon 
makes a significant claim: physical pain and suffering, are ‘always politically and 
racially situated.’81 Both psychical and physical strain manifest the alienation that 
forms the lived experience of blackness. In fact, images of fragmented, shattered, 
dismembered bodies are at the centre of the experience of having a black body 
in a white world: ‘What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a 
haemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood.’82 
In a famous footnote from The Ego and the Id, Freud stresses that it is impossible 
to think of psychic space without incorporating the role of the body like a shield 
and a surface. The body makes graphically visible the fragility against ‘painful 
illnesses’ and pain in general and gives shape and materiality to experiences.83 
‘The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego,’ to which he added: 
The ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those 
springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a 
mental projection of the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen 
above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus.84 
Thinking the body as a projection of the ego, Freud frames it as a corporeal reality 
that functions as a border with the external world; it is subjected to knowledge 
from the subject and from others. Although Freud does not develop this idea 
further, Butler’s reading of Freud presents a crucial extension of this view. The 
body is a corporeal reality subjected to ‘racializing interpellations’—symbolic 
79 Gibson and Beneduce, Frantz Fanon, Psychiatry and Politics, 124.
80 Gibson and Beneduce, 124.
81 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 1986, 113. Emphasis in the original.
82 Fanon, 113.
83 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and The Id, ed. Angela Richards, trans. Strachey, James, 2nd ed., On 
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structures do not precede but attribute meaning and ‘materiality’ to the body.85 
A similar view is presented by Teresa de Lauretis who argued that the body is ‘a 
permeable boundary […] and a site of incessant material negotiations between 
the external world, on one side, comprising social institutions, other beings and 
things, the gaze of the other, and on the other side, the internal world of the 
psyche, the drives, the unconscious and the ego’s mechanisms of defence […].’86 
These formulations of psychoanalysis, which open the unconscious to the body, 
spring from a Fanonian psychoanalytic schema that conceives the subject as 
inconceivable outside the social world. 
But more influential for Fanon’s theorisation of racial difference and its effects, was 
Lacan’s account of the emergence of the ego. Lacan argues that one’s imaginary 
understanding about oneself is fundamentally an illusion of coherence that is 
confirmed externally.87 Without getting into great detail here, Lacan’s early thesis 
of the emergence of the ego was consolidated in what he called the ‘mirror stage,’ 
a phase in development which takes place from the age of six months, when 
the child becomes capable of recognising its own image in the mirror. Standing 
in front of a mirror and supported by its guardian (or parent), the infant sees 
its reflection and assumes an image which is then symbolically affirmed by the 
guardian. The mirror stage is effectively an identification: ‘the transformation 
that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image’ (an ideal image of the 
self).88 Lacan makes a significant distinction between the I as ‘precipitated in a 
primordial form’ and the imago in which the I becomes solidified and objectified 
through the symbolic, the language of the guardian (‘this is you’).89 The precipitate 
of the I and the symbolic production of the I are asymptotical—meaning they 
can never cross-cut or osculate (have a tangent point of contact)—instead it 
is the subject’s task to constantly work through this irresolvable discordance.
Lacan’s mirror stage illustrated how the individual is always penetrated from an 
external force that shapes it from without, resulting in the emergence of self-
consciousness, a form of Cogito that is not grounded on any natural or biological 
traits; it is beyond essentialism. The mirror stage highlights how subjectivity is 
85 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1993), 17–18.
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always dependent on an external source for the validation of its existence, which 
makes it essentially alienated. 
Thought through the irreducibility of the body, Fanon exposed the limits of 
psychoanalysis and punctured its acclaimed universality by arguing that amidst 
a racist world, where blackness is woven together by fragmented narratives of 
‘cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects’ and so on,90 the 
black man cannot claim agency; ‘the black man has no ontological resistance 
in the eyes of the white man.’91 Fanon’s reading of the Lacanian mirror stage 
marks a key intervention in firstly the ‘universalizing tendency of psychoanalytic 
reductionism’ by offering a racialised version of the mirror whereby the onlooker 
is not a neutral other, but a subject interpellated by the social-political dynamics 
of colonialism;92 the gaze looking at the black body is a white, racist gaze. Fanon 
develops the concept of an ‘epidermal schema’ as an excess to the ‘corporeal 
schema,’ namely, blackness as an additional feature of having a body—a black 
body is never just a black body, but it is ‘overdetermined’ through the gaze of the 
other. This way, Fanon punctures psychoanalysis and embroiders a narrative that 
accounts for racial difference that is not merely sociological, but psychological 
too. As previously shown, although Fanon began Black Skin, White Masks from 
the assumption that the black body does not exist, he unveiled a body suffering, 
afraid of dying, on the verge of disappearance, experiencing an imaginary 
amputation, haemorrhaging. Dismissing the Oedipus complex as inapplicable 
to the condition of the black man, indeed, Fanon moves a step further giving 
a voice, a face and a body to the debilitating effects of racism and dissociating 
effectively, the psychoanalytic narrative of racism as projection—that Mannoni 
discussed—into racism as a discourse with physical power. What is left to 
be examined, though, is the nature and ontology of the racist gaze, which is 
closely tied to the white unconscious and where, perhaps unsurprisingly, Fanon 
situates—and he is the first one to do so—the cannibalistic fantasies.
90 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 84–85.
91 Fanon, 110.
92 Stephen Frosh, “Psychoanalysis, Colonialism, Racism,” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical 
Psychology, American Psychological Association, 33, no. 3 (2013): 146.
174
6.5 ‘Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up’: Fanon, Racism and Homophobia 
In Black Skin, White Masks Fanon extends his understanding of the ramifications 
of racial difference and racism in a culture that has systematically constructed 
the black body as phobogenic—meaning being the object of phobias. The book’s 
most famous passage is an example of phobia ‘mise-en-scène,’ as Vicky Lebeau 
explained, a piece of theory ‘suffused by the work of condensation.’93 The instance 
conglomerates a series of verbal, non-verbal and unconscious transmissions that 
capture the experience of being objectified and reduced through the gaze, which 
is at the centre of Fanon’s analysis of race. Whilst a medical student in Lyon, 
Fanon becomes aware of being seen and not being seen, by a ‘little white boy’94 
and his mother. This is the passage, and it is worth quoting it at length: 
“Look at the nigger!... Mama, a Negro!... Hell, he’s getting mad…” Take 
no notice, sir, he does not know that you are as civilised as we… My 
body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in 
mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro 
is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look a nigger, it’s cold, the 
nigger is shivering, the nigger is shivering because he is cold, the little 
boy is trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is shivering 
with cold, that cold that goes through your bones, the handsome little 
boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, 
the little white boy throws himself into his mother’s arms: Mama, the 
nigger’s going to eat me up.95
Fanon regarded phobia as the key to understanding the white human’s 
unconscious, and therefore he proposed to unpack the motivations behind 
what he called ‘negrophobia;’ the fear of the black man. ‘What is phobia?’, asks 
Fanon.96 Throughout Black Skin, White Masks, he traces two specific kinds 
of phobias: firstly, the fear of the black man as rapist, as, according to Fanon, 
shared by white women. Secondly, the fear that ‘the nigger’s going to eat me up’ 
we find in the words of the young boy. Rape and cannibalism, sexuality, fusion 
and orality comprise Fanon’s analysis of Negrophobia, disclosing an inherent 
93 Vicky Lebeau, “Children of Violence,” in Black Skin, White Masks: New Interdisciplinary Essays, 
ed. Max Silverman (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), 141.
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connection between anxiety, death, violence and annihilation embedded in the 
white unconscious. Fanon’s psychological explanation of phobia is premised 
upon the view that the choice of the phobic object is a priori ‘overdetermined.’97 
Following what he calls, a psychoanalytic ‘complete orthodoxy’ Fanon opined 
that the phobogenic object is invested with qualities that are excessive; they 
appeal to sexual anxieties and fantasies of destruction. ‘The object is endowed 
with evil intentions and with all the attributes of a malefic power.’98 
To unpack why the black body is placed at the centre of phobias, Fanon 
explores the exaggerated black sexuality in the white imaginary and refers to the 
‘hallucinatory’ sexual potency of the black man which is most clearly articulated 
in the female fantasy of rape: ‘a Negro is raping me.’99 Fanon argues that this 
fantasy expresses a concealed desire: ‘basically, does this fear of rape not itself 
cry out for rape?’100 Following Marie Bonaparte and Helen Deutsch, Fanon takes 
the rape fantasy a step further, arguing that it is an unconscious aggression of 
a woman towards her mother’s body; the white woman wants the black man’s 
penis to rape herself, and through that to rape her mother too. Thus, Fanon 
pronounces the actual content of the fear of rape: ‘I wish the Negro would 
rip me open as I would have ripped a woman open.’101 However, this fantasy 
does not explain the cross-racial identification with the black man; why is the 
black man required for this fantasy. This cross-racial identification, as we saw, 
has been left unexplored in Melanie Klein’s account too (although in this case 
was between a white and a black woman). Fanon uses the psychoanalytic idea 
about the female’s double Oedipus complex, which is permitted because of 
her complex physical sexuality. Bonaparte argued that female masochism is a 
concealed sexual desire for the mother (homosexuality) since it is comprised of 
a phallic (clitoral) aggression that originally was directed towards the mother 
but is eventually returned towards the woman’s self.102 Additionally, Bonaparte 
saw female sexuality as progressing from the clitoral to the clitoral-vaginal and 
finally to formally vaginal sexuality.103 What one must assume, Fanon says, when 
thinking about the maturity of female sexuality is that, in ‘Negrophobic’ women, 
97 Fanon, 155.
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there must be some remains of the early, clitoral sexual phase that carries forward 
a phallic aggression towards the mother: ‘in her as in the little boy there will be 
impulses directed at the mother; she too would like to disembowel the mother.’104 
The reason why the white woman identifies with the black man is because ‘the 
Negro is the genital.’105 Using the black man’s excessive sexual potency, the white 
woman attacks the mother, in fantasy. At the same time, observes Walton, she 
also repudiates herself, satisfying her own guilt for her aggressiveness towards 
the mother—by allowing herself to be raped. 106 
In her reading of Fanon’s account of rape fantasy, Walton observes that 
technically Fanon displaces the aggression projected on the black body onto the 
maternal body.107 It is her mother that the white woman wants to attack, and 
for this purpose, uses the black man as an object, an objectified, excessive penis 
which can help her fulfil the fantasy. Walton critiques Fanon for replicating the 
view that female sexuality is structured on ‘masochism,’108 a reading, which as 
we saw earlier, Mannoni was keen on proposing with regards to the black man. 
The displacement of masochism from the black man (Mannoni) to the white 
woman (Fanon) exposes that it is a normative, heterosexual masculinity that 
corroborates processes of sexual and racial othering within psychoanalysis—a 
point which neither Fanon nor Mannoni managed to articulate.109 Nonetheless, 
Vicky Lebeau fleshed out the intricacies of Fanon’s argument towards a slightly 
different direction. She argues that if we look beyond Fanon’s problematic 
displacement, what he seems to be arguing is that there is an implicit structural 
aetiology within the psychoanalysis of white femininity that entwines female 
sexuality with ‘Negrophobia.’ This is why, according to Lebeau, Fanon finds ‘such 
an acknowledgment—a projection of thought, of painful thought, on to the 
white woman—[…] remarkable not least because it begins to draw attention to 
the overdetermination of the interpretation of sexuality and phobia,’ but because 
for him, it signals a ‘liberation from thinking.’110 
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Εxamining Fanon’s argument around ‘Negrophobia’ and female sexuality, 
Lebeau argues that what Fanon discovers in the unconscious of the white 
woman is that her transition to vaginal female sexuality implies that the woman 
must stop oscillating between clitoral and vaginal sexuality. She must therefore 
abandon the possibility of satisfying her aggression towards the maternal body 
in fantasy—and give up internalised forms of female masochism. This theory, 
however, relies on the cultural presupposition of the black man as an object, 
a ‘predestined depositary of a young girl’s aggression.’111 The psychoanalytic 
account of female subjectivity is necessarily compatible with the black man rape-
fantasy; Negrophobia is ‘a form of sacrifice.’112 What is being sacrificed is the black 
man’s humanness at the expense of white femininity’s aggression. In sustaining 
the cultural stereotype of the black rapist, says Fanon—and I am echoing 
Lebeau’s reading here—what comes to the fore is ‘the collective representation 
of the infant’s fantasy of disembowelling the mother [which] sustains its fusion 
of passivity and aggression; the cultural stereotype—the “Negro myth”, the black 
imago—displaces and re-enacts the drama of self-other violation that Fanon 
discovers in the white girl’s unconscious.’113 In other words, what the rape fantasy 
unveils is that the black man’s body is the necessary excess; an excess that is 
articulated through Fanon’s epidermal schema that is added on the corporeal 
one. The black skin is a surface vital for the psychoanalytic theoretical formation 
of female sexuality.
While following the sexual anxiety embedded in ‘Negrophobia,’ leads us with 
both Lebeau and Walton into the deconstruction of a stereotype at the cost of 
the establishment of an other (the black man who rapes—the white woman who 
is a sexual masochist), I now wish to explore how Fanon scrutinises the cannibal 
trope and the kind of unconscious desire that is exposed behind it. In other 
words, what kind of imagos and phantasms are embedded in the psychoanalytic 
white unconscious, once we access it, as Fanon did, from the point of view of 
a cannibalistic fantasy?114 And to quote Burman what ‘of portraying all this as 
instigated or precipitated by a child?’115 In the aforementioned example, both 
the boy and the black man are involved in a gradual culmination of tension, the 
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black man is ‘shivering’ the boy is ‘trembling,’ and cannibalism and engulfment 
in the body of the other is the climaxing moment in this staging of the psychic 
effects of the racialising gaze. There is a latent content in this encounter, which 
is that of the white boy’s/man’s repressed homosexuality, as another layer of 
‘Negrophobia.’ Fanon explains: ‘The Negrophobic woman is in fact nothing 
but a putative sexual partner—just as the Negrophobic man is a repressed 
homosexual.’116 While Fanon’s discussion of white and black femininity has been 
extensively addressed in literature, little emphasis has been attributed to the fact 
that he links the boy’s fear of being eaten with Negrophobia and latent, male 
homosexuality.  
Against the racism of the white man that reduces the black man to a phallic 
object that is both feared and desired, Fanon juxtaposes a psychoanalytically-
informed argument. Drawing on the persistent representation of the black man 
as a ‘cannibal’ Fanon illustrates the fears and desires of white masculinity. Firstly, 
Fanon acknowledges that racism is sustained through the Western epistemology 
and biology that acknowledges the cannibal trope as the essence of blackness: ‘My 
chromosomes were supposed to have a few thicker or thinner genes representing 
cannibalism. In addition to the sex-linked, the scholars had now discovered the 
racial-linked.’117 The inherent link between racial difference and the cannibal 
trope, Fanon observes, becomes universalised through the naturalisation of race 
when it is seen as a biological category—rooted in the most miniscule fragment 
of the human body; the container of genetic information, the chromosome. 
To counter the racism of Western science, Fanon proposes a psychological 
explanation for the longevity of the fears surrounding the black man’s body, 
because the ‘the myth of the bad nigger is part of the collective unconscious.’118 
Thus, Fanon puts forward the argument that racism when expressed as fear, what 
he calls ‘Negrophobia,’ is because of the white man’s latent homosexuality—the 
unacknowledged sexual desires of the Oedipus complex. The racist is the white 
man who openly shares the fantasy of the black man as ‘sensual’, or ‘prolific’ or 
having a ‘prodigious vitality.’119 
Daniel Boyarin has argued that Fanon’s text is caught in the threshold of ‘partial 
decolonization’ between a colonial and a post-colonial milieu which allows 
116 Fanon, 121.
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him to circumstantially grasp the white, male colonial gaze and look at himself 
and his blackness through this.120 Fanon then ‘recovers his “maleness” […] by 
pathologizing his male and female enemies as “feminized”.’121 More precisely, 
when discussing what he calls ‘Negrophobia’ Fanon brings the example of a Jewish 
physician, named Michel Salomon.122 In this case, the sensual essentialism of the 
black body is nothing but a manifestation of what Fanon sees as a ‘revulsive’ 
(Jewish) male homosexuality: ‘in addition, M. Salomon, I have a confession to 
make to you: I have never been able, without revulsion, to hear a man say of 
another man: “he is so sensual!” I do not know what the sensuality of a man 
is.’123 Fanon’s move here needs careful consideration because through Salomon’s 
sexualisation of the black body, Fanon establishes his argument about racism as 
latent homosexuality. For Fanon, Salomon becomes the par excellence repressed 
white, homosexual masculinity that craves for the alleged ‘sensuality’ of the 
black body. Nevertheless, one is obliged to ask: why does Fanon use the account 
of a Jewish physician to detach the fear and lust for blackness from essentialism? 
I suggest that we should read Fanon’s pairing of homosexuality and racism in 
the context of his overall critique to psychoanalysis; a critique of psychoanalysis’ 
refusal to grasp forms of otherness beyond sexuality. 
Fanon’s example about the latent homosexuality of the white racist exposes how 
for psychoanalysis—a discipline with Jewish origins—race cannot be theorised 
independently from sexuality. This is why Fanon insisted that racial difference is 
a matter of skin colour, of being seen as a dehumanised, threatening cannibal, an 
experience, which Fanon mistakenly argues is not shared among Jews: the Jew 
‘belongs to the race of those who since the beginning of time have never known 
cannibalism. What an idea, to eat one’s father! Simple enough, one has only not to 
be a nigger.’124 Ignoring the forms of anti-Semitism that have drawn on imageries 
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of cannibalism as discussed in the first chapter, Fanon substitutes one form of 
racism with another one. For Boyarin, Fanon’s anti-Semitic implication is related 
to masculine anxieties and fantasies about white masculinity. Homophobia, 
racism and anti-Semitism stem from the fact that in the colonial discourse both 
the Jewish body and the black body are both ‘misrecognized as feminine:’125 ‘the 
black man is a penis; the Jew is a clitoris. Neither has the phallus.’126
Furthermore, the white unconscious as the source of cannibalistic fears and 
fantasies is the racial site where white masculinity and Jewish masculinity meet. In 
the white unconscious, the racial signification of the black man, expressed through 
the cannibal trope signals a latent homosexual desire to ‘eat one’s father’127 that has 
gone astray. The racist slur of ‘being a nigger’128 then amalgamates this repressed 
homosexual desire through the discourse of racial difference. In other words, the 
only way white men can dissociate their homosexual feelings would be through 
the image of the black man who ‘in being a nigger’ ‘eats his father’ and fulfils 
a repressed colonial fantasy. Fanon here addresses the unacknowledged aspect 
of the Oedipal dynamics, where in not accounting for the son’s homosexuality 
towards the father, the site of the colony becomes exigent for the projection, 
actualisation and amalgamation of the white man’s homosexual terrors. While 
for Fanon the first point of criticism towards psychoanalysis rests on the Jewish 
complicity in the racialisation and objectification of blackness, the second 
point directly addresses the question of the Oedipus complex. Intriguingly, 
while Fanon brings to the fore the toxic effects of the European compulsive 
heteronormativity, his argument loses its critical edge by refusing to problematise 
European patriarchy. Instead, Fanon proclaims his revulsion for homosexuality 
and considers it symptomatic exclusively of whiteness: 
Let me observe at once that I had no opportunity to establish the 
overt presence of homosexuality in Martinique. This must be viewed 
as the result of the absence of the Oedipus complex in the Antilles. 
The schema of homosexuality is well enough known. We should not 
overlook, however, the existence of what are called there ‘men dressed 
like women’ or ‘godmothers’. Generally, they wear shirts and skirts. But I 
am convinced that they lead normal sex lives. They can take a punch like 
any ‘he-man’ and they are not impervious to the allures of women-fish 
and vegetable merchants. In Europe, on the other hand, I have known 
125 Boyarin, “Homophobia and the Postcoloniality of the ‘Jewish Science,’” 183.
126 Boyarin, 180.
127 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 115. 
128 Fanon, 115.
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several Martinicans who became homosexuals, always passive. But this 
was by no means a neurotic homosexuality. For them it was a means to a 
livelihood, as pimping is for others.129 
Fanon’s main strategy in dismantling the racism of white masculinity passes 
through a heteronormative context and an anti-Semitic stain. He claims ‘the 
absence of the Oedipus complex in the Antilles,’ namely that the black man 
need not to identify, compete, overthrow, his father. For Fanon, the black 
man’s sexuality is not ordered by castration fears and cannibalistic anxieties 
towards the black father, to safeguard his masculinity, male potency and 
phallic power. Here, Fanon’s purpose is not to critique the universality of the 
Oedipus complex and its uncritical application in the colonial context. On the 
contrary, by affirming the absence of the Oedipus his aim is to link racism to 
white male sexuality. Unlike the female rape fantasy, in the cannibal trope we 
find another layer of repression—namely that sexual desire is not expressed as 
such but through the place of the mouth or the orifice. De Lauretis observed 
that Fanon’s rhetoric about homosexuality is symptomatic of homophobia as 
well: ‘negation (there are no homosexuals in Martinique) and disavowal (there 
are men dressed like women, but I am convinced they lead normal lives).’130 
In the white, psychoanalytic unconscious Fanon encounters the body of the 
black man as the ‘depository’ of sexual anxieties, representing everything that 
cannot be acknowledged in the narrow boundaries of the normativity of white 
sexuality: while the ‘Negrophobic’ woman wishes to ‘rip the mother open’ the 
‘Negrophobic’ man wishes to be engulfed by the father.
6.6 ‘We should not allow ourselves to forget’: Fanon, the Child and the 
Cannibal Trope 
One final point that needs to be addressed is to do with the fact that in several 
instances throughout Black Skin, White Masks Fanon brings together the 
knowledge about racialisation, as it manifests through the cannibal trope, and 
the voice of a child. Burman has theorised the concept of the child as a method 
through which, in Fanon’s work, processes of racial, gendered and developmental 
identification emerge.131 In the famous passage ‘Look Mama a Negro’ the child 
129 Fanon, 180. Emphasis in the original. 
130 Lauretis, “Difference Embodied: Reflections on Black Skin, White Masks,” 63.
131 Erica Burman, “Fanon and the Child: Pedagogies of Subjectification and Transformation,” 
Curriculum Inquiry 46, no. 3 (2016): 265–85.
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becomes the agency that voices the fear of being eaten by the black man, to his 
mother’s embarrassment. Burman emphasises the need to pay attention not only 
to how, by spelling out this racist smear the child becomes divested from the 
innocence of childhood, but also how the category of the child becomes the site 
where the political possibilities of post-colonial futures become amalgamated. 
Fanon’s child is fragmented, undertheorised and situated in the tensions between 
innocence, helplessness, vulnerability; the child also becomes the agency where 
post-colonial possibilities co-exist alongside the ‘transcendent repository of a 
racist culture.’132 
For Fanon, the racialisation of the black man lies in the interstices between 
the hegemonic white masculinity and boyhood. It comes to being through the 
interplay between colonial reality and infantile fantasy, adult masculinity and 
boy’s play. In magazines put together by white men for ‘little white men,’ Fanon 
writes, ‘the ‘Wolf, the Devil, the Evil Spirit, the Bad Man, the Savage are always 
symbolised by Negroes or Indians.’133 Fanon explains that the cannibalistic 
fantasy dominates colonial representations; ‘the white little boy, becomes an 
explorer, an adventurer, a missionary “who faces the danger of being eaten by 
wicked Negroes”.’134 It is unclear, in Fanon’s passage, if the little white boy mimics 
the coloniser or it is colonialism, which, for the white man is being regarded as 
a game (just like police and thieves). The representation of blackness in white 
children’s literature is there where Fanon witnesses how the romantic fantasies 
of exploration and conquest invite ‘little white men’ into the world of older white 
colonialists, by demanding the racialized evil other and endorsing the imaginary 
victory over his body. Nevertheless, for the white child exploration and conquest 
does not seem to signify anything else but play—Western culture abides with 
nursery rhymes, fairy tales and children’s stories about figures that consume, 
swallow, bite and devour.135 However, Fanon’s point is that despite the apparent 
virtuousness, the white child is situated in the intersection between the grown-
up racist, colonial masculinity and the innocent play of exploration. This tension, 
as Burman put it, ‘“reveals”, by [the child’s] own implication within it, the social 
132 Burman, “Fanon’s Lacan and the Traumatogenic Child: Psychoanalytic Reflections on the 
Dynamics of Colonialism and Racism,” 21.
133 Fanon, 146.
134 Fanon, 146.
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order he is entering.’136 But, does the same hold true for the black boy?
Fanon recounts another scene of encounter between a black scout boy and three 
white boys, as seen in a children’s paper: 
Recently, in a children’s paper, I read a caption to a picture in which 
a young black Boy Scout was showing a Negro village to three or four 
white scouts: “This is the kettle where my ancestors cooked yours.” One 
will gladly concede that there are no more Negro cannibals, but we 
should not allow ourselves to forget… Quite seriously, however, I think 
that the writer of that caption has done a genuine service to Negroes 
without knowing it. For the white child who reads it will not form a 
mental picture of the Negro in the act of eating the white man, but rather 
as having eaten him. Unquestionably, this is progress.137
While Fanon agrees that the cannibal trope entertains no actual currency (‘there 
are no more Negro cannibals’), this does not automatically lead to the undoing 
of the harm colonial racism has inflicted. Instead, the cannibal trope has become 
consolidated into a history—a distorted history according to which it was the 
‘black ancestors’ that threatened the white ones. This is a form of history that is 
structured on biological essentialism, displacing the responsibility of violence 
on the so-called naturally threatening black appetite, and not on the white 
consuming colonial oppression. More crucially the cannibal trope has been 
turned form a question of trauma into one of memory: ‘we should not allow 
ourselves to forget.’ 138 Fanon, in this instance, does not have the white child speak 
but the black child confronting the consequences of the hegemonic Western 
historical narrative. The black child becomes the heir of the intergenerational 
trauma of colonial racism, and it is the figure that Fanon situates in the frictions 
between colonial memory and its post-colonial workings. 
6.7 Conclusion: Fanon and the Post-Colonial Unconscious 
Fanon’s approach to the question of the cannibal trope is vital for a 
genuinely decolonial strategy to the European unconscious. The tendency of 
psychoanalysis—as we saw in the three case studies that preceded—to theorise 
the cannibal trope in relation to the so-called primitives that are naturally 
threatening becomes reversed in Fanon’s theory. The trajectory of his argument 
136 Burman, “Fanon and the Child: Pedagogies of Subjectification and Transformation,” 273.
137 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 203.
138 Fanon, 203.
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creates a significant challenge for psychoanalysis. Instead of theorising the 
colonial subject by outlining how psychoanalytic pillars become translated in the 
context of the colony (for example the progress of psychosexual development, 
sexual difference, the primary unity with the mother, as Róheim does), Fanon’s 
theory exposes why the psychoanalytic imaginary is foreclosed in relation to 
subjectivities which are socially constructed as racialised: the black body is the 
limit of psychoanalytic discourse. I have drawn attention to two major instances 
in Fanon’s text that work around this limit: firstly, how the black body cannot 
claim any right to agency independent from the white, colonial imaginary—
which we saw in Fanon’s discussion of Mannoni and Lacan. Secondly, how 
the black body can only exist as a libidinal object, inflicting fear and lust (it 
consumes, and it can be consumed). The colonial imagery of cannibalistic figures 
seized by heroic white men, which as we saw in Chapter Two frames the colonial 
representation of the non-European, exposes for Fanon the latent, homosexual 
desires that cannot be claimed and experienced within the European patriarchy. 
In the context of the colony, then, male homosexual desires become fulfilled 
through the racist stain of the black man as a cannibal—just as the white female 
homosexual desires become fulfilled through the racist fantasy of the black man 
that rapes. Fanon’s deviation from the traditional psychoanalytic inclination to 
naturalise racial difference through the concept of excessive and transgressive 
appetites, allows space for post-colonial psychoanalytic perspectives where the 
racist stain of cannibalism becomes a constitutional aspect of the European, 
colonial, patriarchal unconscious.
Nevertheless, what seems to emerge as a decolonial critique of psychoanalysis 
risks resolving into similar forms of othering and dehumanisation that are 
not far from the colonial Manicheanism. This is because Fanon’s reversal of 
the cannibal trope fails to escape a justification of racism as the outcome of a 
non-heteronormative sexuality. Fanon explains racism and the construction 
of racialised objects of phobia through a repressed or silenced homosexuality. 
He situates the fantasies surrounding the site of the colony as complementary 
to the European, patriarchal and heteronormative libidinal economy. The 
trajectory of Fanon’s theory then leans towards the heterosexual imperative that 
as Butler cautions: ‘[reduces] racial differences to the derivative effects of sexual 
difference (as if sexual difference were not only autonomous in relation to racial 
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articulation but somehow more prior, in a temporal or ontological sense).’139 
Rather, Fanon’s argument exposes how the psychoanalytic emphasis only on the 
inner, psychic structures means that otherness can only be addressed, analysed, 
accounted for, in terms of sexuality. Fanon’s limitations bring to the fore that 
from a psychoanalytic point of view, racism cannot be explained unless through 
a heterosexist assumption.  
What is more, Fanon’s argument could propose a radical claim for the 
reformulation of the patriarchal and heteronormative European sexuality. For 
example, the primacy of sexuality and its repression as the reason for social 
discontents, violence and oppression is a question that we partially encountered 
in the case of Róheim and will be more thoroughly discussed in the context 
of radical, social re-readings of psychoanalysis from post-Freudian Marxist 
theorists, in the last chapter. However, his negation of homosexuality in 
Martinique suggests otherwise; ‘They can take a punch like any ‘he-man’ and 
they are not impervious to the allures of women-fish[…].’140 It is not only the 
cannibal trope that expresses European fantasies for the body of the colonised, 
but homosexuality too lies in the unconscious of those who have conceived and 
defended the Oedipus complex. Fanon’s reversal of the racist stain of the cannibal 
trope does a favour to psychoanalysis by showing that the natural association 
between blackness and transgressive appetites is exclusively a European fantasy. 
On the other hand, this argument needs to be taken with a grain of salt, as it 
points to the limits of post-colonial readings of psychoanalysis when these are 
exhausted on the role of sexuality as the only possible source of subjectification. 
To conclude, in Fanon’s theory we encounter a pivotal moment for the 
decolonisation of psychoanalysis, marked by the consolidation of the colonial 
unconscious and the emergence of a post-colonial one. Contrary to the avant-
garde approaches seeing the cannibal trope as an opportunity for agency (as 
Andrade claimed) and an example of how racial differences create dynamics 
of inequality among the colonised (as Césaire’s case shows) Fanon’s case study 
exposes what is at stake in the colonial fantasy of the cannibal trope from an 
unconscious point of view. His work then makes the cannibal trope becomes an 
outdated practice—a question of ancestral antagonism and heritage that purges 
colonial violence and plagues the colonised (male child). What is left out when 
139 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1993), 18.
140 Fanon, 180.
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Fanon takes apart the cannibal trope—and what he refuses to address, namely 
the homophobia, the misogyny and the anti-Semitism—become the axioms 
that shape the feminised fears embedded in the post-colonial unconscious. As 
we will see in the last chapter, while the colonial imagery of the cannibal trope 
ceases to gain theoretical currency in psychoanalytic discourse, the same does 
not hold true for the fears of otherness and the anxieties about the ‘other’ who 
consumes, swallows, appropriates, engulfs, and annihilates through the body. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Trajectories of Liberation:
Towards the Decolonisation of Psychoanalysis
7.1 Alienated Bodies: Sexuality and the Politics of Liberation
The previous chapter sought to trace how without Fanon’s emphasis on how the 
social impacts on the psychological, and vice versa, a decolonial approach to 
psychoanalysis would not be possible. Fanon’s deconstruction of an interminable 
colonial myth that sapped the humanity of the colonised subject comes at the 
end of two psychoanalytic trajectories: firstly, the unacknowledged dependence 
of psychoanalysis on a colonial and social mytheme about racial difference 
and secondly the role of white fantasies in the construction of the black body. 
Fanon’s contribution prepares the ground for a major decolonising moment 
and allows us to understand psychoanalysis as both a practice for reading the 
colony and a discourse not freed from the traps of the essentialism of race. It 
is through Fanon’s exteriority to psychoanalysis that we can identify its limits 
and construct a decolonial and feminist lens that helps us remain aware of the 
theoretical fallacies of psychoanalysis as a thorough and systematic anatomy of 
post-colonial subjectivities. 
I would now like to investigate the Marxist appropriation of psychoanalysis that 
takes place in cold-war American culture, from a Jewish refugee from German 
Nazism, Herbert Marcuse. I will investigate what happens when a Marxist 
intellectual fails to come up with an adequate understanding of how the colonial 
milieu contributes to individual psychology . Given the decolonising and 
feminist movements that were developing one after the other in the late 1960s in 
the United States, Marcuse’s insistence that it is (male) sexuality that is the main 
site of capitalistic oppression indicates a startling omission.  Firstly, I discuss 
Marcuse’s theory of repression of sexuality as what he sees as the only pitfall of 
capitalist life. As we have seen previously, otherness within the psychoanalytic 
subject is defined through the racialised and sexualised imagery of the cannibal 
trope. I show that because Marcuse emphasises social repression as entirely 
dominating the individual, his account of the subject lacks such an inherent 
otherness. Drawing from psychoanalytic criticisms of Marcuse, it appears that 
his psychoanalytic subject is not structured upon an inner dynamic tension, but 
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it is entirely constructed through social, capitalist power. Furthermore, because 
Marcuse unwittingly considers capitalism as synonymous with patriarchy, I 
argue that he externalises the necessary psychoanalytic split onto the role of 
woman, and in particular the mother. For Marcuse, the mother becomes the 
threatening and alluring other that defines the (male) subject. Overall, I argue 
that the absence of the cannibal trope in Marcuse’s theory becomes profoundly 
connected to the vision of otherness as feminised and racialised. In the white 
male imaginary, the mother becomes a substitute for the cannibal trope. 
7.1.2 Eros and Civilisation: a Marxist Rereading of Psychoanalysis 
To appraise Marcuse’s project, I first situate his work historically. The historian 
Eli Zaretsky noted that the 1950s in the United States was a transitional period 
for society and psychoanalysis, too.1 Psychoanalytic thinkers and practitioners 
were divided between pessimism and despair, following the totalitarian 
politics of the 1940s, and efforts to imagine radical alternatives by resituating 
revolutionary Marxist ideas at the heart of the capitalist societies.2 In post-
war America, psychoanalysis underwent examination by analysts who defined 
themselves as neo-Freudians and developed the tradition of ego psychology by 
rejecting some of Freud’s fundamental assumptions such as the centrality of 
sexuality and drive theory. Neo-Freudians like Karen Horney and Erich Fromm 
strongly opposed the idea that drives were biologically determined forces 
immanent in human nature, or that they emerged out of ‘unalterable situations’ 
related to biological development.3 On the other hand, libertarian Marxists 
such as Herbert Marcuse and Norman Brown deployed psychoanalysis towards 
a subversive and non-conservative direction by arguing the need to review 
Freudian theory without being ‘eclectic’ or ‘minimising the extent and depth of 
[psychological] conflict,’ as the neo-Freudians did.4 As Frosh has outlined, the 
fundamental difference between these two polemical traditions boils down to 
the question of aggression and negativity within the subject.5 Whilst the former 
group imagines the individual as good and pure, corrupted by culture, the latter 
1 Eli Zaretsky, “Charisma or Rationalization? Domesticity and Psychoanalysis in the United 
States in the 1950s,” Critical Inquiry 26, no. 2 (2000): 328–54.
2 Zaretsky.
3 Dagmar Herzog, Cold War Freud: Psychoanalysis in an Age of Catastrophes (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 26.
4 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 251.
5 Stephen Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1999), 
179.
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sustains the psychoanalytic pessimism about inherent negativity, and devises 
ways to negotiate oppression by keeping an eye on social transformation and the 
ways in which society could mitigate the individual’s suffering.
Marcuse was preoccupied precisely with the part of psychoanalysis that Freudian 
scholars considered the most problematic as it installed within the subject 
disastrous, deadly, and destructive drives. In Freud’s drive theory, Marcuse found 
an opportunity to explain why, despite the claims of progress in contemporary 
civilisation, misery, destruction, and psychological discomfort was looming all 
around. Marcuse argued that, according to Freud, civilisation was an effort to 
master and control sexuality because it was an inherently subversive force and 
could endanger the collective.6 If left unregulated, the life and death drives—
or as they became known in post-Freudian thought Eros and Thanatos—are 
equally damaging. Without repression, there is no cultural progress because 
instincts seek immediate gratification in accordance with what Freud called the 
pleasure principle. Within the Western culture, children had to become educated 
in delaying and repressing their gratification by adjusting themselves to the 
reality principle, the impossibility of receiving instant gratification. According 
to Marcuse, the transition from pleasure to reality reveals that ‘civilization has 
progressed as organized domination,’ because individuals learn to forgo their 
wishes.7 However, this negation of instincts does not imply their disappearance. 
Instead, instincts continue ‘to exist in civilization itself.’8 Becoming cultured 
is not a simple process of the ‘adjustment of pleasure’ to the reality of societal 
norms but it is equally the ‘subjugation and diversion of the destructive force 
of instinctual gratification’ as a sacrifice which becomes meaningful through 
claims of the ‘transubstantiation of pleasure itself.’9 The human being becomes a 
rational, conscious being by learning to delay and repress the gratification of the 
instincts. Marcuse’s objection was that in the current historical circumstances 
this repression was unnecessarily excessive.  
Upon a closer observation on Freud’s articulation of the reality principle, 
Marcuse reaches the following generalisation: the reality principle is informed 
by need or scarcity. The distribution of scarcity is ‘imposed upon individuals—
6 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 15.
7 Marcuse, 34. Emphasis in the original.
8 Marcuse, 15.
9 Marcuse, 13.
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first by mere violence, subsequently by a more rational utilisation of power.’10 
In other words, there is more than one form of repression, depending on how 
social institutions and laws impose their domination, i.e. what he called ‘surplus 
repression’ as opposed to ‘basic repression.’11 Similarly, the reality principle 
also depends on particular historical and political formations. Marcuse argues 
that contemporary capitalist society is organised in accordance with the 
‘performance principle’: a ‘specific reality principle’ under whose ‘rule society is 
stratified according to the competitive economic performances of its members.’12 
Under the  performance principle, instead of seeking satisfaction through 
labour, individuals work in alienation: ‘[L]abor time […] is painful  time, for 
alienated labor is absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure principle.’13 
Remarkably, while the repressed libido cannot be channelled into work, it 
cannot be invested in leisure time, either, that is, ‘the late stage of industrial 
civilization […] has the technique of mass manipulation’ by  ‘an entertainment 
industry which directly controls leisure time. The individual is not to be left 
alone.’14 Marcuse’s pessimism was profound: within a culture that boasts about 
its progress and freedom, repression is unreasonably excessive, and historical 
reality is dominated by the pressure to be productive and useful. Not only are 
modern subjects incapable of receiving any form of libidinal gratification from 
their labour but also, even in their leisure time, they are left with no option 
but to consume the products of the entertainment industry. In this direction, 
if surplus repression corrodes the modern subject by creating the conditions of 
alienated labour, how did Marcuse envision social transformation? What is the 
space whereby one is able to voice opposition to the performance principle and 
reclaim one’s right to a more fulfilling life? 
Marcuse saw sexuality as a life-enhancing form of energy that holds the potential 
of reversing the lethargy capitalistic domination imposed. He diagnosed that 
‘the sex instincts bear the brunt of the reality principle.’15 Under the performance 
principle, sexuality appears compartmentalised and partial, and, is reduced to 
genitality and procreation. The institution of monogamy channels and regulates 
libidinal energy in such a way that it becomes productive—‘it is turned into 
10 Marcuse, 36. Emphasis in the original.
11 Marcuse, 37.
12 Marcuse, 44.
13 Marcuse, 45.
14 Marcuse, 48.
15 Marcuse, 40.
191
a specialized temporary function, into a means for an end.’16 On the other 
hand, non-procreative sexuality was labelled as perversion, exemplifying 
those practices which, in being excluded from the heteronormative practices 
of private life, defined it. ‘Against a society which employs sexuality as means 
for a useful end, the perversions uphold sexuality as an end in itself; they 
thus place themselves outside the dominion of the performance principle and 
challenge its foundation.’17 When talking about perversion Marcuse refers to 
Freud’s articulation of sexuality as ‘polymorphously perverse,’ namely as a free-
floating energy not yet concentrated onto genitality. However, Marcuse does not 
suggest that all sexuality must become non-procreative because this signifies a 
withdrawal from the creation of life and marks ‘the submission of Eros to the 
death instinct.’18 But, he was interested in how the compartmentalisation of 
sexuality could be reversed and undone. 
In adopting a Marxist framework, Marcuse determined the performance 
principle as one which is governed by the capitalist, modern values of utility and 
productivity.19 Just as sexuality was governed by the injunction of productivity—
sustain a heteronormative family and encourage procreation—labour and 
leisure time were also dictated by the injunction to use one’s libidinal energy at 
the service of collective progress. ‘Efficiency and repression converge: raising 
the productivity of labor is the sacrosanct ideal of both capitalist and Stalinist 
Stakhanovism.’20 In the post-industrial world, the subject is plagued by these 
values since productivity was more and more placed as the opposite of pleasure, 
thus enhancing the individual repression. Productivity became associated with 
utility and effectiveness and was dissociated from practices that do not result in 
end products, like homosexuality or ‘rest, indulgence, receptivity.’21 However, 
seen from another angle, productivity could also engender the terms for its own 
collapse and carry the possibility of creating conditions that militate ‘against the 
subjugation of man to his labor.’22 Marcuse found this opportunity in technology 
and automation: whilst labour can never entail freedom as it involves a physical 
presence and activity, yet, ‘it can release time and energy for the free play of 
16 Marcuse, 41.
17 Marcuse, 50.
18 Marcuse, 51.
19 Marcuse, 155.
20 Marcuse, 156.
21 Marcuse, 156.
22 Marcuse, 156.
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human faculties outside the realm of alienated labor.’23 If technology could be 
deployed at the service of society, then it would assume the burden of producing 
material goods; individuals would not have to outweigh their performance to 
become more efficient. ‘[F]reed from this enslavement, productivity loses its 
repressive power.’24 As a result, individuals would have more time away from 
paid employment to cultivate their creativity and enjoy private leisure time. 
Productivity could become displaced from the field of economic exploitation 
to the service of imagination, art, and aesthetic practices. Extended beyond the 
institutions of exploitation, productivity would lose its capacity to repress the 
individual and impel a change that would libidinally re-energise the oppressed 
subject. ‘The struggle for existence then proceeds on new grounds and with 
new objectives: it turns into the concerted struggle against any constraint on 
the free play of human faculties, against toil, disease and death.’25 Tempting as 
its sounds, Marcuse’s political thesis was mischievously romantic as he did not 
seem to consider, for example, the possibility of mass numbers of unemployment 
resulting from the technological takeover of production. 
Nevertheless, Marcuse’s strategy for social transformation necessarily involved 
a reconfiguration of the subject’s relation to its body and sexuality. For 
Marcuse, it was only through an alleviation of repression that the experience 
of alienation invoked by economic exploitation could re-sexualise the 
compartmentalised body. Once sexuality was freed from social injunctions and 
regained its polymorphous status, the forces of Eros would equally augment and 
counterbalance the forces of death. The calls for sexual liberation as the only 
opportunity to foster connections in the social web sat in stark contrast with 
Freud’s diagnosis about the need to impose sexual restrictions on individual 
libido—which once left unrestricted would hamper the progress of civilisation.26 
While Freud recognised that individual misery was caused by the internalisation 
of too much guilt and prohibition, resulting in the super-ego weighing on the 
subject, Marcuse regarded oppression as entirely emanating from the outside, 
ignoring how it becomes internalised. Marcuse’s subject is not plagued by its 
own conscience or super-ego. Thus, he proposed that only through lifting the 
social restraints of sexuality would the liberation from the values of capitalist 
23 Marcuse, 156.
24 Marcuse, 156.
25 Marcuse, 157.
26 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), trans. David McLintonck (London: 
Penguin Books, 2002).
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oppression be achieved. Hence, where Freud’s project makes a claim for an 
individual responsibility and ethics, Marcuse displaces individual responsibility 
with the collective one: it is not the individual’s obligation to manage psychic 
tensions, but it is the aim of a politically revolutionary project to alleviate social 
repression and to emancipate sexuality. Misery, unhappiness and discontent 
with civilisation for Marcuse belong only to the sphere of politics. 
Furthermore, Marcuse’s emphasis on the social dimension of the excessive 
repression of sexuality lies in tension with the main point of psychoanalysis 
about the subject’s agency as emerging against the psychic exteriority that is the 
unconscious. This is because for Marcuse repression becomes overwhelming. 
Marcuse overlooks the psychoanalytic claim that psychic life is ordered by its 
own laws, not exclusively submitted to the social. His theory has ‘no aspect of 
psychic life escaping the total penetration of cultural domination.’27 The result 
is that Marcuse’s insights divest Freudian psychoanalysis from its fundamental 
ambivalence. Instead, ‘human agency is reduced to domination, while the 
repressed unconscious is linked to emancipation.’28 Additionally, Marcuse 
sees ‘modern man’ as undersexualised as a side-effect of capitalist reality: ‘[M]
an exists only part-time, during the working days, as an alienated instrument 
of alienated performance.’29 Yet, he does not acknowledge how this impacts 
on individual (male) psychology. Marcuse’s theory, then, cannot reconcile 
the social with the psychic, exposing their inherent links. For example, while 
Fanon explores how white sexual and racialised fantasies construe the colonised 
subject, Marcuse’s view of sexuality signifies a bodily energy that once submitted 
to social regulation, enslaves the subject altogether. In neglecting how sexuality 
informs psychic conflict Marcuse is led to theorise this split externally. In the 
next section I will show how in eliding capitalism with patriarchy, Marcuse 
displaces the inherent otherness within the subject externally, exchanging one 
form of domination (the division of labour) with another (gendered inequality). 
7.2 Universalising Alienation, Colonising Diversity: Marcuse, Race, Gender 
and the Postcolonial
In Eros and Civilization, repression is regarded as an inherent property of 
27 Anthony Elliott, Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 
51.
28 Elliott, 51.
29 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 47.
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civilisation with its own anthropological and historical genealogy. Following 
Freud, Marcuse considers that society is troubled by the same ‘archaic mental 
immaturity’ as exemplified by the primal horde hypothesis.30 Marcuse seeks 
to establish a link between individual processes of repression and repression 
enforced by institutions that sustain contemporary post-industrial societies. 
He argues that individual psychology and social repression are effectively 
underpinned by the same structures because it is impossible to isolate the 
individual from its position in the historical trajectory of humanity: ‘individual 
psychology is thus in itself group psychology in so far as the individual itself 
still is in archaic identity with the species.’31 For Marcuse, there is a historical 
continuity between early forms of paternal domination which provide the 
foundation for the ‘mature ego of the civilized personality’ by preserving ‘the 
archaic heritage of man.’32 This is because in preventing the prehistoric band 
of brothers from having sexual relations with his wives and daughters, the 
primal father was the first figure to impose the reality principle over the pleasure 
principle. Marcuse translates Freud’s myth of the primal horde as a struggle 
between the reinstitution of tyrannical fathers—a ruling group that achieves a 
‘lasting satisfaction of their needs […] by repeating, in a new form, the order of 
domination which had controlled pleasure’—and rebellious sons who wish the 
removal of the patriarch.33 
As Robinson explains, Marcuse transforms Freud’s primal myth into a kind 
of ‘capitalist allegory’ where the sons symbolise the unsuccessful proletarian 
revolution. Their guilt is not, as in Freud, a result of their ambivalence for the 
father, but their betrayal to the revolutionary project by perpetuating the father’s 
morality.34 The power of the primal father has been substituted by ‘duly constituted 
authority’ and therefore, his supplanting would not endanger the order and 
values of civilisation because the latter are being safeguarded by institutions.35 
What Marcuse describes as the transition from the paternal ‘despotic monopoly’ 
into contemporary structures of impersonal domination and to the ‘various 
agencies and agents which teach the son to become a mature and restrained 
30 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 60.
31 Marcuse, 56.
32 Marcuse, 58.
33 Marcuse, 64.
34 Paul A. Robinson, The Sexual Radicals: Reich, Róheim, Marcuse (London: Granada Publishing 
Limited, 1972), 156.
35 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 77.
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member of his society,’36 misses Freud’s point about the internalisation of the 
paternal prohibition of incest and cannibalism that institutes the split within 
the subject. Therefore, the psychological preservation of paternal power in the 
subject’s unconscious structures and fantasies becomes, in Marcuse’s rereading of 
the myth, preserved externally. It becomes a patriarchal form of domination. In 
other words, the capability of contemporary patriarchal institutions to regulate 
sexuality is determined by a historical memory: the capacity of the primal father 
to establish his domination by controlling and regulating the sons’ sexuality, and 
the sons’ willingness to give away some of their instinctual wishes for the sake of 
patriarchy’s perpetuation. Ultimately, Marcuse argues that ‘the transformation 
of the pleasure principle into the performance principle, which changes the 
despotic monopoly of the father into restrained educational and economic 
authority, also changes the original object of the struggle: the mother.’37  
This final point seems crucial in unpacking how Marcuse’s psychoanalytic 
theory of social emancipation is implicitly dependent on a gendered and raced 
otherness. For Marcuse, the Oedipal situation is a psychological reproduction of 
the scenario of the primal myth, with one difference: while the father is substituted 
by the son, his power triumphs. Thus, where Freud sees the primal myth as 
instituting a foundational form of guilt within the subject, Marcuse disregards 
this splitting and instead argues that the Oedipus situation actually assures the 
son’s ‘ability to take the father’s place.’38 Marcuse sees the identification between 
the son and the father as dependent on capitalist structures. It is the financial 
compensation that allows him to acquire the father’s place: ‘the institution of 
inheritable private property, and the universalization of labor, give the son a 
justified expectancy of his own sanctioned pleasure in accordance with his 
socially useful performances.’39 Thus ‘the son leaves the patriarchal family and 
sets out to become a father and boss himself.’40 
Significantly, although Marcuse makes the ambivalence towards the father 
disappear, the same does not hold true for the son’s attitude towards the wife—a 
dimension that we do not see in Freud’s reading. In the primal myth, Marcuse 
argues the primal mother represents the undifferentiated nature of the instincts; 
36 Marcuse, 75.
37 Marcuse, 75–76.
38 Marcuse, 75.
39 Marcuse, 75.
40 Marcuse, 75.
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she is ‘Eros and Thanatos in immediate, natural union.’41 The mother is the 
desired object of the son’s wish, which is also a  narcissistic wish since the return 
to her is a return to ‘integral peace […], the absence of all need and desire.’42 
Because the mother becomes the object of prohibition, the son’s sexual objects 
becomes split. ‘Mother and wife were separated, and the fatal identity of Eros 
and Thanatos was thus dissolved.’43 However, what his argument exposes is that 
the separation does not occur between the mother and the wife, but between 
sexual love and affection. ‘[S]exuality and affection are divorced; only later 
they are to meet again in the love to the wife which is sensual as well as tender 
[…].’44 Marcuse’s distinction between the Life and Death instincts with love and 
sexuality respectably, falls apart. His argument could have been that patriarchal 
society creates a split between sexual and affectionate love that allows the son 
to be affectionate with the mother without transgressing a taboo, and to seek a 
sexual partner. But he ends up implying that while the life instinct becomes split 
(so that the son can be both affectionate towards the wife and express his sexual 
wishes) the death instinct remains attached to the mother. Therefore, while the 
figure of the primal father becomes perpetuated through patriarchal power, the 
figure of the primal mother remains confined in representing death. 
Perhaps the taboo on incest was the first great protection against the 
death instinct: the taboo on Nirvana, on the regressive impulse for peace 
which stood in the way of progress, of Life itself.45 
The point here is that Marcuse’s theory depends on the representation of the 
mother as a symbol of a deadly union: the desire to return to her is strong 
because the maternal union promises relief from ambivalence and conflict 
(hence narcissism). The maternal object is also fearful since, in the patriarchal 
imaginary, she represents the collapse of boundaries and the demolition of 
independence. The mother, thus, becomes the necessary excess that unwittingly 
structures male subjectivity. Marcuse’s anti-capitalistic pontification thus seems 
to reflect what feminist critics have stressed, for decades, about the patriarchal 
problem of the mother as a deadly excess. As Jacqueline Rose put it: ‘The message, 
spoken and unspoken is clear: we will not take care of you, or allow you to take 
care of yourself, because part of us wants you out of here, or dead. The visceral 
41 Marcuse, 76.
42 Marcuse, 76.
43 Marcuse, 76.
44 Marcuse, 76.
45 Marcuse, 76.
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fact of motherhood, the fons et origo of our being in the world, is an affront to 
normal—meaning, free of mothers and babies—life.’46 
To better illustrate this point, I argue we need to turn to one of the most 
significant adaptations of Marcuse’s argument by his contemporary and cordial 
friend Norman O. Brown in a book published in 1959 called Life Against Death: 
The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History.47 To be precise, where Brown’s analysis 
significantly differs from Marcuse’s is in arguing that Eros is ‘a desire for union 
(being one) with objects in the world.’48 Brown sees a way out of contemporary 
oppression by thinking about a state of ‘post-ambivalence;’ in other words, the 
achievement of instinctual reconciliation without regressing to an early stage 
where these instincts were undifferentiated—as in a union with the mother. 
For Brown, psychoanalysis demonstrates that ‘mankind will not cease from 
discontent and sickness until the antinomy of economics and love, work and play, 
is overcome.’49 Providing a more careful unpacking of the nature of drives and 
their regulation through culture than Marcuse, Brown argues that ambivalence 
is not inherent but it becomes the ‘distinctive achievement to break apart the 
undifferentiated or dialectical unity of the instincts at the animal level.’50 If 
there is no necessary antithesis between the drives, then it is the task of human 
culture to contain the death instincts within those of the life. Brown recognised 
a ‘repression of death,’ as a cultural tendency to avoid death that indicated an 
incapacity to learn how to grow old, to lose and to die.51 ‘Man who is born of a 
woman and destined to die, is a body, with bodily instincts. Only if Eros—the 
life instinct—can affirm the life of the body can the death instinct affirm death, 
and in affirming death magnify life.’52 
It is remarkable that Brown’s argument enters such pessimist terrains so as to 
call for an embracement of a death culture, as the necessary existential horizon 
that could uplift the individual and ‘magnify life.’53 At the same time, in Brown’s 
46 Jacqueline Rose, Mothers: An Essay on Love and Cruelty (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 
2018), 26.
47 Norman  O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History, 2nd ed. 
(Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1985).
48 Brown, 44.
49 Brown, 53.
50 Brown, 84.
51 Brown, 103–9.
52 Brown, 109.
53 Brown, 109.
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analysis, the mother becomes the par excellence figure of death and the source 
of all psychic conflict for the individual. Echoing Róheim—whom he references 
frequently—Brown invites us to consider the possibility that patriarchal cultural 
structures are established to compensate for the separation from the mother. 
Separating from the mother is, in Brown’s psychological analysis, a process of 
achieving ‘individuality, independence and separateness.’54 Only by figuring 
out a way to remaining differentiated from the mother yet fundamentally 
connected to her—what Brown frames as the ‘post-ambivalence’ state—does 
it become possible to contain the violence of separation. Brown, therefore, 
makes a significant counter-argument to Marcuse’s portrayal of motherhood, by 
outlining that Marcuse’s patriarchal framework is built on the repression of the 
mother.  
These two works allow us to grasp how although the cannibal trope is not 
deployed as the matrix of otherness, yet, the mother becomes the symbol of 
undifferentiated unity that swallows and engulfs the subject. That is to say, 
Marcuse’s distinction between femininity and motherhood can be understood 
on the basis of racial difference: the mother as a threatening and desirable 
figure, as the symbol of death resembles the fantasies surrounding the other as a 
cannibal.  Although Marcuse was a marginal and radical Marxist thinker writing 
from a place of exteriority of mainstream culture and convincingly condemning 
capitalist structures as draining the individual, he uncritically reiterated 
patriarchal views that perpetuate the objectification of female subjectivity. His 
example points out that even if psychoanalytic critiques are produced from the 
margins they are far from free of sexist and racist implications. 
Overall, Marcuse’s work presents important applications of the psychoanalytic 
canon for the deepening of a cultural and political anatomy of oppression. In 
situating the individual experience in a capitalistic system, Marcuse creates 
the opportunity of opening psychoanalysis to interrogation against specific 
power structures such as the division of labour and transforming Freudian 
psychoanalysis into a psychological explanation of how sexual repression is not 
simply a drawback of capitalism, but, actively sustains capitalist domination. 
However, because Marcuse considers sexual difference as presenting an external 
split for the (male) subject, and not a psychological one, his project depends on 
the patriarchal oppression of women and the confinement of the mother in a 
54 Brown, 109.
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place of taboo and death. In the 1950s American society, it seems quite unlikely 
that sexual and gendered difference was the sole source of oppression, given 
the African-American civil rights movements that combated racial segregation 
and discrimination in the years that followed. However, Marcuse’s recognition of 
sexuality as the only site of capitalist oppression can be read, as Daniel Boyarin 
suggests, in the context of a ‘desperate attempt on the part of European Jewish 
refugees to escape the postcolonial subject position.’55 A post-colonial, feminist 
lens to psychoanalysis, then, is exigent not only to acknowledge the discipline’s 
historical affinities with colonialism, but also to maintain the radical openness, 
frictions, tensions and splits of the psychoanalytic subject open for alternative 
political possibilities. 
7.3 Psychoanalysis as Post-Colonial Critique 
So far, I have examined in four separate case studies how psychoanalysts and 
psychoanalytic thinkers until the late 1950s have dealt with the question of the 
cannibal trope. My main aim has been, on the one hand, to investigate why and 
how these thinkers engaged with the colonial smear of cannibalism, while on 
the other hand, to explore the implications of this uneasy engagement for their 
psychoanalytic theorisations of subjectivity. Although, I have also tried to point 
towards the ways by which the deployment of the cannibal trope has efficiently 
contributed to the deconstruction of the European self as coherent, rational, 
civilised, and white; in this final section, I want to evaluate more generally what 
these individual cases have to offer in discussions about using psychoanalysis 
as a political and social critique. More precisely, given that psychoanalysis has 
both perpetuated the imagery of the other as the cannibal and interestingly 
reversed the view of other as cannibal by arguing that it is the European, 
bourgeois psychoanalysable subject which has cannibalistic wishes: what does 
this particular hidden trajectory say about psychoanalysis as a post-colonial 
analytic tool?  
This thesis starts with an outline of how the colonial enterprise has systematically 
produced images and mythologies of the colonised as cannibalistic. Following 
the representation of cannibals in cultural artefacts from the Middle Ages to 
modernity, my aim has been to show that the monstrosity of the colonised has 
55 Daniel Boyarin, “Homophobia and the Postcoloniality of the ‘Jewish Science,’” in Queer 
Theory and the Jewish Question, ed. Daniel Boyarin, Daniel Itzkovitz, and Ann Pellegrini (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 188.
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been not only part of the discourse of bourgeois, middle-class civility as other 
forms of racial representation. But, once we move beyond the apparent ahistoricity 
of the cannibal and follow this figure into the realm of fantasy, an added layer of 
understanding emerges. The cannibal does not merely stand in stark opposition 
to a bourgeois whiteness but also it brings to light particular aspects, desires, and 
fears of the coloniser’s unconscious. For example, as Shakespeare’s Prospero and 
Caliban dyad in The Tempest indicates, the assumption of the inferiority of the 
colonised is an immanent aspect of the European subject who is also constituted 
through colonialism. Additionally, in focusing on cannibalistic fantasies in the 
context of anti-Semitism, I have sought to assert that post-colonial studies often 
neglects full consideration of its racial dimension. The cannibal trope cannot 
be considered as a formulation aimed solely at the colonised people of colour 
in the Southern hemisphere colonies, but it was very much part of European 
modernity as well, as directed at Europe’s ‘inner demons,’ as Norman Cohn has 
shown.56 This is not to imply that the Jewish communities within the European 
Empires were colonised in the same way as the Australian Aborigines were, 
but to highlight a similar theme of relish and repellence, loathing, and desire 
surrounding those social groups which were socially marginalised. In focusing 
strongly on the interconnection between colonial racism and anti-Semitism, my 
aim is to historicise the cannibal trope as the fantasy par excellence accompanying 
the foreign other. 
The history of cannibalism reminds us that the imagery of a destructive appetite 
has been pertinent in the context of capitalist exploitation as well, as Karl 
Marx’s critique demonstrates. Conservative anthropologists were so intent on 
manifesting their greed for profit that they embraced the idea of cannibalism 
as a bourgeois bravado intended to intimidate. Eventually, cannibalism 
became an ingredient of the institutional history of anthropology and haunted 
anthropology until the late 1970s when critics meticulously reviewed the ways 
through which cannibalism had been constructed and sustained as a part of the 
mythology accompanying dehumanisation and colonisation. The implications 
of this colonial mapping for post-colonial studies is that the cannibal trope was 
far from a marginal imagery. Credibly, or not so for Europeans, the cannibal 
trope has popularly accompanied the social and cultural processes that have 
constructed the colonised as a sexualised and monstrous sub-human figure. 
56 Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons: The Demonization of Christians in Medieval 
Christendom, 2nd ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1993).
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Secondly, this mapping makes clear that, despite its anti-capitalist appropriation, 
the cannibal trope is a profoundly racist and conservative imagery. This adds 
to the already existing discomfort between psychoanalysis and post-colonial 
studies. The cannibal becomes enlisted alongside the figure of the primitive and 
the metaphor of the ‘dark continent’ for female sexuality among those features 
that render the representation of non-Western civilisations in psychoanalysis 
problematic. Finally, after the history of the cannibal trope as outlined in the first 
chapter, it should not be possible to consider colonial history without this figure 
whose trajectory and genealogy inevitably feeds into psychoanalysis, and can be 
explored only once psychoanalysis is considered as a discipline emerging within 
the colonial context. 
Freud seemed the obvious place to start investigating how this particular 
aspect of colonial history entered psychoanalysis, not merely because he was 
the originator of psychoanalysis, but because in his work on Totem and Taboo 
Freud interrogated the taboo on cannibalism. Despite psychoanalysis’ focus on 
individuality, Freud’s Totem and Taboo sets an important precedent for works 
thinking about how psychoanalysis has engaged with the non-European. Firstly, 
drawing on colonial anthropology Freud submitted psychoanalysis to a tradition 
that represented the Australian Aboriginal in a way that pathologises him. 
However, when taking into consideration that Freud was writing in response to 
Jung’s psychoanalytic theory and implicit anti-Semitism, it appears that Freud’s 
turn to the fantasy of humanity’s prehistory acquires a different meaning. In 
Totem and Taboo, the role of the primal horde as a fantasy of origins, and as an 
explanation of how the taboo on cannibalism has become socially established, 
has a double function. On the one hand, it aims at universalising the nature of 
unconscious wishes and conflicts. On the other hand, it becomes an attack on 
anti-Semitism within the institutional origins of psychoanalysis. While Freud 
exhibits a desperation to impose on the constructed figure of the primitive a 
cannibalistic tendency, he is mostly concerned with recognising a shared 
savagery repressed in the unconscious structures of both Europeans and non-
Europeans. 
This juxtaposition presents one of the several thorny points of contact between 
psychoanalysis and post-colonial theory. It begs the question of whether 
by comparing the unconscious structures of the Australian Aborigines and 
the European bourgeoisie psychoanalysis is presented as a form of ‘liberal 
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colonialism,’ as post-colonial critics have argued.57 Assuming that the colonised 
subject shares the same unconscious struggles as the coloniser is an  act of 
psychological equality,  which, however at the same time transforms the colonised 
into a psychoanalytic and a psychoanalysable subject, preparing the ground for 
the appropriation of the indigenous in the globalised national citizenship. Thus, 
psychoanalysis advances a particular model of subjectivity that is premised upon 
an excess that is claimed to be universal —an imaginary prehistoric outside 
where humans lived in a state of nature.58 Freud, just as Klein, seems to consider 
cannibalism within a psychoanalytic excess which relates to the origins of the 
subject and of humanity. While, for Freud, cannibalism is the unconscious of 
the social that informs the history of humanity, it is the psychic reality of the 
infant that forms a precipitate of guilt and anxiety in the unconscious for Klein. 
Additionally, their emphasis on bodily drives creates a similar exteriority that is 
not historical but biological.59 For example, one could argue that Klein’s emphasis 
on the death drive as the container of an immanent cannibalistic tendency is a 
form of an excess that is unrelated to culture, and which needs to be left behind 
for subjectivity proper—civilised, reparative, ordinarily depressed—to emerge. 
As Klein after him, Freud did not write about the colonised subject, but used 
the fantasy of a primitive and cannibalistic exteriority to describe the European 
bourgeois subject. It is because their theories depend on this exteriority that 
the representation of the colonised subject becomes a problem which neither of 
them can solve.
Nevertheless, to see their developmental accounts as discourses in which the 
subject harmoniously progresses by leaving something distasteful behind would 
be to miss the point of their contribution in the question of cannibalism, and as 
a result, to miss a politically poignant issue buried in the troublesome historical 
engagement of psychoanalysis and colonialism. For example, Freud argues 
that the European coloniser is no less cannibalistic than the Aborigines. This 
juxtaposition is neither on the basis of a biological similarity nor of a cultural 
57 Warwick Anderson, Deborah Jenson, and Richard C. Keller, Unconscious Dominions: 
Psychoanalysis, Colonial Trauma, and Global Sovereignties (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2011), 2.
58 This term is used here echoing Thomas Hobbes’ definition of the pre-state living conditions. 
Hobbes believed that the emergence of the state puts an end to an anarchic form of collective life 
where man’s aggression presents a threat to other men. By conveying their sovereignty into the 
state, which regulates, punishes and imposes the law, men could also achieve protection from one 
another. Hobbes’ theory is considered the foundation of theories of liberal statehood. Please see: 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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one, but psychological. For Freud, Christianity, like other totemic religions 
has failed to successfully repress humanity’s cannibalistic past and depends 
on forgiveness and redemption from the ritual of collective partaking. Freud 
makes it impossible to consider that cultural and religious structures leave the 
subject unaltered, and at the same time he makes it hard to sustain the colonial 
dichotomy between racialised black and white subjects, once seen from a 
psychological point of view, this distinction is made to fall apart. 
Similarly, in Klein’s developmental account any attempt at achieving the 
racialised position of whiteness is disrupted by the immense destructiveness 
of the unconscious forces with which she has equipped subjectivity. But where 
Klein’s theory becomes more interesting, and perhaps more relevant for post-
colonial studies, is in her accounts of gendered subjectivity. Klein on the one 
hand, theorises a colonial white male subject as one that becomes an impossibility 
or a utopian fantasy. On the other hand, Klein’s idealism is juxtaposed with a 
misogyny demonstrated in her theorisation of the female subject who, caught 
in a developmental threshold, is constantly undone by her own cannibalistic 
wishes. Klein’s theory unwittingly shows that it is impossible to construct an 
account of the psychoanalytic subject without it being undone by the radical 
contradictions and dichotomies that dominated the world of colonial Britain. 
Her theory exemplifies how within a colonial framework theorising a coherent 
subject that can repair—such as the hegemonic white male—results in idealism 
and normativity. Conceptualising a vulnerable and constantly undone subject 
results in pathology and sexism. After Klein’s psychoanalysis, one could go as 
far as to argue that it becomes impossible to consider social change without 
being aware of how the inherent contradictions and incompatibility of 
colonial dichotomies, translated in the subject’s psychology, actually foreclose 
any possibility to think beyond them. In a sense, Klein’s failure to theorise a 
psychoanalytic subject without avoiding idealism or pathology should become 
acknowledged as the limitation of colonial psychic realities. 
Unlike Freud and Klein, Róheim came in direct contact with so-called cannibals 
and tried to apply the psychoanalytic theory of the subject to the Australian 
Aborigines. Indeed, Róheim’s work seems to directly address the question of 
possibility for psychoanalysis to become of any use in non-European contexts, 
given its claims to universality. Róheim’s work is particularly interesting with 
regards to his treatment of aboriginal cannibalism. Contrary to anthropologists 
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of his time, Róheim, although he subscribed to the mythology of aboriginal 
mothers as cannibals, nevertheless did not regard it as a side-effect of racial 
difference but as a symptom of the mother’s difficulty in separating from her baby. 
Thought this way, Róheim’s explanation of maternal cannibalism could even be 
regarded as a humanising explanation and a normalisation of maternal anxieties, 
if this was not accompanied by a profound blindness and neglect towards the 
colonial living conditions of extreme deprivation and humiliation. To put it 
differently, through his psychoanalytic education Róheim was not immediately 
judgmental about aboriginal women as his contemporary anthropologists and 
psychologists in the area were. Paradoxically, he used the wider frame of ethics 
and norms that psychoanalysis possesses and explained why these women might 
eat their babies instead of a priori dehumanising them. However, Róheim’s non-
judgmental disposition is both sympathetic and borderline problematic because 
it is politically uncritical. While Róheim’s theory could genuinely open a debate 
about what exactly is wrong with the cannibalistic practices of the colonised—if 
not that this is a constructed imagery, a form of colonial propaganda, on behalf 
of the coloniser—by failing to extend his focus onto the colonial context, he 
presents psychoanalysis as complicit in the reproduction of the imagery of 
cannibalism. Only that this time the colonial imagery of aboriginal cannibalism 
is considered to be rooted in the black mother’s unconscious as well. Like Freud 
and Klein, Róheim’s ideas are based upon the necessity to expel or project 
cannibalism upon an exteriority—in this case the aboriginal woman which does 
not become theorised in her own terms. However, Róheim also insists that we 
should not fail to acknowledge that it is the separation from the mother that 
profoundly shapes not only the subject, but the culture too. It is psychoanalysis’ 
task to highlight that Western culture depends on the repression of the vital 
role of the mother and as a result it informs masculinity and aggression as well. 
Ironically, Róheim fails to acknowledge how his own theory does the same to the 
mother of colour.  
What runs through all these three cases is on the one hand the silencing and 
racialisation of white women and women of colour, and on the other hand, a 
radical challenge on the one who has the monopoly of savagery and cannibalism. 
If as Mrinalini Greedharry puts it ‘the aim of postcolonial critique is to 
understand how colonizers attempted to secure their authority through their 
representations of the colonized and how their efforts always failed to function 
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perfectly,’60 psychoanalysis can take us towards this direction: colonialism—and 
by extension, psychoanalysis as a colonial discourse—was secured by exclusions 
from the psychoanalytic hegemonic discourse of figures and spaces feminised 
and racialised (as in Freud’s primal horde, Klein’s pre-Oedipal cannibalistic, and 
Róheim’s aboriginal mothers) and on the other hand, these exclusions failed to 
function properly because psychoanalysis claimed them to be a part of individual, 
social, and cultural histories. In other words, psychoanalysis as a social critique 
is particularly useful when it attributes to the hegemonic colonising subject what 
appears otherwise entirely disconnected and accordingly irrelevant from it. 
Nevertheless, it is not until Frantz Fanon’s rereading of psychoanalysis that the 
possibility fully arises of using it for analysing the colonial situation despite its 
racist libel. More precisely, Fanon reads cannibalism not as a natural, instinctual 
inclination of the hegemonic subject, but as a racialised phobia of the coloniser. 
In doing so, Fanon has enriched the psychoanalytic understanding of colonial 
racism from drive to desire—from the claim that the hegemonic colonial subject 
is undermined by cannibalistic wishes to the claim that the coloniser’s desire is 
to eat the colonised. In other words, Fanon moves psychoanalysis away from 
a drive theory into a theory based on the recognition of how it is impossible 
to explain psychological phenomena without taking into consideration the 
impact of the social world.61 Hence, Fanon showed that the Oedipus complex 
cannot account for racialised phobias, precisely because it does not account for 
racial difference. Fanon explained that latent homosexual feelings towards the 
white father repressed in colonial, hegemonic culture seek expression in the 
objectifying representations of the black man as a cannibal.
In Fanon’s hands, psychoanalysis becomes a significant tool for analysing the 
material effects of racism but also a profoundly elliptical discourse which 
alongside colonialism makes no room for theorising the colonised in their own 
terms. More crucially, Fanon shows that the subject of colour does not share the 
same degree of alienation as the white subject. He argues that, on the one hand, 
there is the fundamental alienation that is created by having an unconscious 
mind, and on the other hand, there is a socially imposed form of alienation that 
is caused by having a body embedded in a racist culture. By introducing the body 
as a threshold between psychic, internal space, and external social contact, Fanon 
60 Mrinalini Greedharry, Postcolonial Theory and Psychoanalysis: From Uneasy Engagements to 
Effective Critique (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 141.
61 Fuss, Identification Papers, 165.
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has invited us to think that it is impossible for psychoanalysis to claim a critical 
perspective without acknowledging how domination succeeds because one has a 
body. Through Fanon, the relationship between psychoanalytic and post-colonial 
theory is initiated as one of disjuncture or aporia: psychoanalysis emphasises 
interiority, post-colonial theory invites us to think about the role of the body. 
Besides, it has erased the psychological mark of racial difference and has produced 
subtle racialising developmental accounts. Furthermore, psychoanalysis has 
endorsed the view that cannibals have existed among the colonised cultures and 
in humanity’s prehistory, and it has also situated cannibalism as a constitutional 
wish of the white bourgeois subject. It is this tension ‘adroitly performing its 
double act as colonial legacy and postcolonial critique,’62 this impossibility to 
pin psychoanalysis into a particular political discourse that is perhaps its most 
important contribution. Instead of trying to avoid this, I have aimed at keeping 
it alive. This should not be translated as an avoidance over choosing a side—
namely on whether the cannibal trope eventually produces a narrative about 
psychoanalysis as a conservative or radical discipline. Rather, it should point to 
how psychoanalysis offers a different historical paradigm for the kind of social 
critique a marginal discipline can offer.
7.4 On Limits and Limitations
7.4.1 Method 
Throughout this thesis, my aim has been to explore the ambivalent engagements 
of psychoanalysis with questions of ‘race’ and racial difference by considering 
the yet unacknowledged colonial legacy of the cannibal trope entrenched 
in the psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity. To approach this question, it is 
necessary that the scope of the research be restricted to the analysis of four case-
studies: Freud, Klein, Róheim, and Fanon. While I do not claim that these cases 
represent the whole of psychoanalytic tradition, they carry significant trends 
that deepen the interrogation of psychoanalysis’ colonial history, and in this 
sense, they are exemplary. There are certainly other ways this research question 
could have been approached, for example, by including more case-studies, or by 
extending beyond the 1960s to include contemporary perspectives on race in 
psychoanalysis. However, in choosing neither of the two options, the limits of 
62 Anderson, Jenson, and Keller, Unconscious Dominions: Psychoanalysis, Colonial Trauma, and 
Global Sovereignties, 17.
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this project have turned into something productive. By focusing on Freud and 
Klein I have shown that the colonial question lies at the heart of two fundamental 
schools of psychoanalysis. They are both pioneering representatives in separate 
traditions. Even though Klein differentiated herself from Freud, their theoretical 
affinity is strong. Additionally, I have chosen not to discuss the independent 
psychoanalytic tradition as epitomised in the work of Donald Winnicott. While 
there is significant emphasis on orality, and a stark affirmation of the mother’s wish 
to eat her baby in Winnicott’s famous paper ‘Hate in the Countertransference,’63 
I would suggest that these traces rather indicate the strength of the colonial 
inheritance of psychoanalytic fantasies about the mother-infant relationship 
and reinforce the argument of examining the early histories of psychoanalysis. 
Finally, focusing on Freud and Klein has allowed me to identify the role of 
drive theory and the associations between development and ‘savagery’ as the 
primary sites and concepts in psychoanalytic theory that are mostly dependent 
on colonial dichotomies. 
Despite being less well known than Freud and Klein, Géza Róheim played 
an important role in the history of psychoanalysis, having been the first 
anthropologically trained psychoanalyst. Róheim’s case has helped me examine 
in depth and in all its complexity the first ever psychoanalytic intervention in 
a British colony. Nevertheless, while Róheim attempts to adapt psychoanalysis 
in the colonial situation, it is not until Frantz Fanon’s work that a significant 
decolonial impetus becomes clearly articulated, and attributes to race a 
prominent place in the formation of subjectivity. Furthermore, in limiting the 
project to the temporal scope of five decades, my intention is not to imply that 
the employment of the cannibal trope ceased in the psychoanalytic imaginary 
after the 1960s.64 Rather, this limit emphasises that the scope of this research has 
been to explore the cannibal trope within the historical and social conditions 
that produced and fostered it, and not to trace its genealogy and inheritance in 
either post-Freudian, or post-Kleinian, or post-Fanonian traditions. 
63 In the eighteen reasons Winnicott offers for a mother to hate her baby, one reads: ‘He excites 
her but frustrates—she mustn’t eat him or trade in sex with him.’ D.W. Winnicott, “Hate in the 
Counter-Transference,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 30 (1949): 69–74.
64 In fact, there are instances where it can be encountered long after the collapse of colonial 
structures, as in Julia Kristeva’s work on female melancholia. In this case, it is not the psychoanalyst 
who conceptualises melancholia as modelled on a symbolic eating but it is the patient who brings 
this theme through a dream. It is remarkable that the racial dimension remains unaddressed in 
the text, and the trope is only explored in relation to female aggression  and desire towards the 
mother. Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, European 
Perspectives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
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What is more, situating my research question in the decades prior to the collapse 
of the colonial project has allowed me to isolate psychoanalysis, and study it 
within the scope of its historical focus. My aim has been to put emphasis on 
the critical intervention of psychoanalysis which, whilst not being able to 
speak about the colonised, has nonetheless consistently deconstructed the 
technologies of hegemony of the white coloniser from a psychological point of 
view. The historical situation aids this research in one more way: it demonstrates 
that a significant aspect of psychoanalysis’ early decades is yet to be explored. 
The absence of race from the analytic lexicon until Fanon should be treated 
as symptomatic of colonialism rather than an indication of resistance, or an 
accidental omission. 
Speaking about how race has been featured historically in psychoanalysis, I would 
like to reflect on my explicit focus on the cannibal trope as opposed to savagery, 
barbarism and primitivity—which are all overlapping categories used to erect 
the superiority of white civilisation. First of all, choosing cannibalism has not 
been an easy decision. This is not merely because of the embarrassment that any 
interest in unpacking this fantasy creates for any researcher who has a social life. 
By focusing on cannibalism, I acknowledge that there is a rich and imaginative 
racist arsenal that supported the formation of European identities against 
indigenous cultures that are yet to be further explored. The impetus behind the 
consolidation of this choice has been twofold: firstly, the embarrassment caused 
by the assertion that the cannibal trope has been deployed, albeit marginally, by 
psychoanalysis makes imperative the development of a decolonial perspective. 
Secondly, contrary to other forms of designating a lack of civility (primitivity, 
savagery, and barbarism), the cannibal trope demonstrates fear, repulsion, 
and desire. As Maggie Kilgour has shown, in the most extensive and thorough 
anatomy of the power of this concept,65 cannibalism encloses the need for 
oneness, unity, fusion, and the collapse of boundaries. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that historically it has proved ripe for psychoanalytic use and analysis.
 7.4.2 Clinical Implications
Although this thesis does not claim a place aside literature that engages with 
psychoanalysis as a therapeutic method, it is neither indifferent nor irrelevant 
to the implications that it may have in clinical practice. Since the era of the 
65 Maggie Kilgour, From Communion to Cannibalism: An Anatomy of Metaphors of 
Incorporation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).
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first generation of psychoanalysts, significant shifts have taken place in the 
establishment of the analytic relationship. The counter-transference, as the 
emotional response invoked in the analyst by the patient is no longer believed 
to contaminate or hamper the process, just like the psychoanalyst is no longer 
recognised as an objective observer or the container of the analysand’s knowledge 
of herself but a co-author and a ‘socially positioned interlocutor.’66 Despite the 
clinical advancements, a great deal of psychoanalysis’ colonialist and racist 
tentacles, as this project has tried to stress, still remains hidden and unexplored. 
Missing the historical specificity of psychoanalysis as a science of the human 
mind threatens to perpetuate colonial forms of violence and inequality, and 
to haunt the psychoanalytic canon inside as much as outside the clinic in very 
concrete ways. 
As suggested by the discussion of Klein’s appropriation of the cannibal trope 
in Chapter Four, key terms of the psychoanalytic lexicon which still entertain 
a theoretical and clinical longevity, such as the paranoid-schizoid and the 
depressive position, have been forged through colonial contexts. As a result, these 
concepts enclose the affective realm of coloniality, and they invoke imageries 
that have their historical origins in a racially codified regime. As Ranjana 
Khanna has argued—following Fanon—this regime is articulated in terms of 
visuality, or what she calls ‘whiting out […] and coloring in.’67 Psychoanalysis, 
as a theory of subjectivity and a therapeutic practice, relies on terms that bear 
whiteness as an implicit developmental achievement. A full acknowledgment 
of how these psychoanalytic ideas are immersed in colonialist imageries would 
have significant implications on how the psychoanalytic subject is construed 
and, what the aim of analysis is. 
Moreover, once the question of a decolonial perspective on psychoanalytic theory 
is raised then the politics of psychoanalysis as a clinical practice need to become 
scrutinised. Following Juliet Mitchell’s interrogation of psychoanalysis from a 
feminist perspective, it follows that feminism is not about the analyst’s politics 
but about how gender, and I would add, race are being experienced as traumatic 
forms of identification, and what their relevance to the clinical relationship 
66 Celia Brickman, Aboriginal Populations in the Mind (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2003), 201.
67 Ranjana Khanna, Dark Continents: Psychoanalysis and Colonialism (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2003), 162.
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is.68 Does ‘race’ feature in the analytic relationship? Does it affect transference? 
How and in what ways is whiteness, as a socially privileged form of racial 
identification in ethnically diverse metropoles pertinent to the psychoanalytic 
interrogation of individual formation? These are the kinds of questions that this 
project puts forward in relation to clinical practice. It is only by recognising the 
possibility that psychoanalysis has disavowed ethnic differences and in doing so 
it has participated in the globalisation of European hegemony, that its clinical 
practice can become transformed into a site where these colonial dynamics are 
withdrawn and allow the space for cosmopolitan psychoanalytic subjectivities 
to emerge.
7.5 Concluding Note
This thesis contributes to the literature on psychoanalytic thought by offering 
a unique account of how psychoanalysts have unwittingly partaken of colonial 
fantasies about ‘racial’ otherness. By exploring the traces of a racist fantasy as 
embedded in the psychoanalytic subject, I have exposed how psychoanalysis 
vacillates between colonial and post-colonial tensions; between radical 
contributions about subjectivity and oppressive silences and erasures of other 
forms of subjectivity, between deconstructionist approaches to whiteness and 
the portrayals of development as a process away from blackness. Race, I have 
shown, is a socially constructed category that in the colonial milieu was the 
main lens of demarcating and dehumanising individuals, and therefore ensuring 
colonial hegemony. I have exposed a fundamental tension that runs through 
the psychoanalytic texts of Freud and Klein, which becomes transmitted to 
post-Freudian critics and colonial disputants. This tension is that although 
psychoanalysis has radically reconsidered what being a (psychoanalysable) 
subject means—being troubled by inherent contradictions, unreasonable desires, 
irrational fears, splits, past memories and so on—the language and imageries 
accompanying the construction of this subject has been strongly dependent on 
colonial assumptions around whiteness as having the monopoly of humanness. 
I have demonstrated how the unconscious fantasies that shape psychoanalytic 
theorisation are drawn from the unacknowledged forms of colonial oppression, 
and especially from the refusal of psychoanalysis to consider the question of 
race. This means that psychoanalysis has never been free from or outside 
of politics, and especially, as I argue in this thesis, from colonialist and racist 
68 Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical Reassessment of Freudian Psychoanalysis. 
New York: Basic Books, 2000. 
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discourses. Rather, as the unusual, uncomfortable and anachronistic angle of the 
cannibal trope has allowed me to illustrate, psychoanalytic theorising has made a 
substantial use of a racialised, subhuman figure in the course of the portrayal and 
analysis of psychoanalytic concepts such as the subject’s development, the role 
of the mother, the aim of drives, the tensions underlying the Oedipus complex, 
the paternal identification and finally, the colonial unconscious and memory. 
The colonial psychoanalytic subject either inherits cannibalistic drives that mark 
the immeasurable incivility of the developmentally ‘primitive’, or is persecuted 
sometimes by cannibals who eat their enemies, sometimes by mothers who eat 
their children. I believe that the narratives of the cannibal trope as historicised 
and contextualised in this thesis mark a significant development in understanding 
the history of psychoanalysis as a discipline with an unconscious structure and 
fantasies that have not been addressed until now. 
Furthermore, in exploring the historical, intellectual and disciplinary past of 
psychoanalysis I have found that psychoanalytic theorising produced from the 
site of the colony (Australia and Algeria) is plagued by similar racist and sexist 
fantasies as the kind of theorising produced in European metropoles (Vienna 
and London). Moving towards the margins, then, does not necessarily entail that 
race and sexuality become more critically defined.69 As Fanon’s case illustrates, 
even though the cannibal trope has been directly addressed and associated with 
European fantasies, Fanon did not avoid pathologising and problematising racist 
masculinity by feminising it (namely arguing that the ‘Negrophobe’ is a closeted 
homosexual). Similarly, Marcuse’s case bolstered the argument that the marginal 
European discourses (in this case Marxism) are equally permeated by implicit 
racialised formulations. This marks the need for critical, post-colonial, feminist 
approaches to psychoanalysis if the colonial inheritance is to be addressed in its 
entirety. 
Overall, this thesis has aimed to make the intellectual histories of psychoanalysis 
more post-colonial; namely to identify and expose those traces, nodal points 
and gaps in the psychoanalytic discourse that racialise and sexualise the 
psychoanalytic subject. The most significant problem is that of the essentialism 
of the body. I have argued that unless psychoanalysis is made aware of its own 
enclosed colonial assumptions surrounding the body as naturally, biologically 
or essentially constructed, it runs the risk of sustaining racism and perpetuating 
69 I have to thank Dr Magda Schmukalla for pointing this out to me.  
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discriminations. Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature by offering a 
new, psychosocial perspective to old ideas—defined by the erasure of race and 
racial difference. My contribution has been to show that psychoanalysis contains 
the discursive framework that allows us to challenge, deconstruct and critique 
racism by offering access to what the discourse of race seeks to conceal. 
The tension I have created by bringing the cannibal trope and psychoanalysis 
together has provided me with the ground for a dynamic discussion between 
the social and psychological regimes that cannot be studied in isolation. Neither 
can the clinical, individual realm remain intact from the social surroundings, 
hegemonic discourses, collective traumas, prejudices and so on. In fact, it is in 
those instances where psychoanalysis uncritically and unreflectively claims the 
authority of knowledge over the European subject’s impulses, the infant’s fantasies 
and the colonial unconscious that the fundamental openness of psychoanalysis 
becomes compromised. The designations of unimaginable incivility, as the 
cannibal trope conveys, exemplify such an instance where the psychoanalytic 
discourse crosses paths with socio-political certainties. This project, by pointing 
to racialised margins of psychoanalysis has tried to emphasise the need to 
maintain a critical, post-colonial, feminist and decolonial perspective towards 
psychoanalysis. Acknowledging psychoanalysis’ colonial past and the ways it has 
shaped racial and sexual fantasies about otherness, is the only way to put its racist 
baggage to rest and allow the room for more global, cosmopolitan, democratic 
psychoanalytic subjects to emerge. 
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Coda: Is Eating People Wrong?70
The impetus for this project came out of a melange of experiences with 
psychoanalysis: a popular villain psychoanalyst, the unexplored archive of 
cannibalistic tropes in the psychoanalytic canon and my own anxieties and 
fears from being a psychoanalytic patient. One of the greatest challenges for me 
throughout has been how to combine the experience of being in psychoanalysis 
with the intellectual task of critiquing psychoanalysis. The figure of Hannibal 
Lecter, which I find both threatening and alluring, exposed a fundamental fear 
that being in analysis had evoked for me: that of becoming consumed, altered, 
tainted, divested of the very core of my ‘identity.’ Slavoj Žižek highlights this 
point in relation to what the figure of Hannibal Lecter discloses about (Lacanian) 
psychoanalysis, arguing that Lecter condenses the violence of the psychoanalytic 
demand for the patient: to offer the analyst ‘what we consider most precious 
in ourselves, denouncing it as a mere semblance.’71 For Žižek psychoanalysis 
is established on an exchange, like the ‘quid pro quo’ request Hannibal Lecter 
makes to Clarise Starling. Confiding her childhood dreams to him is the price 
he asks for assisting her FBI investigation. Žižek concludes ‘Lecter is not cruel 
enough to be a Lacanian analyst: in psychoanalysis we must pay the analyst to 
allow us to offer our Dasein on a plate.’72 Žižek’s criticism demonstrates on the 
one hand that psychoanalysis is at its core a financial exchange that aims to shift 
or resituate the subject in relation to ‘being’ and identity, by ruminating on them 
and offering them back to the analysand as intangible fantasies, immaterial 
imaginings about one’s self making the subject ‘more pliable, more supple, more 
flexible, more agile, and more delicious.’73 This is what Žižek, echoing a Lacanian 
framework, calls ‘mere semblance,’ or what Freud tried to demonstrate through 
affirming an ‘unconscious’ part of the mind. Apart from inaugurating a debate 
about the relationship between psychoanalysis, neoliberalism and class that 
would require a whole new project, Žižek’s cynicism also allows us to witness 
the modesty of the psychoanalytic task when brought down to its basic elements. 
70 I have borrowed this title from Malcolm Bradbury’s 1959 novel ‘Eating People is Wrong’ which 
comically deals with the tensions between social change, liberalism, the post-imperial and post-
war frustrations of the 1950s. The didactic claim that ‘eating people is wrong’ seems to mark in 
the novel, the impossibility of withdrawing from a hostile and antagonistic positionality to one 
that fosters tolerance and open-mindedness against otherness. Malcolm Bradbury, Eating People 
is Wrong, (London: Picador, 2012[1959]).     
71 Slavoj Žižek, Interrogating the Real, ed. Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, 3rd ed. (London: 
Continuum, 2010), 179.
72 Žižek, 179–80. Emphasis in the original
73 Winograd, Black Psychoanalysts Speak.
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While reflecting on what a feminist approach to psychoanalysis could be, 
Elizabeth Abel argued that it seems easier to either adopt a polemical stance 
against psychoanalysis or to become too invested in it, instead of staying with its 
contradictions, ambiguities, foreclosures, tensions and evasions: 
It is too early for feminism to foreclose on psychoanalysis. Vast cultural 
terrains unfold beyond the boundaries of this essay and beyond those 
of psychoanalysis as well, undoubtedly. But rather than fixing those 
boundaries, my goal has been to forestall the sense that we know exactly 
where they lie and what they necessarily exclude. Psychoanalysis has been 
resistant to the social, but it need not always, uniformly, be. It is better for 
feminism to challenge that resistance than to renounce psychoanalysis 
entirely or succumb to its seductions.74  
Abel exposes an over-investment in the expectations of psychoanalysis, as if, as 
Jacqueline Rose suggests, there is a demand (and a subsequent disappointment) 
for a theory that can explain subordination ‘across specific cultures and different 
historical moments.’75 It is easy to idealise psychoanalysis, almost as easy it is 
to cannibalise it; to devour and destroy it, to dismiss it due to its patriarchal 
misogyny and homophobia, to sweep away the entirety of its historical and 
intellectual contributions on the grounds of its racism. 
While I am aware that pairing psychoanalysis with the cannibal trope has in no 
way been a compliment, my project has not been a polemic. My intention has 
been to demonstrate that psychoanalysis is just one theory about the subject that 
cannot be studied separately from the social, historical and colonial conditions 
that made it emerge in the first place. Psychoanalysis tends to become fetishised 
as a master discourse and a hegemonic form of knowledge about subjectivity; 
its conceptual and intellectual absurdities become worshipped. Drawing the 
historical limits of my study in the decolonising moment of the 1960s, I have 
aimed to illustrate the impact of social imageries in psychoanalytic theorising in 
their entirety. Moreover, through its invitation to think humbly about theory, the 
locus of the ‘psychosocial’ has offered me a grounding from where to establish a 
critical distance from psychoanalysis, whilst remaining a close and sympathetic 
ally to its project. In a playful analogy, I believe that this is the meaning of the 
74 Elizabeth Abel, “Race, Class, and Psychoanalysis? Opening Questions,” in Feminist Social 
Thought: A Reader, Philosophy, Women’s Studies, Politics (Hove: Psychology Press, 1997), 194. 
My emphasis. 
75 Jacqueline Rose, “Femininity and Its Discontents,” Feminist Review, Palgrave Macmillan 
Journals, 80, no. Reflections on 25 Years (2005): 25.
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‘psychosocial’ per se: to make psychoanalysis a ‘semblance,’ to de-essentialise it, 
to illustrate its unconscious and to make it like the psychoanalytic subject: ‘more 
pliable, more supple, more flexible, more agile, and more delicious.’
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